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THE FRACKING REVOLUTION: SHALE GAS AS A CASE 
STUDY IN INNOVATION POLICY 
John M. Golden∗ 
Hannah J. Wiseman∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The early twenty-first century has witnessed a boom in oil and natural gas 
production that promises to turn the United States into a new form of 
petrostate. This boom raises various questions that scholars have begun to 
explore, including questions of risk governance, federalism, and export policy. 
Relatively neglected, however, have been questions of why the technological 
revolution behind the boom occurred and what this revolution teaches about 
innovation theory and policy. The boom in U.S. shale gas production reflected 
long-gestating infrastructure developments, a convergence of technological 
advances, government-sponsored research and development, the presence or 
absence of intellectual property rights, rights in tangible assets such as land 
and minerals, and tax and regulatory relief. Consequently, the story behind the 
boom reaches far beyond the risk-taking and persistence of George Mitchell, 
whose independent production company achieved pioneering success with 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in Texas’ Barnett Shale. Indeed, the broader 
story demonstrates how a blend of distinct policy levers, reasonably adjusted 
over time, can combine to foster a diverse innovation ecosystem that provides 
a robust platform for game-changing innovation. As exemplified by this story, 
the centrality of other policy levers can mean that patents play only a modest 
role, even in spurring technological development by profit-driven private 
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players. Other lessons drawn from this case study include “negative lessons” 
about the possibility and even likelihood of downsides of a technological boom 
or the policies used to promote it—for example, environmental damage that 
more careful regulation of a developing technology such as fracking might 
have avoided. Anticipatory and continuing attention to such potential 
downsides can help prevent innovation-promoting policies from becoming 
“sticky” in a way that undercuts innovation’s promise and popular appeal. 
Such lessons can helpfully inform efforts either to extend the United States’ 
“fracking revolution” abroad or to develop other potentially revolutionary 
technologies such as those associated with renewable energy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Innovations in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (often 
collectively referred to as “fracking”)1 have produced a technological 
revolution in natural gas and oil extraction. The United States, the world leader 
in these technologies’ development and exploitation, has suddenly returned to 
the role of energy-producing superpower.2 Cheaper and more stably priced 
natural gas, commonly derived from underground shale formations, has 
promised to provide a long-lasting boost to a flagging U.S. economy,3 even 
aiding in a revival of U.S.-based manufacturing.4 Both positive and negative 
spillover effects associated with the boom in use of new extraction 
technologies—spillovers that range from the economic to the environmental or 
political5—promise to reach not only across the United States’ continental  
 
 
 1 There is debate over whether the abbreviated form of “hydraulic fracturing” should be “fracing” or 
“fraccing,” rather than “fracking,” with the latter form often being associated with more negative views of 
hydraulic fracturing as a social practice. RUSSELL GOLD, THE BOOM: HOW FRACKING IGNITED THE AMERICAN 
ENERGY REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE WORLD 297 (2014). In using “fracking,” we do not mean to take 
sides in debates over hydraulic fracturing’s overall social benefits but instead follow what we believe to be the 
more dominant popular spelling as well as a spelling that seems to best signal how the term is pronounced. See 
id. at 297 n.* (explaining that the book employs “the spelling frack and fracking” because “they are the 
preferred spelling of the Wall Street Journal and other major newspapers” and because “the spelling fraced 
simply doesn’t convey the clipped cadence of the word as it is pronounced by opponents and engineers”); see 
also GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE FRACKERS: THE OUTRAGEOUS INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW BILLIONAIRE 
WILDCATTERS 27 (2013) (explaining that industry initially called the technique “hydraulic fracturing” or 
“fraccing” and that “from the beginning industry members detested the word” fracking, and accused 
environmental groups of coining the term to imply negative impacts of the practice, but noting that the term 
originated in Battlestar Galactica). 
 2 See U.S. Expected to Be Largest Producer of Petroleum and Natural Gas Hydrocarbons in 2013, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13251. 
 3 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 1 
(2014), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er%282014%29.pdf (“Ongoing improvements in 
advanced technologies for crude oil and natural gas production continue to lift domestic supply and reshape 
the U.S. energy economy.”). 
 4 ALAN KRUPNICK, ZHONGMIN WANG & YUSHUANG WANG, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, SECTOR EFFECTS OF 
THE SHALE GAS REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 36–39 (2013), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-
DP-13-21.pdf (exploring the impacts of domestic shale gas production on the manufacturing sector and 
projecting that “[a]n expansion in the production capacity of ethylene will probably boost production in a wide 
variety of manufacturing industries”); AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, SHALE GAS, COMPETITIVENESS, AND NEW 
US CHEMICAL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON ANNOUNCED PROJECTS 27 (2013), 
http://chemistrytoenergy.com/sites/chemistrytoenergy.com/files/shale-gas-full-study.pdf (noting that “renewed 
competitiveness from shale gas is already occurring,” creating an estimated $2.2 billion in added value in 
2012). 
 5 For discussions of these effects, see, inter alia, the following sources: Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants, Endangered Species Status for Diamond Darter, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,074 (July 26, 2013) 
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breadth but around the globe.6 
The technological revolution that preceded this U.S.-centered oil and gas 
boom represents a massive burst of innovation that could hold lessons for 
further technological development, including additional energy 
transformations. The revolution reflects a classic disruptive innovation, 
potentially the very kind of innovation that government policy should most 
look to foster. Yet few scholars have explored why this innovation occurred, or 
how the story behind the fracking revolution comports with or departs from 
dominant innovation theory. This Article examines the public policies, 
economic forces, and private initiatives that helped produce the fracking 
revolution, focusing on the development of shale gas extraction in particular. 
The Article primarily concentrates on developments leading to the revolution, 
including decades of work that preceded late-twentieth century breakthroughs. 
But the Article also gives some attention to the post-breakthrough diffusion of 
new extraction technologies and difficulties encountered as use of those 
technologies has become widespread. 
 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2014)) (describing a species in the Marcellus Shale area that has become 
endangered in a final rule issued by the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service); TIMOTHY W. 
KELSEY ET AL., MARCELLUS SHALE EDUC. & TRAINING CTR., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MARCELLUS SHALE IN 
PENNSYLVANIA: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME IN 2009, at 5 (2011), http://www.shaletec.org/docs/ 
EconomicImpactFINALAugust28.pdf (exploring positive economic benefits); KENNETH B. MEDLOCK III, AMY 
MYERS JAFFE & PETER R. HARTLEY, JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, RICE UNIV., SHALE GAS AND 
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 13 (2011), http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/ccecf6b6/EF-pub-DOE 
ShaleGas-07192011.pdf (describing many positive economic and security-based impacts); WILLISTON ECON. 
DEV., WILLISTON IMPACT STATEMENT 2014, at 1, 28 (2014), http://www.willistondevelopment.com/usrimages/ 
Williston_Impact_Statement.pdf (describing local infrastructural and service-based impacts as well as tax 
revenues); Cliff Frohlich et al., The Dallas–Fort Worth Earthquake Sequence: October 2008 Through May 
2009, 101 BULL. SEISMOLOGICAL SOC’Y AM. 327 (2011) (describing small earthquakes possibly induced by 
the disposal of liquid oil and gas wastes from the Barnett Shale); Michelle L. Hladik, Michael J. Focazio & 
Mark Engle, Discharges of Produced Waters from Oil and Gas Extraction via Wastewater Treatment Plants 
Are Sources of Disinfection By-Products to Receiving Streams, 466–467 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 1085, 1092 (2014); 
Brian G. Rahm & Susan J. Riha, Toward Strategic Management of Shale Gas Development: Regional, 
Collective Impacts on Water Resources, 17 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 12, 15 (2012) (describing water quality and 
quantity impacts); Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 
733–34 (2013) (describing many of the impacts based on state enforcement of oil and gas regulations at 
unconventional well sites). 
 6 See generally GOLD, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that, from the U.S. perspective, hydraulic fracturing “is 
providing an abundance of domestic energy, helping to drive a rebirth of manufacturing, and easing 
dependence on overseas energy peddlers”); Diana Davids Hinton, The Seventeen-Year Overnight Wonder: 
George Mitchell and Unlocking the Barnett Shale, 99 J. AM. HIST. 229, 229 (2012) (“[T]he opening of massive 
natural gas production in north Texas from a geological formation called the Barnett Shale has begun a new 
era in world energy.”). 
GOLDEN_WISEMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/19/2015 9:41 AM 
2015] THE FRACKING REVOLUTION 959 
Studying innovation through a case study of the fracking revolution is apt 
in light of current levels of understanding. Limits on our knowledge of the 
mechanics of innovation often renders generalized theorizing and narrow 
econometric studies of relatively little use for drawing practical, 
policy-oriented conclusions. In this context, case studies of specific innovation 
trajectories can inform the intuitions that necessarily guide much present 
policymaking, and case studies can support and guide later theoretical and 
econometric efforts. Such focused observational studies have substantial limits. 
But we suspect that the physicist Richard Feynman had reason for listing 
observation first in describing “[o]bservation, reason, and experiment [as] 
mak[ing] up what we call the scientific method.”7 As with careful recording of 
celestial motions in the early stages of the Scientific Revolution, careful 
observation of specific innovation trajectories might be among the best ways to 
advance understandings of innovation and innovation policy.8 
Why study fracking as a foundation for more nuanced innovation theory? 
Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, communications, and computer-related 
technologies have commonly provided the basis for modern debates about how 
innovation works.9 Given the social and political salience of these 
technologies, the attention devoted to these areas is understandable. But energy 
technologies seem a more than worthy addition to this common grouping. The 
energy sector has a long history of cutting-edge innovation, and innovations in 
energy technology have long undergirded innovation in much of the rest of the 
economy. The Industrial Revolution motored forward on the basis of, first, 
new technologies for harnessing wind and water10 and, second, even newer, 
 
 7 RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, SIX EASY PIECES: ESSENTIALS OF PHYSICS EXPLAINED BY ITS MOST BRILLIANT 
TEACHER 24 (Robert B. Leighton & Matthew Sands eds., 1995) (emphasis omitted). 
 8 Cf. id. at 90 (describing how Tycho Brahe’s careful observation of planetary trajectories laid the basis 
for Kepler’s discovery of “some very beautiful and remarkable, but simple, laws”); GERALD HOLTON & 
STEPHEN G. BRUSH, INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS AND THEORIES IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE 38 (2d ed. 1973) 
(noting that Tycho Brahe “spen[t] nearly a lifetime in patient recording of planetary motion with unheard-of 
precision”). 
 9 See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 507 & nn.7–8 (2010) 
(describing conflicts over patent legislation that featured a coalition including “information technology, 
semiconductor, computer, and financial-services companies” on one side and a coalition, including 
“pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and chemical companies” on the other). 
 10 JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 34 
(1990) (noting medieval advances in harnessing energy from wind and water). 
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interconnected technologies for extracting coal and harnessing steam.11 The 
modern Information Revolution has relied on later advances in the production 
and harnessing of electrical energy.12 
In short, energy technologies are vitally important, and fracking has proven 
remarkably so. It also happens to have a fascinating origin story. A common 
quasi-myth is that fracking’s commercial development is largely the tale of a 
single oil-industry entrepreneur, George Mitchell, who bucked conventional 
wisdom, risked millions, and persisted for years in efforts to make 
unconventional gas reserves commercially exploitable.13 Indeed, Mitchell 
deserves great credit both for unusual persistence and for his company’s 
ultimate development of a formula for combining horizontal drilling and 
“slickwater” fracturing in a way that industry adapted with awesome rapidity 
to shale and other formations around the United States.14 
 
 11 Id. at 85 (observing that “[t]he first economically successful [steam] engine . . . was installed in a coal 
mine near Wolverhampton in 1712” and “solved drainage problems . . . in the deep coal mines in the north of 
England”). 
 12 Cf. ALFRED C. CHANDLER, JR., INVENTING THE ELECTRONIC CENTURY: THE EPIC STORY OF THE 
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER INDUSTRIES, at  xiv–xvii (rev. ed. 2005) (comparing the Information 
Revolution and the Industrial Revolution); Warren D. Devine, Jr., From Shafts to Wires: Historical 
Perspectives on Electrification, 43 J. ECON. HIST. 347, 371 (1983) (examining the historical “shift from steam 
power to electric power”). 
 13 See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 
325 (2011) (“[M]itchell’s relentless commitment . . . would transform the North American natural gas market 
and shake expectations for the global gas market.”); America’s Bounty: Gas Works, ECONOMIST, July 14, 
2012, at 5, 5–6, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21558459 (explaining that “the biggest 
difference [in fracking’s development] was down to the efforts of one man: George Mitchell, the boss of an 
oil-service company,” who “spent ten years and $6m to crack the problem,” even though “[e]veryone, he said, 
told him he was just wasting his time and money”); Jonathan D. Silver, Origins: The Story of a Professor, a 
Gas Driller and Wall Street, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 20, 2011, at A-1, available at  http://www.post-
gazette.com/business/businessnews/2011/03/20/The-Marcellus-Boom-Origins-the-story-of-a-professor-a-gas-
driller-and-Wall-Street/stories/201103200259 (“[I]n the early 1980s, Texas oilman George P. Mitchell pursued 
a fringe strategy—exploring the Barnett Shale.”); see also ZUCKERMAN, supra note 1, at 5 (asserting that “a 
small group of individuals made [a new age in U.S. oil and gas production] happen, against all odds,” and 
crediting Mitchell, “who discovered a novel way to extract gas from shale formations” with “impact [that] 
eventually might even approach that of Henry Ford and Alexander Graham Bell”). But see ZHONGMIN WANG 
& ALAN KRUPNICK, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, A RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: WHAT LED TO THE BOOM? 3 (2013), http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-13-12.pdf 
(exploring in detail the many factors contributing to the technological innovations behind the shale gas boom 
and largely agreeing that “it was the private entrepreneurship from Mitchell Energy & Development . . . that 
played the primary role in developing the Barnett play in Texas”); ZUCKERMAN, supra note 1 (providing a 
richer account by describing efforts by Mitchell, leading individuals at Chesapeake Energy, and others in 
inducing the technological revolution). 
 14 See infra text accompanying notes 84–91; see also MICHAEL RATNER & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43148, AN OVERVIEW OF UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND NATURAL GAS: RESOURCES AND 
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But even a Mitchell-centric view of fracking’s development acknowledges 
that there were other factors that contributed critically to the technological 
revolution behind commercially viable shale gas extraction and the associated 
boom in oil and gas production more generally. A great number of these 
related to physical, legal, and economic infrastructure including pipelines, 
natural gas markets, and property systems for land and mineral rights, which 
provided a foundation upon which unconventional natural gas pioneers could 
successfully operate.15 Further vital preconditions for Mitchell’s successful 
“fracking synthesis” included multiple lines of innovation—for example, in 
hydraulic fracturing, directional drilling, and seismic imaging to identify oil 
and gas deposits—that sometimes reached decades into the past.16 
Significantly, private forces for innovation benefited substantially from 
public aid. In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Bureau of Mines (later part of the 
Energy Research and Development Administration)17 and Department of 
Energy (DOE) “spent hundreds of millions”18 on research and development 
that helped both point and pave the way for Mitchell’s ultimate success.19 
Moreover, public support extended far beyond early R&D. Fracking and 
associated technologies have long benefited from public–private research 
 
FEDERAL ACTIONS 3 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43148.pdf (“The application of advances in 
directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing were first applied to shale gas formations, particularly as natural 
gas prices increased in the mid-2000s.”). 
 15 See WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 4 (discussing the importance of property systems in land 
and mineral rights); America’s Bounty, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing factors behind the fracking revolution 
such as “a deep and liquid gas market that allowed the risks of drilling to be hedged, ready access to capital, 
America’s home-grown oil industry,” and “the liberalisation of access to existing pipelines by third parties”). 
 16 See infra notes 62–80 and accompanying text. 
 17 For a discussion of consolidations in the 1970s, after which the Department of Energy (DOE) oversaw 
all energy R&D, see WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 7–8. 
 18 Alex Trembath, Letter to the Editor, A Joint Effort, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2012, at 14, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21559890. 
 19 MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER ET AL., BREAKTHROUGH INST., WHERE THE SHALE GAS REVOLUTION CAME 
FROM 6 (2012), http://thebreakthrough.org/images/main_image/Where_the_Shale_Gas_Revolution_Came_ 
From2.pdf (discussing how the Bureau of Mines’ Morgantown Energy Research Center “initiated the Eastern 
Gas Shales Project, which established a series of  partnerships with universities and private companies” to 
demonstrate gas recovery from “unconventional resource bases that stood out of reach from contemporary 
drilling technologies, including coalbed methane deposits, “tight sands” natural gas, and shale gas”); id. at 3 
(noting that Department of Energy’s role in the first demonstrations of “massive hydraulic fracturing” and 
“directional drilling in shale”); see also WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 3 (concluding that “some of the 
key technology innovations resulted from government research and development (R&D) programs and private 
entrepreneurship” but that “some of the key technologies . . . were largely developed by the oil industry”); id. 
(noting, in particular, the role of government research in developing early “key technologies” in the Michigan 
and Appalachian Basins in the 1970s when “US gas producers were small”). 
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partnerships20 as well as both tax21 and regulatory22 relief.23 Further, trade 
secret protection has enabled companies to invoke proprietary rights as a 
means, not only to stay ahead of competitors but also to avoid disclosure of 
fracking chemicals to regulators and the public.24 
Notably, patents appear to have been only bit players in the basic story 
behind the fracking revolution. Somewhat ironically, in light of Edmund 
Kitch’s use of resource-extraction rights to motivate his “prospect theory” for 
relatively broad patent rights,25 “during the late 1990s and early 2000s neither 
Mitchell [Energy] nor [its ultimate acquirer,] Devon [Energy,] pursued patent 
protection for their respective innovations in slickwater hydraulic fracturing 
and horizontal drilling.”26 Far from holding fracking’s further development 
back, such restraint in patenting might have helped enable the recent natural 
 
 20 SHELLENBERGER ET AL., supra note 19, at 9 (“In 1991, Mitchell partnered with DOE and GRI [the 
federally funded Gas Research Institute] to develop tools that would effectively fragment formations in the 
Barnett Shale . . . .”). 
 21 Trembath, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that the U.S. government offered a “$10 billion production tax 
credit for unconventional gas between 1980 and 2002”). 
 22 David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 449 (2013) (“Fracking operations enjoy some exemptions from federal environmental 
regulation.”); cf. Michael Burger, Response, Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
150, 157 (2013) (“[D]ue to a toxic blend of agency capture, flawed research, and shortsighted administrative 
decisions, the federal government’s leadership in fracking regulation has been paralyzed.”). 
 23 Cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
303, 311–12 (2013) (describing how prizes, grants, and tax relief, as well as intellectual property rights, can 
affect a would-be innovator’s incentives). 
 24 Barbara Warner & Jennifer Shapiro, Fractured, Fragmented Federalism: A Study in Fracking 
Regulatory Policy, 43 PUBLIUS 474, 486 (2013) (noting that various states limit disclosure requirements for 
fracking chemicals “that companies deem proprietary”); Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and 
Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 4–8 (2011) (describing federal 
and state trade secret allowances). Many public comments on proposed state and regional fracturing 
regulations—even rules unrelated to chemical disclosure—have focused on concerns about the chemicals used 
in hydraulic fracturing and the lack of trade secret disclosure. See, e.g., 36 TEX. REG. 9307, 9312 (Dec. 30, 
2011) (noting comments calling for greater disclosure of “proprietary chemicals”); Email from Mark Mackin 
to Tom Richmond, Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation (June 5, 2011, 11:52 AM), available at http://bogc. 
dnrc.mt.gov/PDF/CombinedComments.pdf (page sixteen of the file) (calling for greater disclosure of 
chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing). 
 25 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977) 
(arguing that the patent system enables a patent owner to coordinate exploitation of a “prospect”—“a particular 
opportunity to develop a known technological possibility”—in a way that increases social efficiency); see also 
id. at 267 (contending that “the scope accorded to patent claims, a scope that reaches well beyond what the 
reward function would require,” is evidence of “[t]he importance of the prospect function in the American 
patent system”). 
 26 Daniel R. Cahoy, Joel Gehman & Zhen Lei, Fracking Patents: The Emergence of Patents as 
Information-Containment Tools in Shale Drilling, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 291 (2013). 
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gas “gold rush,” “with companies racing to capitalize on innovative, yet 
unpatented techniques in other geographies.”27 Although patents might have 
played a nontrivial role in the technology buildup that enabled Mitchell’s 
turn-of-the-millennium breakthrough, their marginalization at this critical point 
demonstrates how, under appropriate circumstances, innovation’s development 
and diffusion can proceed apace—perhaps even at a faster pace—without great 
resort to intellectual property. 
Generally speaking, the translation of lessons from one technological and 
social context to another can be perilous. Nonetheless, the story behind the 
fracking revolution provides lessons both for innovation theory and also, at 
least at a strategic level, for specific problems of technological development in 
the present day. In particular, the story provides lessons that can productively 
inform efforts to replicate the United States’ shale gas boom abroad and efforts 
to revolutionize wind and solar markets at home. These lessons include not 
only “positive lessons” about how to promote innovation but also “negative 
lessons” about how to avoid or mitigate downsides of innovation that could 
undercut innovation’s promise and popular appeal. As with many 
technological booms, environmental concerns28 and social dislocations29 have 
accompanied the shale gas boom, and their emergence affords instruction in 
how policymakers might act anticipatorily or reactively to maximize 
technology’s potential. 
This Article’s exploration of the story of the fracking revolution proceeds 
as follows. Part I introduces the wellhead technologies that converged to 
generate the “Mitchell synthesis” of techniques of horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing. Part II explores factors beyond the wellhead—in 
particular, the development of open-access pipelines and national markets in 
natural gas. Part III describes the role of federal and state governments in 
advancing hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling through such policy 
mechanisms as research partnerships and regulatory and tax relief. Part IV 
discusses how private property rights in land and minerals, patents, secrecy, 
and information exchange contributed to the technological developments 
behind the shale gas boom. Part V explores lessons, positive and negative, 
from this case study in technological innovation and potential application of 
 
 27 Id. at 291–92. 
 28 See infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 268–70 and accompanying text. 
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these lessons to oil and gas development abroad and renewable-energy 
development in general. A concluding section follows. 
I. THE SHALE GAS BOOM AND TECHNOLOGIES BEHIND IT 
Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling are now key factors in the 
exploitation of a great variety of fossil fuel resources. But this Article focuses 
on the most revolutionary field of these technologies’ recent use—the 
extraction of natural gas from underground shale formations, which consist of 
“hard, concretelike shale rock”30 formed by sediment and organic matter that 
accumulated in formerly marine environments.31 The Article focuses on shale 
gas extraction because development of unconventional reserves of shale gas is 
commonly recognized to be at the heart of the now more general oil and gas 
boom32 and because, among affected fossil fuels, newly exploitable natural gas 
reserves seem to have the greatest potential for disruption of energy economies 
historically tied more tightly to oil and coal.33 This Part discusses the United 
States’ shale gas boom and the intricate combination of technological 
developments that lies behind it. 
A. Boom in U.S. Production of Natural Gas 
The remarkable nature of the recent growth of domestic, unconventional 
gas production is underscored by comparing the current situation to that in the 
 
 30 YERGIN, supra note 13, at 326. 
 31 Q.R. PASSEY ET AL., SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, SPE 131350, FROM OIL-PRONE SOURCE ROCK TO 
GAS-PRODUCING SHALE RESERVOIR—GEOLOGIC AND PETROPHYSICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF 
UNCONVENTIONAL SHALE-GAS RESERVOIRS 10 (2010) (describing how most shales “had their origin as 
organic-rich mud” and how the sediments in shale “could have been deposited in the marine environment, in 
lakes (lacustrine), or in associated swamps and mires along the margins of lakes or seas”). 
 32 Shale of the Century, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2012, at 77, available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21556242 (“As a proportion of America’s overall gas production shale gas has increased from 4% in 2005 to 
24% today.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Monthly Coal- and Natural Gas-Fired Generation Equal for First Time in April 2012, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 6, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6990 (noting that “for 
the first time since EIA began collecting the data, generation from natural gas-fired plants is virtually equal to 
generation from coal-fired plants, with each fuel providing 32% of total generation,” in April 2012 in part 
because “natural gas prices as delivered to power plants were at a ten-year low”); Natural Gas Generation 
Lower than Last Year Because of Differences in Relative Fuel Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 25, 
2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13111 (“The increasing gas use for power is a 
structural change that is occurring across a wide range of temperatures and seasons. Several factors underpin 
this trend, including moderate natural gas prices, increased shale gas production, and additions of natural gas 
generating capacity.”). 
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very first years of the twenty-first century. Already in 2001, after surveying a 
history of relatively incremental progress but before recognizing the 
imminence of the impending boom, the National Research Council declared 
past public support for shale gas a substantial success.34 The Council reported 
that in the mid-1970s the United States extracted about 70 billion cubic feet 
(Bcf) of natural gas per year from shale formations.35 By 1998, that amount 
had risen by over a factor of five to 380 Bcf per year.36 With natural gas 
production from the Barnett Shale expected to join that from the Eastern Gas 
Shales, shale gas production was expected to rise to 0.8 trillion cubic feet 
(0.8 Tcf, equivalent to 800 Bcf) by 2010 and to nearly 1 Tcf per year by 
2020.37 According to the Council, the federal government’s Eastern Gas Shales 
Project of 1976 to 1992 had already generated benefits to industry of $705 
million in 1999 dollars, and these benefits exceeded project expenditures of 
$148 million by a ratio of 4.8 to 1.38 A much higher benefit-to-cost ratio would 
have resulted from taking into account “over $8 billion in consumer savings 
due to lower gas prices.”39 Given such figures, the Council had good reason to 
conclude that the past quarter century’s fivefold increase in shale gas 
production and the future promise of a nearly threefold increase over the next 
couple decades were cause for celebration.40 
Wonder then at how we should react to what actually occurred. By 2007, 
six years after the Council’s report and thirteen years before annual shale gas 
production had been expected to “approach 1 Tcf,”41 the United States 
 
 34 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY RESEARCH AT DOE: WAS IT WORTH IT? ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
AND FOSSIL ENERGY RESEARCH 1978 TO 2000, at 201 (2001), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10165.html 
(“[I]ncentives through tax credits, combined with optimum deployment of advanced technology, served to 
revive a domestic gas province in decline.”). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 In 2002, another set of commentators reacting to unconventional natural gas production levels of 4,500 
Bcf per year were similarly impressed. Vello A. Kuuskraa & Hugh D. Guthrie, Translating Lessons Learned 
from Unconventional Natural Gas R&D to Geologic Sequestration Technology, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. RES., 
Feb. 2002, at 75, 81 (citing 1999 production level of 4,500 Bcf, 370 Bcf of which resulted from gas shale 
production). As they observed, “[a] poorly-understood, high-cost energy resource, one that the U.S. Geological 
Survey had not even included in its national appraisals of future gas resources (until their most recent 1995 
assessment), is now providing major volumes of annual gas supplies.” Id. at 80. 
 41 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 201. 
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extracted nearly 2 Tcf of shale gas.42 In the past decade and a half, growth in 
shale gas production has been more than exponential. As noted above, shale 
gas production approximately quintupled in the more than twenty years from 
the mid-1970s to the late 1990s.43 If the growth in shale gas production were 
exponential, production would have taken another couple of decades to rise by 
another factor of five.44 But in half that time—the ten years from 1998 to 
2007—shale gas production more than quintupled again, rising from nearly 
400 Bcf to nearly 2 Tcf.45 Within a mere five additional years, United States’ 
shale gas production had quintupled a third time. Production in 2012 amounted 
to more than 10 Tcf,46 more than five times the production level in 2007 and 
about ten times the amount that the National Research Council had projected 
for 2020.47 From 2000 to 2012, shale gas had gone from supplying only about 
1% of the United States’ natural gas to supplying well over one-fourth.48 As 
Daniel Yergin put it, “[p]erennial shortage gave way to substantial surplus.”49 
The United States now looks forward to becoming a net exporter of natural 
gas.50 
The world is still absorbing the significance of this natural gas boom, one 
that has helped turn the United States into an unexpected, technology-driven 
“petrostate” of a type never seen before.51 The “shale gale”52 of the past decade 
has generated a vast range of straightforward economic benefits, including 
improved GDP and balance-of-payments numbers, increased employment and 
 
 42 U.S. Natural Gas Withdrawals from Shale Gas (Million Cubic Feet), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/ngm_epg0_fgs_nus_mmcfa.htm [hereinafter U.S. Natural 
Gas Withdrawals]. 
 43 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 44 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 820 (5th ed. 1991) 
(“Exponential growth is growth at a constant percentage rate.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 45 Compare supra text accompanying note 36, with supra text accompanying note 42. 
 46 U.S. Natural Gas Withdrawals, supra note 42. 
 47 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 48 YERGIN, supra note 13, at 329. 
 49 Id. 
 50 JASON BURWEN & JANE FLEGAL, AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, UNCONVENTIONAL GAS 
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION 7 (2013) (“The US is now expected to become a net exporter of natural gas in 
the next decade.”). 
 51 The Petrostate of America, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2014, at 10, available at http://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21596521-energy-boom-good-america-and-world-it-would-be-nice-if-barack-obama-helped 
(noting that the United States’ “‘fracking’ revolution . . . . owes less to geological luck than enterprise, ready 
finance and dazzling technology”). 
 52 YERGIN, supra note 13, at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tax revenues,53 and by at least one estimate “on the order of $100 billion of 
gains to consumers each year.”54 Low natural gas prices have helped revitalize 
U.S. manufacturing, particularly in the natural-gas-dependent petrochemicals 
industry.55 Reduced U.S. and foreign dependence on energy-rich states that 
have often been either unstable or hostile to U.S. interests could shake up 
geopolitics for decades to come.56 Finally, although records of incidents at 
shale gas sites, as well as broader scientific data, show a range of negative 
environmental effects that have been associated with natural gas extraction,57 
ample supplies of natural gas offer the possibility of significant environmental 
benefits—particularly if concerns with methane leakage from wells, gathering 
lines, and pipelines are addressed.58 Natural gas is a much cleaner-burning fuel 
 
 53 See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic 
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 157 (2013) (reporting on 
combined contributions of unconventional fossil fuel resources to U.S. economic figures). 
 54 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 7. 
 55 See AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, SHALE GAS AND NEW PETROCHEMICALS INVESTMENT: BENEFITS FOR 
THE ECONOMY, JOBS, AND US MANUFACTURING (2011), http://chemistrytoenergy.com/sites/ 
chemistrytoenergy.com/files/ACC-Shale-Report.pdf; Merrill & Schizer, supra note 53, at 159. 
 56 See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 53, at 162–63 (suggesting that U.S. natural gas could reduce 
European dependence on Iran and Russia, as well as “enabl[ing] the U.S. to cut its defense budget”); The 
Petrostate of America, supra note 51, at 11 (“A world in which the leading petrostate is a liberal democracy 
has much to recommend it.”). But see BakerInstitute, Shell Distinguished Lecture Series—World Energy 
Outlook, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WcVNrWZ9rwU (noting that U.S. 
production likely will not continue at this pace beyond several decades and that Middle Eastern resources will 
continue to be very important). 
 57 See supra note 5; infra notes 262–69 and accompanying text; see also GOVERNOR’S MARCELLUS 
SHALE ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT 75 (2011), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/PublicParticipation/Marcellus 
ShaleAdvisoryCommission/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryPortalFiles/MSAC_Final_Report.pdf (documenting 
certain “high-profile” well blowouts at fractured wells); E.T. SLONECKER ET AL., US GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
LANDSCAPE CONSEQUENCES OF NATURAL GAS EXTRACTION IN BRADFORD AND WASHINGTON COUNTIES, 
PENNSYLVANIA, 2004–2010, at 26 (2012), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2012/1154/of2012-1154.pdf (noting that 
both conventional and unconventional wells cause forest fragmentation, which can have negative effects on 
“interior species” that prefer undisturbed habitat); Mitchell J. Small et al., Risks and Risk Governance in 
Unconventional Shale Gas Development, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8289, 8290–91 (2014) (exploring the 
scientific literature and summarizing the risks); cf. Katie M. Keranen et al., Potentially Induced Earthquakes in 
Oklahoma, USA: Links Between Wastewater Injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 
41 GEOLOGY 699, 701–02 (2013) (noting that injection of liquid wastes from oil and gas wells might have 
triggered a large earthquake in Oklahoma but not isolating this observation to wastes from unconventional 
wells). 
 58 For discussions of methane leakage at various points in the process of producing, transporting, and 
using natural gas, see, for example, David T. Allen et al., Measurements of Methane Emissions at Natural Gas 
Production Sites in the United States, 110 PNAS 17,768, 17,772 (2013) (estimating lower emissions from 
wellheads than the EPA has estimated, but noting uncertainty), and A.R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from 
North American Natural Gas Systems, 343 SCIENCE 733 (2014) (finding high methane emissions from natural 
gas used in transportation).  
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than coal and has already contributed to recent declines in the United States’ 
greenhouse gas emissions.59 In a post-Great Recession world highly concerned 
with promoting economic growth, there is hope that, with appropriate 
regulation of extraction and use, natural gas can act as a “bridge fuel,” enabling 
relatively painless reductions in near-term greenhouse gas emissions while the 
world works toward greater reliance on nonfossil fuels.60 
B. The Web of Technologies Behind the Boom 
Multiple new technologies undergird the shale gas boom, and the most 
prominent of these are hydraulic fracturing—specifically slickwater 
fracturing—and horizontal drilling. In a sense, both are relatively old 
technologies. A horizontal well existed at least as early as 1929,61 and judges, 
scholars, and industry experts have commonly traced hydraulic fracturing to 
increase fuel extraction back to the late 1940s.62 But the combination and 
enhancement of these techniques by a host of improvements and ancillary 
technologies have yielded results that are qualitatively new. 
Fundamentally, hydraulic fracturing—commonly known as “fracking”—is 
a process of pumping large amounts of liquid into a wellbore and selected 
areas of surrounding rock, with the liquid being pumped at a high enough 
 
 59 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NO. DOE/EIA-0560(98), NATURAL GAS 
1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS 52–53, 53 fig.22 (1999), http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/ 
analysis_publications/natural_gas_1998_issues_trends/pdf/it98.pdf (comparing emissions of nitrogen oxides, 
sulfur dioxide, particulates, carbon monoxide, and hydrocarbons from natural gas and coal and noting much 
lower emissions from natural gas); Spence, supra note 22, at 440–41 (citing these data and emphasizing the 
cleaner-burning qualities of gas). 
 60 J. Rothstein, Hydrogen and Fossil Fuels, 20 INT’L J. HYDROGEN ENERGY 283, 284 (1993); see also 
JOHN D. PODESTA & TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NATURAL GAS: A BRIDGE FUEL FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (2009), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/08/pdf/ 
naturalgasmemo.pdf; Merrill & Schizer, supra note 53, at 165–66; Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation 
in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 231–32 (2010). 
 61 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 3. 
 62 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2008) (“First used 
commercially in 1949, fracing is now essential to economic production of oil and gas and commonly used 
throughout Texas, the United States, and the world.”); Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic 
Fracturing: History of an Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Dec. 2010, at 26, 26–27 (“The first 
experimental treatment to ‘Hydrafrac’ a well for stimulation was performed in . . . Kansas, in 1947 . . . .”); 
Hydraulic Fracturing 101, HALLIBURTON, http://www.halliburton.com/public/projects/pubsdata/ 
Hydraulic_Fracturing/fracturing_101.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (stating that Halliburton “first” used “the 
process in 1947 to stimulate flow of natural gas from the Hugoton field in Kansas”). 
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pressure that the rock fractures.63 In a natural-gas-bearing shale formation, the 
cracking of the hard but slightly porous rock helps expose surface area of the 
shale64 and frees natural gas trapped within the shale to travel through the 
wellbore to the surface, where it is collected, processed, and transported, 
typically by pipeline.65 
The oil and gas industry long sought to increase recovery of fossil fuels 
through predecessor techniques to hydraulic fracturing. Beginning in the 
1860s, some operators used nitroglycerin to generate underground explosions 
in wells,66 and by the 1930s, enterprising individuals injected acid into wells to 
open up fractures in surrounding formations.67 Hydraulic fracturing emerged in 
1947, when Floyd Farris of Stanolind Oil and Gas Corporation (later Amoco) 
performed an experimental “[h]ydrafrac” in Kansas, using 1,000 gallons of 
gasoline thickened with napalm followed by a gel injection to fracture a 
limestone formation.68 
To enhance the effectiveness of fracking, the liquid pumped into the rock is 
mixed with chemicals and one or more forms of “proppant,” commonly sand.69 
Proppant particles are trapped in cracks generated by fracking and help “prop” 
them open—facilitating the continued flow of gas through the fractures.70 For 
decades, operators have experimented with various combinations and 
concentrations of gels, proppants, and water (and sometimes foam)—often 
 
 63 See BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2 & fig.2; CHING H. YEW, MECHANICS OF HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING 1 (1997) (“This fluid pressure creates a fracture extending into the rock medium which contains 
oil or gas.”). 
 64 See P. KAUFMAN, G.S. PENNY & J. PAKTINAT, SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, SPE 119900, CRITICAL 
EVALUATIONS OF ADDITIVES USED IN SHALE SLICKWATER FRACS, 1 (2008) (noting that horizontal wells are 
used to “create as much contact with the reservoir as possible”). 
 65 See C. CLARK ET AL., ARGONNE NAT’L LAB., ANL/EVS/R-125, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SHALE 
GAS PRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY, IMPACTS, AND REGULATIONS 3 (2013), http://www.afdc.energy.gov/uploads/ 
publication/anl_hydraulic_fracturing.pdf (noting the reduction in pressure following fracturing, after which 
fluid (and later gas) flows out of the well, and noting that propped fractures create “a pathway for natural gas 
to flow back to the well”).  
 66 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 62, at 26–27. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69 Id. at 28. 
 70 See BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2; CAROLYN SETO, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER SP 2.3: ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN UNCONVENTIONAL GAS RESOURCES 11–12 (2011), 
http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/Supplementary_Paper_SP_2_3_Unconventional_Technology.pdf; YEW, supra 
note 63, at 61. 
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varying the technique for different formations.71 The nature of the fracking 
fluid and proppant is generally tailored to the particular geological formation 
being fracked.72 For the types of shale gas formations of concern here, the 
fracking mixture tends to be at least about 98% to 99% water and sand, with 
the remainder comprising any of a number of substances.73 These substances 
can include “friction reducing” agents such as polyacrylamides, biocides such 
as methanol to kill bacteria, “scale inhibitors” such as hydrochloric acid, and 
various other materials such as guar gum, borate salts, and isopropanol that can 
help optimize any of a variety of fracking fluid properties such as viscosity and 
the ability to carry and release proppant.74 Proppants can also be varied in 
terms of grain size, shape, coating, or source.75 Some form of sand remains the 
dominant choice, but at one time or another fracturing service companies have 
tried a host of alternatives, including “plastic pellets, steel shot, Indian glass 
beads, aluminum pellets, high-strength glass beads, rounded nut shells, 
resin-coated sands, sintered bauxite, and fused zirconium.”76 Industry players 
have apparently been willing to look far and wide for materials that could help 
improve fracturing solutions or proppants: in the 1970s, energy companies 
“‘borrowed’ [chemical agents] from the plastic explosives industry.”77 
Such broad experimentation reflects the trial-and-error approach through 
which fracking has commonly developed—an approach that at least partly 
 
 71 See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 744 n.60 (compiling and describing sources on historic fracturing fluids 
and treatments). 
 72 See ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40894, UNCONVENTIONAL GAS SHALES: 
DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES 24 (2009) (“It is important to note that the service 
companies adjust the proportion of frac fluid additives to the unique conditions of each well.”); JOHN H. 
GRAVES, FRACKING: AMERICA’S ALTERNATIVE ENERGY REVOLUTION 100–02 (2012) (noting that “[s]lick 
water is most commonly used in deep holes” and “[a]cid fracing . . . is used where the rock is susceptible to the 
etching of an acid wash”—for example, in a limestone or dolomite formation (emphasis omitted)); KAUFMAN 
ET AL., supra note 64, at 1 (“[T]he selection of the fluid and additives [is] based upon the mineralogy.”). 
 73 N.Y. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES & HIGH-VOLUME 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 40–48 (rev. draft 
2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/rdsgeisch50911.pdf (describing the typical 
percentage of chemicals by volume and listing the chemicals used); Jo Melville, Fracking: An Industry Under 
Pressure, 18 BERKELEY SCI. J., no.1, at 22, 25 (2013) (“Modern fracking fluid consists on average of 99.5% 
freshwater and sand and a mere 0.5% additives.”). 
 74 GRAVES, supra note 72, at 100–01 (describing “slick water” fracking fluids); KAUFMAN ET AL., supra 
note 64 (describing the additives and their purposes); supra note 73. 
 75 GRAVES, supra note 72, at 102–03; id. at 106 (“The choice of sand type, its source, and its composition 
varies with each wellbore.”). 
 76 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 62, at 28. 
 77 Id. 
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reflects difficulties in modeling the high-pressure dynamics of “sand-infused 
liquids” and their interactions with rock formations that can be more than a 
mile underground.78 Computer programs have been used to plan or simulate 
fracking operations since the mid-1960s,79 but they have failed to remove all 
elements of personal skill and luck from the process.80 
In any event, fracking itself has not necessarily proven adequate to make 
shale gas production economically viable. Even with fracking, traditional 
vertical wells might not stimulate release of enough natural gas to justify their 
cost. Gas is commonly trapped at low densities throughout large areas of a 
shale and is often found in the greatest quantities in a small layer of the 
formation—sometimes within a portion of the shale that is less than one meter 
thick.81 To optimize gas recovery, another technology has frequently been 
necessary: effective “directional drilling” in which oil and gas companies drill 
a well vertically toward the formation that they are targeting, then 
progressively slant the drill bit, and ultimately drill laterally through the 
formation, sometimes for over a mile.82 This horizontal drilling can address 
concerns with fracturing containment (limiting fractures to targeted areas of 
underground rock)83 and, more intuitively for the inexpert, can allow more oil 
or gas to flow from the shale by exposing more surface area in the formation, 
both through the drilling itself and through the fractures that later emanate 
 
 78 See, e.g., GRAVES, supra note 72, at 107 (“The modeling of the fluid dynamics of sand-infused liquids 
is an ongoing aspect of deep research in frac tech.”). 
 79 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 62, at 31–32. 
 80 GRAVES, supra note 72, at 103 (“Each choice [of fracking materials] depends on the engineering of the 
hole, the rock below, the skill and function of the men and equipment—and a goodly dose of luck.”). 
 81 PASSEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 (noting that “the vertical variability in organic richness can vary on 
relatively short vertical scales” that are “often much less than one meter”). 
 82 HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE. UNCONVENTIONAL 
CHALLENGES., 3 (2008) (noting that a “typical lateral” in the Barnett shale is “2,500 feet to 3,000 feet”); David 
Blackmon, Horizontal Drilling: A Technological Marvel Ignored, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2013/01/28/horizontal-drilling-a-technological-marvel-ignored/ 
(“Horizontal Drilling now allows these [fracking] operators to drill and set pipe for a mile or more horizontally 
through this same rock formation.”). 
 83 See Kent A. Bowker, Development of the Barnett Shale Play, Fort Worth Basin, SEARCH & 
DISCOVERY, Apr. 18, 2007, art. no. 10126, at 1, 12 http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/documents/2007/ 
07023bowker/images/bowker.pdf  (noting difficulty extending early successes in the Barnett Shale to areas 
where the shale was “not bound above and below by effective frac barriers,” and observing that operators were 
“experimenting with various completion techniques (including four horizontal wells) . . . in an attempt to 
overcome the problem of fracing out of zone”). 
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from the lateral wellbore.84 Although a horizontal well might cost, say, twice 
as much as a traditional vertical well,85 it can also be three times as productive, 
thereby substantially increasing the well’s overall benefit-to-cost ratio.86 
The existence of a basic rationale for drilling horizontally through shale 
formations was probably never hard to grasp. Developing the drilling and 
drill-monitoring technologies necessary to do it efficiently was the hard part.87 
Prior to the 1980s, available technologies were crude.88 “Early directional 
drilling involved placing a steel wedge downhole (whipstock) that deflected 
the drill toward the desired target, but [this technique] lacked control and 
consumed time.”89 A great breakthrough came in the 1980s with the 
introduction of the “steerable downhole motor.”90 This decade also witnessed 
the first successful commercial horizontal drilling tests in the oil and gas 
sector, tests initiated in the early 1980s by a French operator that worked in 
southwestern France and offshore from Italy.91 Later in the decade, U.S. 
 
 84 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NO. DOE/EIA-TR-0565, DRILLING 
SIDEWAYS—A REVIEW OF HORIZONTAL WELL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS DOMESTIC APPLICATION 7 (1993); see 
also YERGIN, supra note 13, at 328 (“Advances in controls and measurement allowed operators to drill down 
to a certain depth, and then drill at an angle or even sideways. This would expose much more of the reservoir, 
permitting much greater recovery of gas (or oil) from a reservoir.”). 
 85 S.D. JOSHI, SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, SPE 83621, COSTS/BENEFITS OF HORIZONTAL WELLS 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.joshitech.com/images/spe83621.pdf (estimating that U.S. newly drilled horizontal 
well costs to be “1.5 to 2.5 times more than a vertical well”).  
 86 G. WATERS ET AL., SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, SPE 103202, USE OF HORIZONTAL WELL IMAGE TOOLS 
TO OPTIMIZE BARNETT SHALE RESERVOIR EXPLOITATION 2 (2006) (observing that Devon Energy’s experience 
in drilling “over 50 horizontal wells” in 2002 and 2003 “indicated that compared to vertical wells, the 
horizontals would have about three times the [estimated ultimate recovery] for twice the well cost”). 
 87 John E. Fontenot, Measurement While Drilling—A New Tool, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Feb. 1986, at 128; 
see also Sara Pratt, A Fresh Angle on Oil Drilling, GEOTIMES (Mar. 2004), http://www.geotimes.org/mar04/ 
feature_horizdrill.html. 
 88 Lynn Helms, Horizontal Drilling, DMR NEWSL. (N.D. Dept. of Mineral Res., Bismarck, N.D.), Jan. 
2008, art. no. 2, at 2, available at https://www.dmr.nd.gov/ndgs/documents/newsletter/2008Winter/pdfs/ 
Horizontal.pdf (asserting that one early source for notions of drilling horizontally through rock came from an 
1891 patent for a flexible drilling shaft, which the inventor envisioned would be used by dentists but also for 
“flexible shafts [of larger size,] . . . for example, . . . for drilling holes in boiler-plates or other like heavy 
work” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 89 ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 72, at 19. 
 90 Pratt, supra note 87. 
 91 Helms, supra note 88, at 2; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 13 (describing the 
government role in this area as “absent or minimal,” supporting that the U.S. government was not, for the most 
part, involved in horizontal drilling research or direct financial support); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra 
note 84, at 7 (noting that earlier limited horizontal drilling also occurred, with “[t]he first recorded true 
horizontal oil well, drilled near Texon, Texas” completed in 1929, another in 1944 in Pennsylvania, and still 
others in China in 1957 and “later” in the Soviet Union, but observes that “little practical application occurred 
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operators began applying this technique commercially in North Dakota’s 
Bakken Shale and Texas’s Austin Chalk formations.92 The 1990s witnessed 
further significant improvement through the development of “rotary steerable 
systems” that could be redirected without having to interrupt drilling by 
stopping rotation of the drill string.93 Finally, the development of 
“measurement while drilling” technology, first commercialized in 1978, 
enabled real-time downhole measurement of parameters “such as position, 
temperature, pressure and porosity,” thereby facilitating better directional 
control and more efficient and safer drilling, with the result being an even 
more favorable benefit-to-cost ratio.94 
The above description of fracking and drilling technologies allows some 
appreciation of the web of technological developments that helped spur the 
shale gas boom. But any such appreciation is only a beginning. Many 
additional innovations underlie the boom and help explain comparison of 
modern wellheads to “high-tech factories.”95 New or improved technologies in 
locating, drilling, and fracturing for oil and gas include, among others, (1) 3D 
seismic imaging techniques to locate areas of abundant gas and to better 
understand the location of faults or of dips or rises in shale formations 
themselves,96 techniques that have benefited from advances in computing and 
that draw on technology originally developed to track submarines;97 
 
until the early 1980’s”); WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 10 (also noting the lack of government 
involvement in horizontal drilling). 
 92 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 84, at vii. 
 93 ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 72, at 19. 
 94 Pratt, supra note 87; see also Formation Evaluation Advances: An Integrated Focus, WEATHERFORD 
MAG., May 2012, at 11, 12, http://www.weatherford.com/dn/WFT196437; cf. Drilling Dynamic Sensors and 
Optimization, SCHLUMBERGER, http://www.slb.com/~/media/Files/drilling/brochures/mwd/drilling_dynamics_ 
sensors_opt_br.ashx (last viewed Mar. 5, 2015) (observing that various forms of downhole sensing allow 
operators to avoid various drilling failures and thus reduce costs). 
 95 The Petrostate of America, supra note 51, at 10. 
 96 See Bowker, supra note 83, at 13 (testifying to the value of “[e]xcellent structural mapping” because 
“wells located on structural flexures or near major faults are less productive”); Murray Roth, Unconventional 
Reservoirs Require Unconventional Approach to Integrate, Interpret Data, AM. OIL & GAS REPORTER (Sept. 
2010), available at https://www.transformsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Unconventional-Reservoirs-
Require-Unconventional-Approach-To-Integrate-Interpret-Data-2010-American-Oil-and-Gas-Reporter-Roth. 
pdf (noting how 3D seismic imaging can help to identify the particular fracturing “sweet spots”—in shale 
areas with particular rock characteristics that make fracturing more efficient—and how understanding the 
overall “thickness” of a shale is often not sufficient for effective shale production, as operators must identify 
key characteristics of the shale in addition to faults, including portions of the shale where fracturing will most 
likely create “permeability paths”). 
 97 WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 10, 13–14 (describing horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, 
and 3D seismic mapping as the three technologies that spurred the boom); Kevin Begos, Fracking Developed 
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(2) “microseismic fracturing mapping,” which typically uses a monitoring well 
to study the “height, length, orientation, and other attributes of induced 
fractures”;98 (3) equipment that isolates portions of a lateral wellbore and 
thereby enables increased fracturing of the rock around a well;99 
(4) polycrystalline drill bits with artificial diamond surfaces100 that are 
particularly well suited to drilling hard rock;101 (5) “flexible coiled tubing, 
continuously unreeled from a giant spool,” that, during the completion process, 
can replace rigid well pipe and eliminate the need to interrupt use of a drill 
while new “sections of pipe are screwed together”;102 (6) friction reducers for 
fracking fluids;103 and (7) “smaller and lighter” drilling rigs that are easier to 
transport between well pads.104 In short, an ever-expanding multiplicity of 
technological developments have helped increase yields or reduce costs 
associated with the exploitation of shale gas formations, thereby enabling the 
favorable cost–benefit projections for producers that have spurred the shale gas 
boom. 
II. INFRASTRUCTURE AND MARKETS BEYOND THE WELLHEAD 
Despite the shale gas boom’s multifarious technological backdrop, its 
triggering is often described as the work of a single man. After expending 
millions of dollars over a time period of nearly two decades,105 the 
entrepreneurial George Mitchell ultimately saw his efforts to exploit the 
Barnett Shale bear fruit: by the late 1990s, his company had developed an 
 
with Decades of Government Investment, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2012, 5:12 AM EST), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/23/fracking-developed-government_n_1907178.html (“[T]echnology created to 
track sounds of Russian submarines during the Cold War was repurposed to help the industry use sound to get 
a 3-D picture of shale deposits and track exactly where a drill bit was, thousands of feet underground.”).  
 98 WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 14. 
 99 See CLARK ET AL., supra note 65, at 3 (“Approximately 1,000 feet of wellbore is hydraulically 
fractured at a time, so each well must be hydraulically fractured in multiple stages, beginning at the furthest 
end of the wellbore.”). 
 100 MICHAEL P. GALLAHER, ALBERT N. LINK & ALAN O’CONNOR, PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGY 97 (2012). 
 101 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 6. 
 102 Pratt, supra note 87. 
 103 See HONG SUN ET AL., SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, SPE 139480, A NONDAMAGING FRICTION REDUCER 
FOR SLICKWATER FRAC APPLICATIONS (2011) (discussing new friction reducers that enable better production). 
 104 Al Pickett, Technologies, Methods Reflect Industry Quest to Reduce Drilling Footprint, AM. OIL & 
GAS REP. (July 2010), http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/docs/GEN170-reducedrillingfootprint.pdf. 
 105 See WATERS ET AL., supra note 86, at 1 (“Development of the Barnett Shale in the Ft. Worth basin 
began in 1981 with the drilling of the Mitchell Energy C.W. Slay #1.”). 
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approach to hydraulic fracturing that could yield surprising quantities of gas 
relative to cost.106 
This story is largely true. Mitchell was an innovator of remarkable 
persistence, and he drew attention to the potential for shale gas production and 
for the combined use of two distinct techniques that had been deployed 
piecemeal over time. After years of failed trial and error, he and his 
independent production company, Mitchell Energy and Development, 
succeeded in “crack[ing] the Barnett’s code”107 through a technique of 
slickwater fracturing that used formulas for fracking fluids remarkable for their 
relative simplicity.108 In combination with horizontal drilling, the other leg of 
the Mitchell synthesis, slickwater fracturing promised to make shale gas 
production commercially viable on a broad scale, rather than the more limited 
scale on which Mitchell’s shale gas production had previously occurred.109 
When natural gas prices rose in the early 2000s,110 Mitchell’s example, which 
 
 106 See DAN B. STEWARD, THE BARNETT SHALE PLAY: PHOENIX FOR THE FORT WORTH BASIN, A HISTORY 
124–29 (Frank Paniszczyn ed., 2007) (recounting how the results from 1998 “light sand” fracturing in the 
Barnett Shale “changed [Mitchell Energy] and the industry’s attitudes about the Barnett” and “basically started 
a leasing and drilling boom in southwest Denton and northwest Tarrant counties”). 
 107 YERGIN, supra note 13, at 327. 
 108 Bowker, supra note 83, at 8 (affirming that “[w]ater fracs . . . were a radical concept” for the Barnett 
Shale “because the general consensus among completion engineers was that as much proppant (sand) as 
economically possible had to be placed in the Barnett” and “un-gelled water can carry very little” proppant). 
Slickwater fracturing combined several previous techniques, using more water, different chemicals, and 
moderate amounts of sand, although even the slickwater technique varies among formations. See SUN ET AL., 
supra note 103 (“Slickwater fracturing, different from fracturing using cross-linked fluids, has been developed 
and used in tight gas sand reservoirs since successful operations in the Cotton Valley Sand in East Texas in 
1997.”); Silver, supra note 13 (“Instead of exotic formulas for hydraulic fracturing fluids used elsewhere, such 
as in North Sea fields, Mr. Mitchell’s company simplified the process and used water . . . .”); see also WATERS 
ET AL., supra note 86, at 1 (“In 1997 Mitchell Energy began to experiment with Slickwater stimulation 
treatments. These treatments contained roughly twice the fluid volume of the large crosslinked treatments 
previously pumped, but less than 10% of the proppant volume.”); Cahoy et al., supra note 26, at 285 (noting 
that, in 1997, Mitchell energy found that well performance with slickwater hydraulic fracturing “was 
somewhat better than [with] the crosslinked jobs, but stimulation costs were reduced by approximately 65%”). 
See generally Wiseman, supra note 5, at 744 n.60 (describing older gel-based and high-sand-volume 
techniques and providing sources). 
 109 See Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 973 (2013) 
(“After a long period of trial and error, an independent gas producer named George Mitchell . . . figured out 
the right combination of horizontal drilling, pressure, and proppants to get the gas flowing out of shale.”). 
 110 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2014 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at MT-21 to MT-23 & figs.MT-39 to MT-44 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/ 
forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf (providing graphs showing how U.S. production of shale gas took off in the 
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, a period when natural gas prices spiked upward and oil 
prices consistently rose). 
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culminated in the sale of Mitchell Energy to Devon Energy for $3.5 billion in 
2002,111 became irresistible.112 
Nonetheless, Mitchell himself would likely have disclaimed this tale’s 
simplicity. Far from being an isolated innovator, he actively sought and used 
private and public collaborators,113 and he applied for and received federal 
incentive pricing for gas from the Barnett Shale.114 Private partners were also 
critical for Mitchell’s success. In particular, Mitchell Energy’s long-term 
contract to supply Natural Gas Pipeline of America was a major impetus 
behind Mitchell’s interest and persistence in developing the Barnett.115 
Moreover, a variety of other factors rooted in government support for 
innovation and natural gas markets were essential drivers of the technological 
revolution behind the shale gas boom. Of most immediate interest, changing 
national approaches to oil and gas regulation of pipelines and pricing reshaped 
potential markets for natural gas in ways that likely accounted for Mitchell’s 
being active in the Barnett Shale at all. 
A. Pipelines and “Pipeline Neutrality” 
The availability of pipeline infrastructure centrally affects incentives to 
produce oil and gas. Generally speaking, fossil fuels are extracted in locations 
where they are abundant, and they must then be transported to the areas of 
 
 111 YERGIN, supra note 13, at 328. 
 112 J. DANIEL ARTHUR, BRUCE LANGHUS & DAVID ALLEMAN, ALL CONSULTING, AN OVERVIEW OF 
MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 4–5 (2008), http://www.all-llc.com/ 
publicdownloads/ALLShaleOverviewFINAL.pdf (noting that “rapid increases in natural gas prices” in part 
drove the recent expansion in use of Mitchell’s techniques). 
 113 See infra text accompanying notes 114–15. 
 114 See WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 25 (noting that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
at the request of Mitchell and the Texas Railroad Commission—the state’s oil and gas agency—approved the 
designation of the Barnett Shale play as a “tight gas” formation, thus allowing sales of gas at a higher price, 
but not as high of a price as other types of unconventional gas could receive). 
 115 See STEWARD, supra note 106, at 44 (observing that Mitchell Energy’s “NGPL contract in the North 
Texas area” provided critical “price guarantees”); WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 16 (stating that 
contractual obligations to NGPL provided an “initial incentive for Mitchell Energy to develop the Barnett 
play”). 
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highest demand.116 For oil and gas, such transport commonly comes via 
pipelines.117 
But the need for pipelines leads to classic problems of mismatch between 
group interests and individual capacities or incentives. Pipelines, particularly 
long interstate pipelines, can be expensive to build, and successful construction 
of interstate pipelines in the United States had historically required navigation 
of multiple states’ policies on siting and land acquisition, as well as the hazard 
of potentially inconsistent regulation even after construction.118 Producers 
could lack either the resources or incentive to run this gauntlet individually, 
and even if a private entity succeeded in constructing an interstate pipeline, the 
pipeline might be closed—or accessible only irregularly or at exorbitant cost—
to others.119 The federal government addressed these problems by regulating 
prices associated with the use of interstate pipelines120 and by providing federal 
siting and eminent domain authority121 to ease the process of construction. 
Eventually, the federal government also required open access to pipelines, thus 
enabling more competition in the production of gas for remote markets.122 By 
the late 1990s, these changes had converged to create abundant pipeline 
capacity that, combined with updated pricing policies, helped spur new natural 
 
 116 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 
9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (1988) (noting that when interstate pipelines began to be developed, “the available supplies 
of natural gas were in different states than the major population and industrial centers where demand for gas 
was large and growing”). 
 117 Id. (“[G]as can be transported economically only by pipeline.”); Refinery Receipts of Crude Oil by 
Rail, Truck, and Barge Continue to Increase, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12131 (noting that half of the crude oil received by U.S. 
refineries flows through pipelines, although transport by barge, truck, and rail is growing). 
 118 See Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure 
Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 36), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2410977 (“Consuming and producing states regularly imposed regulations on pipelines that were 
inconsistent . . . .”); Pierce, supra note 116, at 5 (noting state policies that served as barriers to interstate 
pipelines). 
 119 See Robert J. Michaels, The New Age of Natural Gas: How the Regulators Brought Competition, 
REGULATION, Winter 1993, at 68, 68–69 (noting that the Natural Gas Act of 1938 capped the prices that 
interstate pipelines could charge for the use of their lines but did not require open access, and pipelines 
typically purchased “gas . . . at the wellhead and, passing on the purchase price, resold it to distributors” rather 
than giving “producers or users” direct access to pipelines); Pierce, supra note 116, at 6–7 (observing that 
pipelines “were not obligated to provide third parties access to their facilities” and noting their “precluding” of 
beneficial transactions). 
 120 See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 122 See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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gas production for sale to out-of-state markets.123 This transition was not quick, 
however; it was the culmination of several historic innovations and policy 
changes. 
As Alexandra Klass and Danielle Meinhardt describe, improved 
technologies for welding, stronger pipeline materials, and better compressors 
necessary for transporting natural gas long distances matured shortly after 
discovery of large natural gas fields in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas in 
1918.124 In 1924, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that states could not 
regulate the prices charged by interstate pipelines,125 thereby removing one set 
of obstacles to pipeline construction and operation. In the wake of these 
developments, “twelve major gas transportation systems” emerged between 
1927 and 1931.126 But the constituent pipelines did not form a truly national 
network, and they left the Northeast, for example, in a common state of 
shortage.127 Further, in the absence of federal regulation, abolition of state 
regulation had opened a regulatory gap.128 Interstate pipeline companies, which 
purchased gas from producers and sold the gas to instate and out-of-state 
consumers, became local monopsonists in dealing with producers and 
oligopolists in dealing with consumers (typically simply called monopolists, 
although in some cases more than one pipeline was available within a region), 
exercising their resulting pricing power to their own advantage.129 
In the 1930s, the pricing practices of pipeline companies, combined with an 
abundance of gas in and around Texas and relative scarcity in the Northeast, 
induced a diverse group of lobbyists to demand federal intervention.130 This 
group included a coalition of cities that wanted better access to gas, the coal 
industry that believed federal regulation would in fact “drive up prices,” and 
producers and consumers who suffered from the pipeline companies’ pricing 
 
 123 Cf. Michael J. Doane, R. Preston McAfee & Michael A. Williams, Evaluating and Enhancing 
Competition in the Interstate Natural Gas Transportation Industry, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 761, 768 (2004) 
(noting the interconnection and integration of pipelines by the 1990s and expanded regional and national 
access to gas). 
 124 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 118 (manuscript at 36). 
 125 Missouri v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924). 
 126 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 118 (manuscript at 36). 
 127 Id. (manuscript at 38) (observing that “from 1932 until World War II” the “Northeastern market 
potential was immense, but no major pipelines existed to bring gas to that populous region”). 
 128 See id. (manuscript at 37) (discussing regulation arising in the aftermath of Kansas Natural Gas Co.). 
 129 See Pierce, supra note 116, at 4–6. 
 130 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 118 (manuscript at 37). 
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practices.131 At the recommendation of the Federal Trade Commission, 
Congress passed the Natural Gas Act of 1938, providing for federal authority 
over the interstate transportation of natural gas, among other interstate gas 
activities.132 The Federal Power Commission (FPC) and, later, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulated natural gas prices,133 
approved certificates for new interstate pipelines,134 and granted eminent 
domain authority for the siting of pipelines,135 allowing an interstate network 
of natural gas pipelines to flourish.136 
Nonetheless, access to pipelines remained limited. The FPC capped the 
price that natural gas pipelines could charge for the natural gas they purchased, 
transported, and sold, but these companies were not required to allow 
producers to use the pipelines.137 Moreover, the FPC had long “refused to 
allow pipelines to transport gas sold directly by producers to end-users” 
because of the Commission’s inability to regulate prices for such sales.138 As a 
result, pipelines typically purchased gas from producers and resold it, and a 
number of producers had only limited access to markets.139 Beginning in 1976, 
however, the FPC began to grant a limited number of producers direct access 
to consumers, allowing case-by-case approvals for pipeline transport of gas 
sold directly from producers to “high priority” commercial and industrial 
consumers.140 Two additional orders (now from FERC) in 1979 further 
supported sales directly from producers to consumers: Order 27 provided 
blanket approvals for pipelines to transport gas sold from producers directly to 
 
 131 Id.  
 132 Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2012)). 
 133 Id. § 4(a), 52 Stat. at 822. 
 134 Id. § 7(c), 52 Stat. at 825. 
 135 Id. § 7(a), 52 Stat. at 824. 
 136 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 118 (manuscript at 36) (“Between 1927 and 1931 about twelve major 
gas transportation systems developed, all over 200 miles long.”). 
 137 See Pierce, supra note 116, at 24 (“[B]y regulating pipeline sales but not pipeline transportation, 
Congress and the FERC had created artificially pipeline monopoly power . . . .”).  
 138 Robert C. Means & Robert S. Angyal, The Regulation and Future Role of Direct Producer Sales, 
5 ENERGY L.J. 1, 5 (1984). 
 139 See Michaels, supra note 119, at 69 (“[I]nstead of transporting gas owned by producers or users, 
pipelines purchased it at the wellhead and, passing on the purchase price, resold it to distributors.”); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 79 (1982) (explaining 
that from the 1930s through 1950s, “monopsony conditions prevailed in much of the market: a single pipeline 
provided the sole market outlet for a number of competing producers”). 
 140 Certification of Pipeline Transportation Agreements, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,760, 41,760 (Aug. 28, 1975); see 
also Sean J. McNulty, Comment, Freeing the Captives: Nondiscriminatory Access to Transportation in the 
Interstate Natural Gas Market, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 843, 849 (1986) (describing the order). 
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critical agricultural users, hospitals, and schools,141 and Order 30 granted 
similar pipeline transport authority for natural gas sold directly from producers 
to consumers in lieu of scarce fuel oil.142 Later, in 1985, FERC Order 436 gave 
pipelines “expedited,” blanket approval to enter into open-access gas 
transportation contracts with third-party shippers if the pipelines accepted the 
risk for the pipeline (rather than passing costs to existing customers) and met 
other conditions.143 Finally, in 1992, FERC Order 636 dramatically 
restructured the pipeline business, requiring the functional separation of 
interstate pipeline companies’ gas purchasing and selling activities from their 
transportation business144 and mandating that these companies offer 
open-access service.145 Under Order 636, pipeline companies could not favor 
their own gas in the operation of pipelines,146 and they had to provide 
electronic pricing and service information so that their terms were 
transparent.147 
When producers, including smaller independents like Mitchell Energy, 
could directly access larger numbers of distant purchasers—particularly those 
in the relatively gas-poor Northeast—they could anticipate lucrative returns 
 
 141 Certification of Pipeline Transportation for Certain High Priority Uses, 44 Fed. Reg. 24,825, 24,825, 
24,828 (Apr. 27, 1979) (allowing “the transportation of natural gas sold by a producer to an eligible user” and 
defining eligible uses). 
 142 Transportation Certificates for Natural Gas for the Displacement of Fuel Oil, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,323, 
30,329 (May 25, 1979) (exempting pipelines from previously-required FERC approval of transportation of 
natural gas from producers—“first sales”—to suppliers of natural gas who would otherwise use fuel oil); see 
also McNulty, supra note 140, at 850 (describing the order). 
 143 See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 
42,467 (Oct. 18, 1985) (establishing “Optional Expedited Certificates” that provided blanket authorizations for 
pipelines to transport gas for third-party shippers if pipelines agreed to take on the risk of building the pipeline 
and met other conditions); see also Thomas P. Lyon & Steven C. Hackett, Bottlenecks and Governance 
Structures: Open Access and Long-term Contracting in Natural Gas, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 380, 387 (1993) 
(describing the order). 
 144 Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing 
Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 
13,267, 13,281 (Apr. 16, 1992) (requiring “firm and interruptible transportation services to be provided 
unbundled from firm and interruptible sales”). 
 145 See id. at 13,281–82 (requiring “an open-access pipeline that offers firm and interruptible 
transportation services to provide those transportation services . . . on a basis that is equal in quality for all gas 
supplies, whether purchased from the pipeline or elsewhere” and allowing “firm” shippers—those who commit 
to using a certain amount of pipeline space—to “release unwanted capacity to those desiring capacity”). 
 146  Id. at 13,288 (prohibiting pipeline companies from “creating an advantage to the pipeline as seller or 
to its marketing affiliate” in “operational provisions”). 
 147 See id. at 13,281 (requiring “a pipeline to provide all shippers equal and timely access to certain 
information through the use of electronic bulletin boards”). 
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even from more-expensive, less-accessible gas reserves that required 
sophisticated technologies for extraction. The natural result was incentive to 
exploit such reserves. As “commons” theorists might hasten to point out,148 it 
seems more than mere coincidence that FERC’s adoption of a “pipeline 
neutrality” policy was followed within about a decade by Mitchell Energy’s 
breakthroughs and subsequent market recognition of shale gas’s commercial 
potential.149 
B. Oil and Gas Markets 
As pipeline policy gradually expanded access to the infrastructure needed 
by natural gas producers, federal pricing policies also attempted to encourage 
the production of oil and natural gas from unconventional formations.150 A 
Supreme Court decision in the 1950s forced the FPC, and later FERC, to 
regulate all prices of gas at the wellhead if that gas was eventually to be sent 
interstate.151 Such regulation effectively discouraged the overall production of 
natural gas, including unconventional natural gas.152 As the interstate price was 
capped, producers commonly had insufficient incentive to sell gas to distant 
interstate users who badly needed the gas.153 Likewise, price caps could 
 
 148 Cf. Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market 
Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (2013) (reviewing BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE 
SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)) (“Rapid growth and change . . . depend on significant levels of 
freedom to operate . . . and therefore require substantial commons in resources.”). 
 149 Interview by Michael Shellenberger with Dan Steward, Former Mitchell Energy Vice President, (Dec. 
12, 2011), available at http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/interview_with_dan_steward_for [hereinafter 
Shellenberger Interview] (recording Steward’s statements that Mitchell Energy had proven shale gas’s 
commercial viability by 2000 and that financial markets ultimately recognized this in 2002). 
 150 Pierce, supra note 116, at 11–16 (describing and criticizing Natural Gas Policy Act pricing policies, 
including policies that maintained price ceilings on “old,” conventional gas that already was being produced 
and raised or eliminating ceilings for other types of gas); Pierce, supra note 139, at 68 (“Lower ceilings were 
established for ‘old gas,’ or gas flowing from existing wells, reflecting the Commission’s determination that 
gas would continue to flow from existing wells at roughly constant costs. Higher ceilings were established for 
‘new gas,’ or gas produced from wells drilled later, to preserve exploration incentives.”). 
 151 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); see also Pierce, supra note 139, at 66 
(discussing the Supreme Court decision and FERC’s previous interpretation of its authority). 
 152 Pierce, supra note 139, at 69 (“There is no longer serious doubt that regulation of gas producer prices 
was the dominant factor responsible for the gas shortage that caused significant economic dislocations in the 
United States from 1969 through 1978.”). 
 153 See supra note 152; see also ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, PUTTING A PRICE ON ENERGY: 
INTERNATIONAL PRICING MECHANISMS FOR OIL & GAS 111 (2007) (“It gradually became apparent that 
wellhead price controls in their then-existing form were unworkable. By the late 1960s, the system was 
beginning to develop serious supply problems, and by the early 1970s gas shortages became increasingly 
severe, leading to supply curtailments of large customers.”); PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE NATURAL GAS 
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eliminate prospects for profit from more marginal reserves, including 
unconventional gas reserves, for which the private cost–benefit calculus was 
not among the most favorable.154 
Government attempts to reform gas markets followed. In the 1960s, FERC 
attempted to enhance the production of domestic gas without causing excessive 
inflation, and it did this by setting lower prices for gas from existing wells that 
was sold interstate and allowing higher prices for interstate gas produced from 
newly drilled wells.155 But shortages remained, and an increasingly complex 
pricing scheme coincided with an overall decline of the “total quantity of gas 
made available to the market.”156 In the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 
Congress later helped stimulate the production of “deep” gas and “tight” gas—
resources that tended to require unconventional technologies like horizontal 
drilling (and ultimately fracturing)—by allowing producers to charge higher 
interstate rates for gas produced from unconventional formations.157 In 1989, 
Congress fully deregulated the price of natural gas at the wellhead, albeit with 
several transition years for price deregulation to take complete effect.158 
Deregulation allowed all producers to charge market prices for all types of 
gas.159 
In short, gradual changes in pricing policies, combined with regulations 
enabling the siting and construction of pipelines and requiring open access to 
these pipelines, created the national market that was necessary to support 
 
MARKET: SIXTY YEARS OF REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 1–2 (2000) (“Federal regulatory policy in the 
1960s and 1970s placed limits on gas prices that caused significant nationwide shortages, and in response, new 
policy in the late 1970s then caused surpluses that closed down production facilities and led to dumping gas in 
spot markets.”). 
 154 Cf. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 42,416 
(Oct. 18, 1985) (noting various market distortions caused by price ceilings and that when Congress deregulated 
the price that could be charged for alternative gas supplies and gas found very deep underground, “[p]rices 
rose sharply,” and “[m]any millions of dollars were spent on exploring for gas that the market seemed to be 
saying could be sold” at a high price); Pierce, supra note 139, at 68–69 (in discussing the regional—“area”—
rates established for natural gas prices at the wellhead, and the higher price allowed to be charged for newly 
drilled gas in an effort to encourage production, noting that “to avoid discouraging production would have 
required ongoing company-by-company cost determinations”). 
 155 Pierce, supra note 139, at 68. 
 156 Id. at 69. 
 157 Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, amended by Natural Gas Wellhead 
Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157; see Hinton, supra note 6, at 233 (noting that the 
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 “offered natural gas producers substantial price incentives to find and produce 
gas from riskier, more expensive exploration”). 
 158 § 2(b), 103 Stat. at 158. 
 159 Id. § 2(a), 103 Stat. at 157–58 (providing that “maximum lawful prices” of gas should cease to apply). 
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high-priced drilling and fracturing by a multitude of independent producers,160 
smaller players that, unlike “major multinational companies such as 
ExxonMobil,” are generally “not vertically integrated” and “are usually 
regionally focused.”161 By the early 1990s, the foundations for a vibrant 
national market in natural gas—open-access interstate pipelines and favorable 
policies on pricing—were in place. 
III. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
Government contributions to the fracking revolution did not stop with 
transport and market infrastructure. Federal and state governments also 
supported relevant technological and commercial developments through a 
variety of frequently more targeted means, including direct government 
research, government funding, collaborative research projects and public–
private partnerships, tax preferences, and regulatory exemptions.162 This Part 
discusses such mechanisms and their roles in fostering the shale gas boom. 
A. Publicly Funded Research and Public–Private Partnerships 
The U.S. government funded or performed both basic and applied research 
that helped prime the pump for the ultimate shale gas boom. Energy crises of 
the early and mid-1970s prompted Congress and President Ford to create the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) in 1976, with 
promotion of “Unconventional Gas Research” as one of its goals.163 ERDA 
promptly began collaborating with universities and industry to “develop[] an 
 
 160 One could argue that without federal intervention, we would not have had the pricing problems 
initially created by interstate price caps. This is true, but the specific incentives provided to tight and deep gas 
on the interstate market—although part of a generally problematic pricing policy—did serve to encourage the 
development of unconventional resources. See Hinton, supra note 6, at 233 (observing that, after the Natural 
Gas Policy Act of 1978, “[t]hose willing to focus on natural gas and willing to try expensive, marginally 
profitable projects that would likely be rejected by the majors’ boards of managers finally had federal blessing 
to try their luck”). 
 161 Id. at 229. 
 162 See infra Part III.C. See generally Federal Financial Support for Energy Technologies: Assessing 
Costs and Benefits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 113th 
Cong. 20 (2013) (statement of Terry Dinan, Senior Analyst, Congressional Budget Office), available at http:// 
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-12-EnergyTechnologies.pdf (describing different 
financial mechanisms for government support). 
 163 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2 (“In 1976, Congress funded the Energy Research and 
Development Administration . . . to launch the Unconventional Gas Research (UGR) program.”). 
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inventory of the unconventional gas resources across several regions,”164 and 
ERDA’s 1977 successor, the DOE, continued such work.165 
For our purposes, perhaps the most important program initiated by ERDA 
was the Eastern Gas Shales Program (EGSP), which ERDA launched in 1976 
and the DOE sustained until 1992.166 In 1975, the federal government had 
partnered with industry to drill the “first Appalachian Basin directional wells to 
tap shale gas, and shortly thereafter completed the first horizontal shale well to 
employ seven individual hydraulically fractured intervals.”167 Building from 
these successes, EGSP focused on the Devonian shales of the Appalachian, 
Michigan, and Illinois Basins.168 Through EGSP, ERDA worked with industry, 
universities, and state geological surveys169 “to assess the resource base, in 
terms of volume, distribution, and character” and also to develop technologies, 
including massive hydraulic fracturing, for monitoring and completing drilling 
of wells to exploit those resources.170 The EGSP supported the drilling of about 
thirty-five experimental wells that demonstrated, among other things, 
possibilities for horizontal drilling.171 The EGSP also supported “theoretical 
and experimental research on hydraulic fracturing by Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory” and collaborative work on fracturing by the Stanford Research 
 
 164 Id. 
 165 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 1. 
 166 Id. at 201. 
 167 NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHALE GAS: APPLYING TECHNOLOGY TO SOLVE 
AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES 5 (2011), http://www.netl.doe.gov/file%20library/research/oil-gas/Shale_ 
Gas_March_2011.pdf [hereinafter NETL REPORT]. 
 168 See NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE’S UNCONVENTIONAL GAS RESEARCH 
PROGRAMS 1976–1995, at 16 (2007), http://www.netl.doe.gov/KMD/cds/disk7/disk2/Final%20Report.pdf 
(discussing the Appalachian, Illinois, and Michigan Basins in relation to “[t]hick Devonian-age black shales 
underl[ying] extensive areas of the eastern United States”). 
 169 Leo A. Schrider & Robert L. Wise, Potential New Sources of Natural Gas, 32 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 
703, 703–04 (1980). 
 170 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 201; cf. Schrider & Wise, supra note 169, at 709 
(reporting that, by 1980, “36 stimulation treatments [of wells, at least some involving a form of hydraulic 
fracturing,] ha[d] been performed in 22 Devonian shale wells”); see also ENERGY SYS. PLANNING DIV., TRW, 
INC., CORING AND LOGGING PLAN: EASTERN GAS SHALES PROJECT (1977), available at http://www.netl.doe. 
gov/kmd/cds/disk7/disk1/EGS%5CCoring%20and%20Logging%20Plan,%20Eastern%20Gas%20Shales%20P
roject.pdf. 
 171 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 3 (“The EGSP resulted in the drilling and coring of 
approximately 35 experimental wells in Devonian shales of the Appalachian basin, which revealed the impact 
of horizontal drilling on shale gas recovery.”); see also THADDEUS S. DYMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NO. 81-598, EASTERN GAS SHALES PROJECT (EGSP) DATA FILES: A FINAL REPORT 
(1981), http://www.netl.doe.gov/kmd/cds/disk7/disk1/EGS%5CEastern%20Gas%20Shales%20Project%20% 
28EGSP%29%20Data%20Files%20A%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
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Institute, Sandia Laboratories, and others.172 In total, the EGSP spent about 
$185 million in 2011 dollars,173 with peak spending occurring during the first 
several years of the program.174 
The amounts spent by the EGSP were modest in the context of overall 
spending of tens of billions of dollars by industry and government on 
energy-related research and development.175 But the EGSP’s contributions 
came at critical times when the possibilities for exploitation of shale gas 
reserves were poorly understood,176 when large oil and gas companies were 
reducing investment in research and development,177 and when, as has 
continued to be the case,178 the field of unconventional gas recovery was 
largely dominated by relatively small independents with limited budgets for 
research and development.179 As one set of commentators concluded, “The 
resulting maps and technical reports both proved the extent of shale gas 
resources and shared technological know-how with industry, demonstrating 
market potential and lowering risks to early entrants.”180 Resource estimates of 
 
 172 Schrider & Wise, supra note 169, at 709. 
 173 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 3. 
 174 Id. (reporting that the EGSP’s peak budget was $18 million—or $47 million in 2011 dollars—in 
1979); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 201 (“DOE expenditures from 1978 through termination 
of the program in 1992 amounted to $137 million (1999 dollars), with about two-thirds of the total having been 
expended between 1978 and 1982.” (citation omitted)). 
 175 Cf. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 160 
(2011), https://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf [hereinafter MIT STUDY] (“Relative to the 
role of natural gas in the energy sector, the Department of Energy (DOE), the lead government funder of 
energy R&D, has historically had very small programs dedicated to natural gas exploration, production, 
transportation and use.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 1 (“From 1978 through 1999, the 
federal government expended $91.5 billion (2000 dollars) on energy R&D, mostly through DOE programs. 
This direct federal investment constituted about a third of the nation’s total energy R&D expenditure . . . .”). 
 176 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 201 (“The DOE program was responsible for 
bringing together and integrating a significant amount of scattered data on the Eastern gas shales critical to a 
solid assessment of the resource base.”). 
 177 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 5 (“Starting in the early 1980s, major oil and gas companies 
began to decrease their research and development spending . . . .”). 
 178 Hinton, supra note 6, at 235 (“It is significant that as shale production has taken off in many areas, 
independents still dominate shale action, greatly outnumbering and outspending major and national oil 
companies.”). 
 179 See BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2 (“[T]he Eastern Gas Shales Project (EGSP) determined 
the recoverable reserves of Devonian shale gas and financed experimental shale wells—at a time when most 
firms in unconventional gas recovery had little or no research budgets.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 34, at 201 (describing the EGSP as “designed to assess the resource base . . . and to introduce more 
sophisticated logging and completion technology to an industry made up mostly of small, independent 
producers”). 
 180 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2. 
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the kind generated by the EGSP are essential for the industry, as they help 
determine where productive wells might most reasonably be drilled and 
fractured. Mitchell and his staff themselves studied EGSP data in support of 
their efforts to “crack” the Barnett Shale even though that formation was not 
part of the Devonian formations on which the EGSP focused.181 
A number of the EGSP’s investments turned out to be not only relatively 
well targeted but also well leveraged through the DOE’s partnerships with 
other actors and especially the Gas Research Institute (GRI), “a private 
non-profit research management organization formed in 1976 and funded 
through a FERC-sanctioned surcharge placed on interstate pipeline gas 
volumes.”182 From the start, a goal of the EGSP was to “encourage[] private 
industry to initiate and direct R&D projects by sharing the risks and costs of 
development.”183 In turn, GRI was perhaps the leading embodiment of a 
public–private partnership in this area. 
GRI, which had “members from all three segments of the industry—
producers, pipelines, and local distribution companies”—acted “as the R&D 
arm of the natural gas industry,” a regulated industry that policymakers had 
believed underinvested in research and development.184 GRI had much more 
money at its disposal than did the EGSP: its “early budget was approximately 
$40 million per year, growing to $200 million per year in the 1990s.”185 GRI’s 
peak annual budgets thus exceeded the total amount spent by the EGSP during 
the decade and a half of its existence.186 Moreover, of likely significance for 
businesses seeking assurance in making long-range plans, GRI’s funding was 
relatively stable and “independent of annual Congressional appropriations.”187 
 
 181 Loren Steffy, How Much Did the Feds Really Help with Fracking?, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2013, 9:21 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorensteffy/2013/10/31/how-much-did-the-feds-really-help-with-fracking/. 
 182 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, app. 8A, at 3. Deregulation of the natural gas industry ultimately led to 
the termination of GRI, which was replaced by the Gas Technology Institute in 2000 and then, after the ending 
of the FERC surcharge in 2004, the Royalty Trust Fund, which has a narrower focus on production and a 
research budget less than one fourth that of GRI at its peak. Id. app. 8A, at 5–6. But GRI lasted through the late 
1990s, when Mitchell made his critical breakthrough with slickwater hydraulic fracturing. 
 183 Schrider & Wise, supra note 169, at 704. 
 184 William M. Burnett, Dominic J. Monetta & Barry G. Silverman, How the Gas Research Institute (GRI) 
Helped Transform the US Natural Gas Industry, INTERFACES, Jan.–Feb. 1993, at 44, 45 (“Regulated 
industries, most notably electric and gas utilities, historically have underinvested in R&D.”). 
 185 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 4. 
 186 See supra text accompanying notes 173–74. 
 187 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, app. 8A, at 5. 
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Consistent with the nature of GRI’s membership, GRI “was dedicated to 
natural gas [research, development, and demonstration] across the value 
chain,” from wellhead to consumer.188 Overall, GRI’s work had a more applied 
focus than the DOE’s work,189 with GRI concentrating on “commercialization 
and deployment of technologies that were of interest to the industry, including 
new logging techniques, reservoir models, and simulation technologies.”190 But 
the work of the DOE and GRI was not purely complementary: they sometimes 
collaborated directly, as in coordinating with private companies to fund the 
drilling of experimental horizontal wells.191 Indeed, the reduction in DOE 
funding for natural gas research and development in the 1980s has been at least 
partly attributed to the availability of funding through GRI.192 
DOE and GRI funding and leadership not only helped set the technological 
agenda for improvements in natural gas extraction but also encouraged 
information sharing. As a condition of federal support for GRI, its projects 
were required to publish all findings, and industry partners were required to 
surrender claims to intellectual property rights in these findings.193 “Moreover, 
FERC made GRI indifferent to [intellectual property] royalties by subtracting 
any royalties from FERC funding; this ensured that GRI focused on technology 
diffusion as much as possible, rather than [on] support[ing] itself from 
licensing income.”194 
Quite generally, GRI appears to have helped foster an environment 
favorable to adoption of new technologies by independent producers, with 
whom GRI collaborated extensively. In 1991, Mitchell Energy began working 
directly with the DOE and GRI, joining with them over a period of several 
years to drill Mitchell’s first horizontal well in the Barnett and, more generally, 
 
 188 Id. at 160. 
 189 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 4 (“DOE and GRI complemented each other; DOE concentrated 
on basic research R&D to generate more data on and develop new exploration and production techniques, 
while the GRI program focused on commercialization and deployment of technologies for industry.”). 
 190 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, app. 8A, at 5. 
 191 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2 (“Experimental horizontal wells for shale gas, drilled 
conjointly with DOE, GRI, and individual companies, proved methods for the industry at a time when no firm 
was willing to try on its own.”); see also MIT STUDY, supra note 175, app. 8A, at 4 (noting that GRI 
“sometimes provid[ed] substantial industry match into the smaller DOE programs”). 
 192 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, app. 8A, at 4 (“To a large extent, the sharp decrease in the DOE natural 
gas [research, development, and demonstration] program funding in the 1980s is attributable to the existence 
of the larger GRI program and the prevailing view that oil and gas RD&D could be left to industry.”). 
 193 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 5. 
 194 Id. 
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to develop knowledge and techniques that would prove useful later.195 More 
generally, the GRI board apparently showed a solid capacity to respond to 
input from industry.196 Mitchell was on the GRI board, and Mitchell’s 
persistence was “generally credited with establishing the GRI focus” on 
unconventional natural gas.197 In turn, the GRI board “convinced DOE to 
refocus away from Eastern Gas shales to first Michigan’s Antrim shales and 
then Texas’ Barnett shales,” where the revolution ultimately took off.198 
In addition to helping individual operators like Mitchell, DOE and GRI 
supported development of a number of significant technologies. DOE and GRI 
contributions to demonstrations and development of techniques of horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing have already been noted.199 Other key 
technologies to which DOE and GRI contributed were polycrystalline diamond 
drill bits,200 measurement and logging of critical data while drilling,201 and 3D 
seismic imaging.202 
The story of DOE’s support of innovation in drill bits is of particular 
interest because it illustrates the unpredictable path that breakthrough 
innovations can take. In the 1970s, the DOE supported the development of new 
drill bits “that would be more suitable than traditional drill bits for the 
high-density, high-temperature applications needed to drill geothermal 
 
 195 See Shellenberger Interview, supra note 149 (quoting a former Mitchell Energy vice president as 
saying that, through the end of the 1990s, the federal government and GRI helped Mitchell Energy develop 
knowledge about the Barnett Shale, drill its “first horizontal well” in the Barnett, map cracks, and work on 
“re-fracks of shale wells”); supra note 20. 
 196 Burnett et al., supra note 184, at 46 (“GRI uses a comprehensive strategic planning and analysis 
approach with wide-ranging advisory input to develop its annual five-year plan.” (citation omitted)). 
 197 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, app. 8A, at 5. 
 198 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 4–5. 
 199 See supra text accompanying notes 188–95. 
 200 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 201 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 195 (noting that the DOE “supported a field 
demonstration of [mud pulse telemetry] in its very early and critical phase of development”); NETL REPORT, 
supra note 167, at 6 (suggesting that modern directional drilling technologies such as electromagnetic 
telemetry had their “roots in DOE research from the 1980s and 90s.”). 
 202 See WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 13–14 (discussing a DOE seismic imaging program that 
began in 1988, DOE-sponsored mapping research at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a “DOE Multiwell 
Site experiment in Colorado”); cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 208, 211 (noting that, 
although “[t]he advances in seismic technology have been developed mostly by industry,” “federal 
government funding geared to certain niche areas—for instance, cross-well seismic, utilization of special 
expertise and facilities such as the high-performance computing capabilities of the national laboratories, or the 
support of seismic surveying for independent operator . . . is a useful adjunct to a major private sector 
activity”). 
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wells.”203 Fortuitously, the resulting polycrystalline diamond bits turned out to 
be tremendously useful in drilling oil and gas wells and lowered drilling costs 
substantially204—a development that was presumably of particular importance 
for the drilling of long horizontal wells through concrete-like shale rock. A 
recent study estimates that the new polycrystalline drill bits yielded cost 
savings of $15.6 billion from 1982 to 2008, with half of this added value 
attributed to the DOE’s investment of a mere $26.5 million during that 
period.205 
B. Tax Relief 
Government support for new and improved oil and gas development 
techniques has included a variety of tax incentives and regulatory exemptions. 
The tax benefit that tends to draw the greatest attention is the Section 29 tax 
credit for “natural gas production from unconventional natural gas wells drilled 
between 1980 and 1992,” which “extend[ed] to natural gas produced from 
those wells until 2002.”206 This tax credit, which Congress enacted as part of 
the Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980,207 generated tax savings of about 
$10 billion for operators between 1980 and 2002,208 including about 
$760 million in savings in 1993 alone.209 Although these savings were shared 
with developers of other unconventional gas sources such as coalbed methane, 
the numbers suggest that the tax credit made financial contributions to shale 
gas development at least on the order of the direct monetary contributions to 
shale gas development made by GRI and DOE combined.210 Even small 
operators who lacked substantial tax liabilities were able to benefit from the 
credits by engaging in tax equity financing transactions in which they 
 
 203 GALLAHER ET AL., supra note 100, at 97. 
 204 Id. (“Approximately 60 per cent of worldwide oil and gas well footage in 2006 was drilled using PDC 
drill bits. . . . [They] yiel[ded] a present value cost savings of $15.6 billion from 1982 to 2008.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 205 Id. at 97–98 (crediting DOE with “significant contribution[s] to (1) developing the bit and getting it to 
the market, (2) overcoming performance flaws, and limitations, and (3) spurring the innovation that resulted in 
overall market success of PDC drill bits”). 
 206 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, at app. 8A, at 5; see also YERGIN, supra note 13, at 326 (“Fortunately, 
something of a carrot was available, what was called Section 29. . . . Over the years, that incentive did what it 
was supposed to do—it stimulated activity that would otherwise not have taken place.”). 
 207 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2. 
 208 Begos, supra note 97. 
 209 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, at app. 8A, at 5. 
 210 See supra text accompanying notes 173–74, 185–86. 
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“effectively ‘sold’ their credits to larger firms.”211 Once again, Mitchell Energy 
took advantage of the opportunity for government assistance, using tax credits 
to “help[] underwrite the cost of developing hydraulic fracturing.”212 
Beyond the now-defunct Section 29 credit, there are a wide variety of 
extant “lenient rules regarding the recognition, timing, character, and 
calculation of taxable profits [that] create large [effective] subsidies for 
taxpayers engaged in” oil and gas production.213 For independent producers, 
aggregation of these various additional incentives can result in a double-digit 
“negative tax rate” that substantially increases pretax returns on investment.214 
Many of these tax preferences are controversial215: the Obama Administration 
has repeatedly proposed repealing a number of them.216 For purposes of this 
study, however, the key point is that, to the extent these more general tax 
preferences attracted investment either in shale gas extraction or in associated 
technologies,217 they too contributed to the shale gas boom. 
 
 211 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 7. 
 212 Steffy, supra note 181. 
 213 John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of Federal Tax Subsidies for Oil, Gas, 
and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 324 (2011). 
 214 See Calvin H. Johnson, Accurate and Honest Tax Accounting for Oil and Gas, 125 TAX NOTES 573, 
573, 577 (2009) (calculating a negative tax rate of 42% under a model in which “four important tax 
preferences”—“the expensing of intangible drilling costs, the pool of capital doctrine, the percentage depletion 
allowance, and the domestic manufacturing deduction”—are applied to an investment); see also GILBERT E. 
METCALF, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, TAXING ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES: WHICH FUELS 
DOES THE TAX CODE FAVOR? 5 tbl.2 (2009), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/eper_04.pdf (estimating 
effective tax rates of negative 13.5% for independent production companies and 15.2% for “integrated firms”). 
 215 See, e.g., MAURA ALLAIRE & STEPHEN BROWN, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, ELIMINATING SUBSIDIES 
FOR FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS MARKETS 14 (2009), 
http://rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-09-10.pdf (“[T]here is divergent opinion about the effects of such 
subsidies.”); Johnson, supra note 214, at 573 (“The government should get out of the business of subsidizing 
oil and gas via the tax system.”). 
 216 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 
2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 59–69 (2009) (explaining proposals to eliminate various tax preferences favoring 
oil and gas companies); ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42374, OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 
TAX ISSUES IN THE FY2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL 2 (2013) (reporting that for the FY2014 budget proposal the 
Obama Administration proposed to eliminate various fossil fuel benefits). 
 217 Cf. Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence 
Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 44 (2006) (“Early empirical studies 
of the impact of oil and gas tax incentives on resource allocation consistently concluded that these special 
provisions allowed the petroleum industry to maintain a higher level of private investment than it would have 
absent these policies.”). 
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In particular, one of these tax preferences, the “percentage depletion 
allowance,”218 is of interest because, since 1975, it has been available only for 
independent producers, operators that, as indicated before,219 are non-vertically 
integrated “producers that do not have refining and retailing operations, and 
are unrelated to those that do.”220 Under the percentage depletion allowance, 
independent producers of oil and gas may “deduct against their gross receipts a 
depletion amount equal to 15% of their oil and gas revenue”—thereby 
effectively rendering that share of revenue free from tax.221 
Percentage depletion can play a substantial role in generating an effective 
negative tax on production.222 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has 
estimated that percentage depletion provided $900 million in tax relief in the 
2011 fiscal year.223 Even aside from direct benefits to fracking’s development 
through the attraction of additional investment, one might conjecture that the 
post-1975, independent-producer-favoring rules on percentage depletion 
helped support the vibrant community of independent producers that 
spearheaded the shale gas boom.224 
Another major tax advantage likewise discriminates between independent 
producers and majors, although only partially. In 1916, the federal government 
allowed the immediate “expensing of intangible drilling costs (IDCs) and dry 
hole [non-producing well] costs.”225 This allowance remains in effect and 
 
 218 Johnson, supra note 214, at 581. 
 219 See supra text accompanying note 161. 
 220 Bogdanski, supra note 213, at 325. Compare id. (describing current provisions for percentage 
depletion), with Stephen L. McDonald, Distinctive Tax Treatment of Income from Oil and Gas Production, 
10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 97, 98 (1970) (noting that 1926 legislation introduced percentage depletion at a 27.5% 
rate as a substitute for “discovery-value depletion”). See generally Walter J. Mead, The Performance of 
Government in Energy Regulations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 352, 352 (1979) (reporting that 
1975 legislation “removed the benefits of percentage depletion allowances for integrated oil companies only” 
but also decreased the allowances for independent producers). 
 221 Bogdanski, supra note 213, at 325. 
 222 Johnson, supra note 214, at 581; see also METCALF, supra note 214, at 5 tbl.2 (estimating effective tax 
rates of negative 13.5% for independent production companies and 15.2% for “integrated firms”). 
 223 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF 
FUELS AND ENERGY POLICIES 2–3 (2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-06-
FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf. 
 224 See WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 31 (“The major oil firms, which are much larger than any 
independent natural gas firm, had the capacity [for large investments], but they did not invest in shale gas 
early.”). 
 225 MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41227, ENERGY TAX POLICY: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF ENERGY TAX EXPENDITURES 2–3 (2011); see also Bogdanski, 
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permits operators to fully deduct non-salvageable expenses in the year in 
which they were incurred, rather than capitalizing them and deducting their 
value only more gradually through depletion or depreciation.226 Costs 
encompassed within this allowance “typically include [those of] labor, fuel, 
hauling, power, materials, supplies, tool rentals, drilling equipment repairs, and 
other items incident to and necessary for drilling and equipping productive 
wells.”227 Congress has specifically indicated that such costs include expenses 
from fracturing.228 Although Congress has not restricted IDC deductions to 
independent producers, it has applied special limitations to their use by 
integrated producers: as noted by John Bogdanski in 2011, “Integrated 
companies are eligible for the expense election, but the election is limited to 
70% of IDC each year; the other 30% must be recovered no more rapidly than 
through a 60-month amortization.”229 
Like percentage depletion, IDC deduction is viewed as a substantial tax 
preference. The CBO has estimated that in the 2011 fiscal year this allowance 
provided a total of $800 million in tax relief.230 Although such relief was not 
exclusive to fracking, horizontal drilling, independent producers, or 
unconventional natural gas, the heavy reliance of hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling on special equipment and know-how suggests that the IDC 
deductions likely provided substantial encouragement for the extraction 
techniques that are hallmarks of the fracking revolution. Consistent with this 
sense, the Western Energy Alliance, a trade association formerly known as the 
Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States,231 gave the IDC 
deductions top billing in a position paper responding negatively to Obama 
Administration proposals for repeal of various oil and gas tax preferences, 
including the percentage depletion allowance.232 The Alliance specifically 
 
supra note 213, at 325 (“The intangible costs of drilling and developing domestic oil and gas wells may be 
deducted immediately, rather than capitalized and recovered over time, at the election of the taxpayer.”). 
 226 SHERLOCK, supra note 225, at 3. 
 227 Hymel, supra note 217, at 49. 
 228 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 
1986, at 195 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) (“IDCs may be paid or accrued to drill, shoot, fracture, and clean the 
wells.”). 
 229 Bogdanski, supra note 213, at 326 (footnote omitted). 
 230 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 223, at 3. 
 231 About Western Energy Alliance, W. ENERGY ALLIANCE, http://www.westernenergyalliance.org/ 
alliance (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 232 W. ENERGY ALLIANCE, INTANGIBLE DRILLING COSTS (IDC) AND OTHER DEDUCTIONS DRIVE 
INNOVATION AND JOB CREATION (2013), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/western_energy_ 
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characterized the IDC deductions as “the R&D program for the oil and natural 
gas industry,” one that “made economically feasible” “[s]hale, tight sands, and 
other unconventional plays from North Dakota to Colorado to Texas.”233 
Other federal tax rules and provisions have also favored oil and gas 
production. These include, inter alia, depreciation of natural gas pipelines over 
fifteen years and natural gas gathering lines over seven years; an allowance for 
“tax-exempt bond-financed prepayments” for natural gas;234 a deduction for 
the use of tertiary injectants, such as carbon dioxide, in old reservoirs to wring 
remaining resources out of them;235 a “passive loss exception for working 
interests in oil and natural gas properties;”236 and limited time periods for 
amortization of “geological and geophysical” expenses (seven years for large, 
integrated companies and two years for independents)237 that allow for a higher 
annual deduction than might otherwise apply.238 In 2004, Congress added to 
the list by enacting a general “domestic manufacturing tax deduction” that has 
enabled oil and gas producers to deduct three to six percent239 “of the lesser of 
taxable income or income from domestic ‘production’ activities” up to a 
payroll limitation generally set at “50% of the wages that are paid by the 
taxpayer and allocable to the [relevant] income.”240 Much longer lived has 
been the “pool of capital doctrine,” which for decades has exempted from 
federal income taxation transfers in which oil and gas producers “compensate 
 
alliance_wg_comment.pdf (headlining the proposal for repeal of IDC deductions and discussing this proposal 
before those for repeal of other tax preferences, such as the percentage depletion allowance). 
 233 Id. 
 234 SHERLOCK, supra note 225, at 8. An additional benefit that does not contribute to the development of 
new wells is the marginal well tax credit, implemented in 1994 “to keep low-production oil and natural gas 
wells in production during periods of low prices for those fuels.” PIROG, supra note 216, at 3. 
 235 PIROG, supra note 216, at 4. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Bogdanski, supra note 213, at 326. 
 238 PIROG, supra note 216, at 6–7. Last-in, first-out (LIFO) rules for inventory accounting can also favor 
oil and gas producers reporting sales of inventory by allowing them to identify “the most recent, usually higher 
costs with the units that are sold and deductible,” while “identify[ing] the lowest costs with the units that have 
been retained and remain as nondeductible basis.” Johnson, supra note 214, at 582. “International accounting 
standards no longer permit use of the LIFO system, but taxpayers who are not subject to those rules (including 
many U.S. oil companies) can, if they use LIFO on their financial books as well as on their tax returns, reduce 
their taxable income considerably.” Bogdanski, supra note 213, at 328 (footnotes omitted). 
 239 PIROG, supra note 216, at 6 (noting that the deduction began “at 3% in 2005, . . . rising to a maximum 
of 9% in 2010,” but with a cap of 6% on the rate for oil and gas production). 
 240 Bogdanski, supra note 213, at 327. 
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landowners, suppliers, and drillers with economic interests in the future profits 
of their operations.”241 
In addition to the preceding host of forms of favorable treatment under 
federal tax law, drilling and fracturing operations have received and continue 
to enjoy state tax advantages. Most states place a severance tax on oil and gas 
when it is extracted, often in the range of three to twelve percent of the market 
value of the oil and gas sold.242 Many of these states, however, exempt 
unconventional or “high-cost” gas from the tax.243 In Texas in 2006, when the 
Barnett Shale boom was still in full swing, the state provided more than 
$1.1 billion to oil and gas companies under its high-cost gas exemption.244 
Meanwhile, with agreement from the governor, Pennsylvania’s legislature 
repeatedly refused to pass a severance tax on resource extraction.245 By 
February 2012, when the Pennsylvania legislature finally agreed upon an 
 
 241 Id. at 328. This doctrine treats the transactions in question—including transactions for services that are 
entirely complete—as nontaxable on the ground that their effect is to generate a sort of joint venture in which 
the various partners will share in profits that only appear later. Mark P. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange: The 
Taxation of Joint Ventures Between Labor and Capital, 44 TAX L. REV. 519, 520–21 (1989) (“The theory 
underlying the [pool of capital] doctrine is that people who join in a venture contributing their capital and 
services for a share of a venture’s profits give up and receive nothing. Instead, they pool their resources and 
keep a corresponding share of profits.”); see also Johnson, supra note 214, at 579 (noting IRS embrace of the 
doctrine in G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214); Walter D. Schwidetzky, The Pool of Capital Doctrine: A Peace 
Proposal, 61 TUL. L. REV. 519, 526 (1987) (describing the “much celebrated, highly abstruse and syntactically 
bizarre General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 22730” as “arguably the most authoritative General Counsel 
Memorandum ever issued”). The pool of capital doctrine is liable to criticism for “creat[ing] an incentive for 
in-kind compensation and a disincentive for normal equity financing.” Gergen, supra, at 539 n.56; cf. id. at 
539 & n.56 (characterizing the “subsidy argument” for the pool of capital doctrine as “preposterous because 
even if we wanted to subsidize oil and gas ventures through the [Internal Revenue] Code, it is absurd to do that 
by not recognizing gains from exchanges of labor for capital,” rather than “by making [oil and gas] returns tax 
exempt or by providing a deduction for the cost of such investments”). 
 242 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:633(7)(a), (c)(ii)(aa) (Supp. 2015) (12.5% tax on oil’s “value at 
the time and place of severance” with temporary suspension of the tax for horizontally-drilled wells); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 27-25-503(1)(b), (c)(1) (West Supp. 2013) (tax of 3% of “the value of the oil at the point of 
production” and 1.3% for oil from horizontally drilled wells for a limited time period); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7-29-4(A)(1), (4) (West 2012) (tax of 3.75% of the taxable value of natural gas, but 2.45% for natural gas 
from “well workover” projects). 
 243 See, e.g., SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, THE ENERGY REPORT 379 (2008) 
(“The High-Cost Gas program provides a tax incentive for high-cost gas wells based on the ratio of each 
well’s drilling and completion costs to twice the median cost for all high-cost Texas gas wells submitted in the 
prior fiscal year.”); supra note 242. 
 244 COMBS, supra note 243, at 68, 378. 
 245 Susan Phillips, Corbett Defends Impact Fee over Severance Tax, STATEIMPACT (June 14, 2013, 
5:06 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/06/14/corbett-defends-impact-fee-over-severance-tax/.  
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impact fee instead,246 the state had already issued more than ten thousand 
permits for unconventional wells.247 
C. Regulatory Relief 
Like taxes, regulations can impact the profitability of innovation-related 
activity, and governments have commonly used regulatory relief to try to spur 
investment. But at least in relation to the fracking revolution, the impact of 
such relief might be more marginal than is commonly assumed. When 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental Protection implemented rules 
required by the state’s Act 13, which included enhanced environmental 
protections for hydraulically fractured wells such as better secondary 
containment under tanks (to catch spills), larger setbacks between well sites 
and water resources, and a heightened presumption of fault for water pollution, 
the Department estimated that total compliance costs imposed through the 
rulemaking would be “between $75,002,050 and $96,636,950 annually.”248 
Spread among approximately 1,751 Marcellus Shale wells drilled and fractured 
in 2011,249 the estimated upper-bound cost was approximately $55,200 
annually per well—an amount that is a small fraction of the more than 
$6 million that one unconventional well can cost,250 although the total cost of 
regulatory compliance rises, of course, through annual accretion. 
In any event, regulations, even those that arguably only hit margins, can 
risk discouraging development to a degree that policymakers find intolerable. 
For example, in 1988, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that 
oil and gas “exploration and production” wastes—most of the soil and rock 
cuttings, liquid wastes, used drilling fluids and muds, and other wastes 
 
 246 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301–2318 (West, Westlaw current through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 247 Year to Date—Permits Issued by County and Well Type Report, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 
http://www.depreportingservices.state.pa.us/ReportServer/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?/Oil_Gas/Permits_Issued
_Count_by_Well_Type_YTD (enter “1/1/2001” for “PERMITS ISSUED START DATE,” “2/14/2012” for 
“PERMITS ISSUED END DATE,” select “All” for “REGION,” select “Yes” for “UNCONVENTIONAL 
ONLY,” and view final page of the resulting report) (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 248 Environmental Protection Performance Standards at Oil and Gas Well Sites, 43 Pa. Bull. 7377 
(Dec. 14, 2013), available at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol43/43-50/2362.html. 
 249 Bureau of Oil & Gas Mgmt., Wells Drilled, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION (Dec. 5. 2011), http:// 
www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/2011%20Wells%20Drilled.gif. 
 250 Pad Drilling and Rig Mobility Lead to More Efficient Drilling, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 11, 
2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7910 (“EIA analysis of average Bakken, Eagle Ford, 
and Marcellus well-related expenses finds that total costs per horizontal well can vary between approximately 
$6.5 million and $9 million.”). 
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produced at well sites—should not be regulated as hazardous wastes under 
Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.251 The EPA 
concluded that states and the federal government were, for the most part, doing 
a reasonable job of controlling the impacts of these wastes.252 Tellingly, the 
EPA highlighted the costs of regulatory compliance if the federal government 
were to treat the wastes as hazardous, concluding that, under high-end 
estimates, compliance could cost several billion dollars.253 With 70,000 wells 
apparently in play, the average cost per well of such regulatory compliance 
might not have seemed so overwhelming254: $7 billion divided by 70,000 is 
$100,000. But, the EPA was apparently impressed. It ultimately exempted 
most oil and gas wastes from RCRA Subtitle C regulation,255 thus ensuring that 
what was perceived as a potentially costly regulatory barrier would not impede 
well development. 
As members of the oil and gas industry, unconventional gas producers also 
benefited from other exemptions during the developmental stages of the shale 
gas boom. For example, Congress did not hold operators liable for cleanup of 
land contamination under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) if these operators spilled 
petroleum substances, including natural gas, natural gas liquids, and liquefied 
natural gas, on the ground.256 
In short, in the decades preceding the shale gas boom, producers looking to 
exploit shale gas and other unconventional reserves enjoyed regulatory 
exemptions that might have tipped cost–benefit analyses in favor of such 
activities. By analogy with the “infant industry” exception to arguments for 
free trade,257 one can envision an “infant technology” argument for such 
 
 251 Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, Development and Production 
Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,447 (July 6, 1988). See generally James R. Cox, Revisiting RCRA’s Oilfield 
Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous Oilfield Exploration and Production Wastes, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 
1, 2–7 (2003) (providing a history of the exemption and explaining the exemption’s scope). 
 252 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,446. 
 253 Id. at 25,450. 
 254 These numbers were based on an estimated “70,000 crude oil and natural gas wells” and additional 
wastes from geothermal energy wells. Id. at 25,448. 
 255 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(b)(2)(A)–(B); 6982(m)(1) (2012); 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446.  
 256 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14) (2012). Oil companies, though, still faced Clean Water Act liability and, as of 
1990, Oil Pollution Act liability for onshore spills. 40 C.F.R. § 112.1 (1990). 
 257 Marc J. Melitz, When and How Should Infant Industries Be Protected?, 66 J. INT’L ECON. 177, 178 
(2005) (“The infant industry argument is one of the oldest arguments used to justify the protection of industries 
from international trade.”); see also JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 612 (J. Laurence 
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favorable regulatory treatment as a means to encourage a critical mass of 
early-stage activity when broad-scale commercial feasibility is still in doubt 
and the activity in question is economically marginal enough that it is at great 
risk of being snuffed out. Further, at least while activity levels are low in such 
a period of infancy, one might expect that the costs of regulatory exemptions 
will be relatively small and isolated. 
But the broad-based regulatory exemptions for oil and gas activities 
described above have commonly applied to well-established as well as 
arguably “infant” activities and thus have not been tailored to fit an 
infant-technology rationale. Moreover, when more tailored regulatory relief 
was enacted, the period of infancy was past. Through the so-called 
“Halliburton Loophole,”258 the Energy Policy Act of 2005 exempted all 
hydraulic fracturing, with the exception of fracturing that uses diesel fuel, from 
the definition of “underground injection” under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act.259 As a result, fracturing could occur without a permit that would have 
required the operator to show that the process would not endanger underground 
sources of drinking water. Although this exemption is well tailored to fit 
fracturing activities that proved critical to shale gas extraction, it came more 
than three years after Mitchell Energy merged with Devon Energy260 and more 
than half a decade after a pronounced upward kink in Barnett Shale gas 
production from 1999 to 2000.261 In short, when lawmakers ultimately 
provided regulatory relief tailored to the exploitation of shale gas reserves, 
they apparently did so at a time when they were no longer nurturing infant 
activity but instead feeding an already gathering boom. 
 
Laughlin ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884) (“The only case in which, on mere principles of political 
economy, protecting duties can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily . . . in hopes of 
naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country.”). 
 258 Warner & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 479–80. 
 259 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (2012). Also in 2005, Congress attempted to narrow the Clean Water Act 
“stormwater” permitting required for the construction of oil and gas well sites—a permitting process intended 
to reduce soil erosion. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2012). But the effectiveness of this exemption has been unclear. 
See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 526 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2008) (curtailing EPA’s efforts to 
implement the statutory exemption); Regulation of Oil and Gas Construction Activities, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY (Mar. 9, 2009), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/stormwater/Regulation-of-Oil-and-
Gas-Construction-Activities.cfm (attempting to clarify relevant regulations). 
 260 STEWARD, supra note 106, at 179 (“In January 2002, the merger of Mitchell Energy and Devon 
closed . . . .”). 
 261 Id. at 189 fig. 6-2 (showing relatively linear growth in Barnett Shale gas production from 1992 through 
1999, followed by a pronounced upward kink in the growth trajectory from 1999 to 2000). 
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As the scope of drilling and fracturing activities has scaled upward, the 
wisdom of such late-coming regulatory relief has become subject to serious 
question.262 More effective regulation might have limited now-evident social 
costs. There have been substantial spills and outflows of fracturing and drilling 
materials at well sites that have sometimes led to water contamination.263 
Moreover, disposal wells that accept liquid wastes from drilling and fracturing 
have been associated with earthquakes in several regions.264 Drilling and 
fracturing also emit air pollution that can increase smog265 and greenhouse 
gases.266 Finally, although communities that have become hosts to booming 
natural gas production have experienced benefits,267 they have also 
 
 262 For a discussion of how scaling up activities can generate problems, see Hannah J. Wiseman, 
Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235 (2014). 
 263 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 5, at 766–68, 799–801 (describing spills at well sites, including spills 
that entered swamps and other waters, based on state inspection reports); Cases Where Pit Substances 
Contaminated New Mexico’s Groundwater, N.M. OIL CONSERVATION DIV. (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www. 
emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/documents/GWImpactPublicRecordsSixColumns20081119.pdf (listing instances of 
groundwater contamination); Press Release, Md. Attorney Gen., AG Gansler Secures Funding to Safeguard 
Susquehanna Water Quality (June 14, 2012), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2012/061412.html 
(reporting contamination by fracking fluids of farmland and a creek tributary). 
 264 Frohlich et al., supra note 5; Austin Holland, Oklahoma Geological Survey: Potential for Induced 
Seismicity Within Oklahoma, GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL 6 (Jan. 23, 2013) http://www.gwpc.org/sites/ 
default/files/event-sessions/Holland_AustinFINAL.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, Record 
Number of Oklahoma Tremors Raises Possibility of Damaging Earthquakes (May 2, 2014), available at 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/contactus/golden/newsrelease_05022014.php (reporting that statistical analysis of 
“recent earthquake rate changes” in Oklahoma “suggests that a likely contributing factor . . . is triggering by 
wastewater injected into deep geologic formations”). Disposal wells are regulated under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, but the Act does not cover induced seismicity. See generally UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL 
NAT’L TECHNICAL WORKGRP., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MINIMIZING AND MANAGING POTENTIAL IMPACTS 
OF INDUCED-SEISMICITY FROM CLASS II WELLS: PRACTICAL APPROACHES (2012), http://www.eenews.net/ 
assets/2013/07/19/document_ew_01.pdf (studying the problem but not regulating it). Only Arkansas and Ohio 
have changed their regulations to fill the gap. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-3-07 (2013); Permanent Disposal 
Well Moratorium Area, ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N (June 7, 2011), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/notices/ 
Ex.%201B%20-Permanent%20Disposal%20Well%20Moratorium%20Area.pdf. 
 265 See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
6-187 to 6-188 (2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (describing N2O and carbon 
dioxide emissions from combustion at well sites); DALE WELLS, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, 
CONDENSATE TANK EMISSIONS 2, 10 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei20/session6/dwells.pdf 
(showing that condensate tanks were the largest cause of regional nonattainment of air quality standards in the 
Denver area). 
 266 Allen et al., supra note 58, at 17,769; Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane 
Leakage from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PNAS 6435, 6438 (2012). EPA Clean Air Act regulations 
effective on January 1, 2015, will introduce partial regulation by requiring operators to capture certain 
emissions of volatile organic compounds (including methane). 40 C.F.R. § 60.5375 (2014). 
 267 Cf. E.B., Well-Being in America: Shale Gas Buys You Happiness, ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2014, 5:59), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21597121 (suggesting that the shale gas boom is a large factor behind North 
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experienced a variety of costs. These include road damage and traffic, 
increased demand for physical infrastructure,268 increased demand for city 
services such as fire and emergency response, rises in crime and drug use,269 
changes in historic economic activities like tourism and agriculture, and 
nuisances from the noise, light, dust, and pollution at well sites.270 
In considering lessons from the story behind the fracking revolution, Part V 
examines how future policymakers might limit the downsides of regulatory 
relief as well as its possible tendency to persist and even expand after 
innovation-fostering justifications have substantially expired.271 In the 
meantime, Part IV continues the discussion of factors behind the revolution 
itself by describing roles played by complementary assets, intellectual property 
rights, secrecy, and information sharing. 
 
Dakota’s rise to the top of the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, meant to act as a measure of the mental 
and physical health of states’ residents). 
 268 See, e.g., WILLISTON ECON. DEV., supra note 5, at 1 (noting that a prior increase in “major 
infrastructure capacity for up to 40% more population (pop 16,000)” had fallen short and there was additional 
need for “water, sewer, and road infrastructure for workforce housing and industry facility needs”). 
 269 A number of media sources report rising crime and drug use following fracking-related booms. See, 
e.g., Jack Healy, As Oil Floods Plains Towns, Crime Pours In, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/us/as-oil-floods-plains-towns-crime-pours-in.html; Michael Marks, 
Drugs Follow Eagle Ford Energy Boom, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN (June 22, 2014), http://projects.statesman. 
com/news/eagle-ford-drugs/. Academic literature and government reports provide a more nuanced picture in 
which increases in crime might largely reflect population growth associated with such booms. See, e.g., CAROL 
A. ARCHBOLD, “POLICING THE PATCH”: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE OIL BOOM ON SMALL TOWN 
POLICING AND CRIME IN WESTERN NORTH DAKOTA 55 (2013), available at http://www.ndsu.edu/fileadmin/ 
cjps/Policing_the_Patch_Report_-_Final_Draft_August_4th_-_Archbold.docx (noting that an apparent 
increase in crime was “proportionate with the increase in population”); Rick Ruddell et al., Drilling Down: An 
Examination of the Boom-Crime Relationship in Resource-Based Boom Counties, W. CRIMINOLOGY REV., 
Apr. 2014, at 3, 9 (finding “modest support for the proposition that crime is higher in oil producing counties 
and that crime increased after the Boom”); MONT. ALL THREAT INTELLIGENCE CTR. & N.D. STATE & LOCAL 
INTELLIGENCE CTR., IMPACT OF POPULATION GROWTH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE WILLISTON BASIN 
REGION 1 (2012), http://www.ag.nd.gov/reports/jointproductfinal.pdf (“With the increase in population there 
has been an increase in arrests, criminal activity and vehicle crashes.”). 
 270 WILLISTON ECON. DEV., supra note 5, at 26–28, 35; Susan Christopherson & Ned Rightor, The 
Boom-Bust Cycle of Shale Gas Extraction Economies, Community & Regional Development Institute, CARDI 
REP. (Cornell Univ. Cmty. & Reg’l Dev. Inst., Ithaca, N.Y.), Sept. 1, 2011, at 4, available at http://www. 
greenchoices.cornell.edu/downloads/development/shale/Economic_Consequences.pdf; Jeffrey Jacquet, Energy 
Boomtowns & Natural Gas: Implications for Marcellus Shale Local Governments & Rural Communities 14, 
17, 22, 25, 28 (Ne. Reg’l Ctr. for Rural Dev., Paper No. 43, 2009), available at http://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/ 
publications/rdp/rdp43; CJ Randall, Hammer Down: A Guide to Protecting Local Roads Impacted by Shale 
Gas Drilling 2 (Cornell Univ. Comprehensive Econ. Impact Analysis of Natural Gas Extraction in the 
Marcellus Shale Working Paper Series, 2010), available at http://www.greenchoices.cornell.edu/downloads/ 
development/shale/Protecting_Local_Roads.pdf. 
 271 See infra text accompanying notes 406–24. 
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IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS, AND SHARING 
A. Complementary Assets, Financing, and the “No Patents” Story 
As described in the Introduction, a common part of the origin story of the 
shale boom is that its beginnings were fundamentally patent free. The key 
entrepreneur, Mitchell, and his successor, Devon Energy, did not patent key 
breakthroughs in slickwater fracturing and horizontal drilling.272 The resulting 
lack of patent protection might have facilitated the subsequent shale gas boom, 
enabling others to rapidly copy Mitchell and Devon’s techniques without 
having to pay licensing fees or worry about lawsuits for patent infringement.273 
There is plausibility to the basic “no patent” story—really a “no patent” and 
“limited trade secret” story to the extent it suggests that significant information 
about advances, such as those by Mitchell Energy, was freely circulated for 
others to use. A major source of plausibility for this story comes from the fact 
that, without obtaining patents or keeping certain forms of key information 
permanently secret, companies like Mitchell Energy and Devon Energy could 
use investments in complementary assets—private land and mineral rights—to 
appropriate substantial returns from innovation.274 
Mitchell Energy provided a classic example of how to appropriate value 
from innovation by acquiring substantial land and mineral rights in the Barnett 
Shale at a time when prices were relatively low. After Mitchell had greatly 
increased the value of those rights by developing and publicizing such 
advances as slickwater fracturing, Mitchell was able to sell those rights at a 
comparatively high price.275 
Mitchell pursued this strategy of buying low and selling high quite 
deliberately. In the late 1980s, Mitchell Energy apparently delayed joining 
forces with GRI because of concern that such collaboration would draw too 
much attention and thereby too quickly drive up prices for rights to land and 
 
 272 Cahoy et al., supra note 26, at 291 (“[D]uring the late 1990s and early 2000s, neither Mitchell nor 
Devon pursued patent protection for their respective innovations in slickwater hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling.”). 
 273 Id. at 291–92. 
 274 WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 30 (“Private land ownership contributed to the development of 
shale gas in that it offered entrepreneurial natural gas firms a method of obtaining reasonable returns from their 
early investments . . . .”). 
 275 See infra text accompanying notes 276–78. 
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minerals in the Barnett Shale.276 After Mitchell Energy had improved “its 
acreage position,” it began working with GRI in the 1990s and ultimately made 
the key breakthroughs that it publicized in the early 2000s.277 In 2002, Mitchell 
reaped the rewards: having proven the Barnett Shale’s profitability, Mitchell 
sold itself and its carefully acquired land and mineral rights to Devon Energy 
for $3.5 billion.278 
Other early movers mimicked Mitchell’s success. Range Resources—the 
first successful developer of a Marcellus Shale well in Appalachia—snapped 
up land and mineral rights in southwestern Pennsylvania and its environs.279 
“By August 2007, Range had spent more than $150 million on what it 
described to its investors as its ‘Appalachian Basin Devonian shale gas play’—
a sizeable investment for a company that had a market capitalization of $400 
million.”280 When prices for gas rights “climbed from about $50 to thousands 
of dollars per acre at the height of the leasing frenzy in 2008 and 2009,” 
Range’s value swelled as well: within a few years, the $400 million company 
was worth $8 billion.281 
Consequently, in the case of the shale gas boom, there is no mystery about 
how private firms could share basic information on new techniques for gas 
extraction while still hoping that their large capital investments would yield 
handsome profits. In Jonathan Barnett’s terms, state-backed land and mineral 
rights provided the supplemental means for appropriation—the background 
“access limitations”282—that underwrote the firms’ capital investments and 
thus enabled a regime of information sharing with limited reliance on 
intellectual property.283 
 
 276 See WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 18 (noting that in the late 1980s, “Mitchell Energy was in 
the process of acquiring leases on large tracts of land, so George Mitchell was, according to Steward, 
‘concerned that any unnecessary publicity might adversely affect the growth of [the firm’s] acreage position’” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 277 Id. 
 278 See supra text accompanying note 111. 
 279 Silver, supra note 13. 
 280 Cahoy et al., supra note 26, at 287 (quoting Silver, supra note 13). 
 281 Silver, supra note 13. 
 282 Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1754 (2010) 
(contending that “economically significant levels of innovation investment almost never appear without some 
form of property rights or other access limitations”). 
 283 Id. at 1814 (arguing for the proposition that, “[a]t least in innovation settings that demand substantial 
capital investments, . . . sharing regimes . . . are unlikely to persist unless supplemented by state-provided 
property rights or some other exclusionary mechanism of functional equivalence”). 
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Indeed, the quick and geographically widespread adoption of the Mitchell 
synthesis by a host of independent producers highlights an aspect of 
complementary assets in land and minerals that contrasts with the nature of 
intangible intellectual property. The spatially limited nature of typical “real 
world” land and mineral leases, plus the generally self-limiting nature of 
processes for their acquisition as purchase efforts predictably drive up 
prices,284 can make difficult and even impractical the effective 
“monopolization” of an extraction technology through purchase of leases 
covering all relevant deposits. Hence, even while enabling large rewards for 
innovators such as Mitchell, reliance on land and mineral leases as the primary 
means for appropriating innovation’s value helped ensure that rewards were 
less than fully exclusionary: rewards for the earliest movers left ample 
opportunities for others to profit from joining the game a bit later. Further, 
reliance on land and mineral leases helped ensure that rewards were 
proportional to at least one dimension of the cost and risk that a would-be 
innovator took on. 
The naturally limited scope of private land and mineral leases as 
mechanisms for appropriation of value from innovation contrasts with the 
readily extensive nature of disembodied intellectual property rights. Based on a 
stroke of the legislative pen, property rights such as patents can claim 
exclusionary effect across entire countries, and, at least partly as a result of 
several strokes of a patent applicant’s pen, a patent can have a 
substantive breadth bearing little necessary proportion to the attorney fees and 
filing costs that constitute its direct expenses of acquisition. These elements of 
contrast between land and mineral rights and intellectual property rights 
suggest that the relatively natural spatial limitations on privately held land and 
mineral rights can, under appropriate circumstances, make them particularly fit 
to support a regime of decentralized development and exploitation by nimble, 
independent actors such as those who rapidly spread implementation of the 
Mitchell synthesis. 
Another significant aspect of oil and gas leases is the developmental 
pressure that they can exert after being acquired. A typical oil and gas lease 
 
 284 Cf. John D. Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling: Tools for Learning in a Complex World, CAL. 
MGMT. REV., Summer 2001, at 8, 17 (discussing “self-limiting” processes featuring negative feedback such as 
how the relative attractiveness of a city generates increased “migration from surrounding areas . . . increasing 
unemployment, housing prices, crowding in the schools, and traffic congestion until the city is no more 
attractive than other places”). 
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includes a clause stating that the lease has a “primary term” of a specified 
number of years and a secondary term that extends “as long thereafter as oil or 
gas is produced.”285 Once acquired, such a lease can provide a positive 
inducement to develop the acquired oil and gas resources before the end of the 
primary term in order to avoid losing the option to continue producing during 
the indefinitely long secondary term. Mitchell Energy itself appears to have 
responded to such inducement,286 and it presumably was far from alone. As 
primary terms for leases appear commonly to be ten years or less,287 the result 
of such lease arrangements could have been significant cumulative pressure to 
develop means of profitable exploitation within a quite limited span of time. 
The effects of such developmental pressure were not necessarily 
unambiguously positive, however. On the minus side, once commercial 
viability was established, the developmental spur of otherwise expiring lease 
rights might have contributed to excessive growth—from a social standpoint—
of fracking and drilling activities by goading production activities forward 
even when more general social interests would have counseled restraint.288 
B. Information Sharing 
Of course, the ability of companies like Mitchell to make profits without 
patenting key innovations does not necessarily explain their failure to seek 
patent protection. If Mitchell had obtained patent rights relating to slickwater 
hydraulic fracturing, Mitchell might have made even more money, 
supplementing through patent royalties the amounts earned from an increase in 
the value of its lease rights in the Barnett Shale. Why did it not seek to do so? 
One reason might be that Mitchell believed that patent rights were 
unavailable. Hydraulic fracturing using water, rather than relying more 
substantially on fancier foams or gels, had long been known as a technique for 
 
 285 JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 336 (5th ed. 2008). 
 286 STEWARD, supra note 106, at 124–25 (reporting management approval of various drilling operations in 
the wake of realization that various lease provisions could mean “that in the absence of drilling we would lose 
more than 5,000 acres”). 
 287 LOWE ET AL., supra note 285, at 336 (“Ten years was once a common primary term, and it is still 
frequently the primary term of leases in unproven or marginally producing areas. Primary terms of from one to 
five years are more typical in states with established oil and gas production.”).  
 288 Cf. Clifford Kraus & Eric Lipton, After the Boom in Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2012, at BU1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/business/energy-environment/in-a-natural-gas-glut-big-
winners-and-losers.html (suggesting that natural gas companies are drilling and fracturing despite losing 
money overall). 
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increasing fossil fuel recovery.289 Mitchell might have believed that, given this 
preexisting public knowledge, Mitchell’s adaptation of the technique to the 
peculiarities of the Barnett Shale would not support a patent or, at least, would 
not support a patent broad enough to cover the particular fracturing techniques 
that other operators would find optimal for other formations. Indeed, there 
seems to be an impression among some commentators that, in the business of 
fossil fuel extraction, “few technologies are patentable.”290 
The posited assumption that patents were either unavailable or believed 
unavailable seems belied by the fact that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
has issued scores of patents relating to the technologies of hydraulic fracturing 
and directional drilling over the course of decades.291 Moreover, Mitchell 
Energy, Devon Energy, and other players in the early stages of shale gas 
development did not lack sophistication that might be thought necessary to 
appreciate the potential availability of patent rights. “By the time Mitchell 
Energy drilled the first Barnett well in 1981, it was the largest gas producer in 
North Texas and a diversified, publicly traded company whose business 
included not only the exploration, production, gathering, and processing of 
natural gas, but also drilling rigs and real estate operations.”292 Mitchell Energy 
was a sharp user of legal regimes in many respects293 and was specifically 
familiar with the possibility of obtaining a patent for a novel variation on a 
previously developed technique: in the 1980s, Mitchell Energy obtained two 
patents on processes relating to previously developed fluid-injection 
techniques in which a fluid such as water is injected into a formation to force 
oil in the formation toward a well.294 Thus, it seems unlikely that Mitchell 
Energy refrained from patenting its improvements on previously developed 
 
 289 See Michael Quentin Morton, Unlocking the Earth: A Short History of Hydraulic Fracturing, GEO 
EXPRO, Dec. 2013, at 86, 87, available at http://assets.geoexpro.com/uploads/31566c31-c43f-4cf1-8964-
c1406108d667/GEO_ExPro_v10i6_Full.pdf (“From 1953, water was also used as a fracturing fluid, and 
various additives were tried to improve its performance.”). 
 290 WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 3; see also id. at 17–18 (“Since few innovations are patentable 
and licensable and it is difficult to keep innovations proprietary, the best way to obtain financial reward from 
R&D investments in the natural gas industry is through leasing large tracts of land that can be sold at higher 
prices later.”). 
 291 See infra Part IV.C. 
 292 WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 13, at 16–17. 
 293 See supra text accompanying notes 114, 195. 
 294 U.S. Patent No. 4,742,873 (filed Mar. 11, 1987) (issued May 10, 1988) (listing Mitchell Energy Corp. 
of The Woodlands, Texas, as the assignee); U.S. Patent No. 4,291,765 (filed Aug. 2 1979) (issued Sept. 29, 
1981) (listing Mitchell Energy Corp. of Houston, Texas, as the assignee). 
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techniques of hydraulic fracturing as a result of straightforward mistakes about 
patent rights’ potential availability. 
 Was Mitchell Energy motivated by philanthropic goodwill? In a 2012 
interview, George Mitchell indicated that he believed Mitchell or Devon 
“could have patented [their] proprietary process and made exponentially more 
money” but that he “already had enough money from the sale of Mitchell 
Energy & Development Corp. to Devon Energy,” and he “was more motivated 
to introduce this technology into the public domain—make it public record—
so that the world could benefit from natural gas as an important energy and 
fuel source.”295 George Mitchell might well have believed this, but Mitchell 
Energy’s commitment to not pursuing patent protection appears to have 
preceded the large payday with Devon. The key technical breakthroughs were 
made by the end of 1998,296 and those breakthroughs were apparently used to 
generate natural gas for sale essentially immediately.297 This commercial 
exploitation presumably barred Mitchell Energy from seeking related patents at 
any time more than a year after its occurrence298—substantially before the 
2002 sale to Devon. 
A better explanation for the non-pursuit of patent protection might be that 
Mitchell Energy simply believed that, as a matter of pure private interest, 
pursuing patent rights was not worth the trouble. This conclusion might have 
followed from a combination of (1) difficulties in enforcing patent rights on 
processes of extraction commonly conducted in relatively isolated locations, 
out of plain sight, or even deep underground;299 (2) the potential value of 
keeping certain aspects of Mitchell’s advances secret, as opposed to disclosed 
in issued patents or published patent applications;300 (3) open-access 
 
 295 S.W., An Interview with George Mitchell: The Industry Can No Longer Simply Focus on the Benefits 
of Shale Gas, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/08/interview-
george-mitchell. 
 296 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 297 See STEWARD, supra note 106, at 123 (“Mitchell’s expansion phase of the Barnett began in 1998 and 
continued through the end of 2001.”). 
 298 See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 141 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing how, even 
if an invention’s use is kept secret, a time-based statutory bar to patenting can prevent patenting of the 
invention at any time more than one year after the invention’s “secret commercialization”). 
 299 Cf. Golden, supra note 9, at 518 (“[D]ifficulties in enforcing patent rights might . . . cause rational 
parties either not to obtain patent rights at all or, alternatively, to leave such rights unenforced or licensed for 
only pennies on the dollar.” (footnote omitted)). 
 300 See id. at 521–22 (noting surveys indicating that private firms commonly view patent disclosures as 
“cost[s] to the patentee”). U.S. applications filed before November 29, 2000, were not subject to a requirement 
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requirements resulting, for example, from Mitchell’s collaboration with 
GRI;301 and (4) developed industry norms of competition based on an accepted 
mix of partial disclosure, partial secrecy, and localized exclusive rights in land 
and minerals—norms that might have successfully fostered an environment in 
which relevant players could appropriate a satisfactory amount of value from 
their own technological advances but at the same time benefit generally from 
advances made by others.302 
These potential factors in Mitchell’s non-pursuit of patent rights merit 
additional discussion. First, there is the fact that, at least from an ex ante 
perspective, a producer like Mitchell might very likely have viewed patents on 
processes of fracturing or directional drilling as unlikely to have great value. 
Mitchell was looking to generate a commodity—salable natural gas. Generally 
speaking, innovations in hydraulic fracturing such as a new technique of 
slickwater fracturing—the sorts of innovation that an independent producer 
like Mitchell would most likely generate—would not be visible in publicly 
sold end products. Instead, such a new technique would likely appear in 
practice only ephemerally in privately deployed processes to extract natural 
gas whose most directly relevant aspects could occur a mile or so 
underground.303 Detection and proof of the infringement of a patent on such a 
technique might be difficult.304 Further, the patented technique might have 
only localized and thus significantly limited value: its advantages might be 
limited to the specific kinds of geologic conditions for which it was originally 
 
that they be published if still pending after eighteen months, but Mitchell Energy could have applied for 
applications abroad, where a practice of publishing patent applications after eighteen months would likely have 
applied. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 61 (5th ed. 2011) (“By the mid-1990’s, the United States was one of the last holdouts of secret 
applications in the world.”). 
 301 See supra text accompanying notes 195–98. 
 302 Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 359, 359–60 (2003) (arguing for extension of the study of the development and maintenance of social 
norms of cooperation to “non-close-knit groups”). 
 303 See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 304 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with 
Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 169 (1994) (noting that a patent on a manufacturing process can be 
“less effective” than on a marketed “end product” “because of practical problems in detecting and proving 
infringing activities in the manufacturing process that are not apparent from inspection of the end product”); 
Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 111, 176 (2010) (“[A]ll else being equal, one would expect that process patents are more 
difficult to litigate, because of problems proving infringement.”). 
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developed.305 Under such circumstances, the expected costs of obtaining and 
enforcing patent rights could well have outweighed the expected benefits. 
The cost of patent-law-mandated disclosure seems likely to have been one 
that Mitchell Energy would have considered. Mitchell separately demonstrated 
its appreciation of the desirability of keeping certain information secret. Recall 
how Mitchell deliberately sought to delay information flow about its 
knowledge and activities so as not to interfere with its plans for profitable 
acquisition of land and mineral rights.306 
Further, Mitchell had worked with GRI and might therefore have been at 
least partially subject to GRI-imposed restrictions on intellectual property.307 
Even if such restrictions only partly limited the extent to which Mitchell could 
seek or enforce rights in particular techniques of well drilling or development, 
such limitations could help cap the expected value of any patent rights or, at 
the very least, highlight what GRI-imposed restrictions required to remain 
uncovered. 
More generally, however, Mitchell Energy might simply have followed a 
mixed strategy of partial secrecy, acquisition of local exclusionary rights in 
land and minerals, and partial disclosure that generally served its interests and 
was also well within the established norms—the laws of economic warfare—
for its industrial context. In this context, private parties such as Mitchell had 
substantial interests in at least partially free information exchange. Mitchell 
appreciated that the sharing of information could serve its strategic interests. In 
the mid-1990s, “management recommended that [Mitchell] begin sharing data 
with other operators in hopes of increasing competitor activity to evaluate 
wildcat areas.”308 Later, a “Barnett Shale Symposium” on September 28, 2000, 
that featured “a variety of excellent technical presentations” helped stoke 
interest in the Barnett play to Mitchell’s apparent benefit.309 
Further, presumably like many independents with limited research budgets, 
Mitchell Energy actively sought valuable information from others, both 
through direct talks and through hiring. Mitchell pursued the technique of 
 
 305 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 306 See supra text accompanying notes 275–78. 
 307 See infra text accompanying notes 313, 319. 
 308 STEWARD, supra note 106, at 175–76. 
 309 Id. at 178–79 (“Following the symposium Mitchell Energy received numerous inquiries about the play. 
Soon afterwards Devon approached Mitchell concerning a merger.”). 
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slickwater fracturing in shale only after the Mitchell engineer “assigned 
completion responsibility for the Barnett,” Nick Steinsberger, followed 
experimentation with the use of a low concentration of gel with outreach to 
representatives of Union Pacific Corporation.310 Union Pacific had developed a 
slickwater technique for fracturing “in low permeability rock,” and “Nick 
obtained approval . . . to discuss their frac[turing] design and its possible 
application to the Barnett Shale.”311 Shortly before Mitchell’s 1998 
breakthrough, Mitchell also benefited from Chevron’s abandoned efforts in the 
Barnett Shale by hiring “Kent Bowker, a highly-experienced, 
unconventional-gas geologist from Chevron,” whom Mitchell valued not only 
for his innate talent but also for “his knowledge of Chevron’s Barnett 
science.”312 
Government actors or partners might have contributed to a culture and 
strategic calculus of information exchange. Partnerships such as those Mitchell 
Energy had with GRI apparently triggered requirements of “full publication of 
findings” and surrender of claims to intellectual property.313 As noted 
earlier,314 FERC, for its part, helped ensure that GRI “focused on technology 
diffusion,” rather than developing revenue from intellectual property, by 
“subtracting any royalties [from intellectual property] from FERC funding.”315 
The plausibility of FERC and GRI thereby influencing the more general 
industry culture might find support in the history of the largely 
contemporaneous “Bayh-Dole model” for university research that encouraged 
universities to seek patents on the results of federally funded research and then 
to use these patents as levers for commercialization.316 Whether the Bayh-Dole 
 
 310 Id. at 112–13. 
 311 Id. at 113 (“In the fall of 1996 [Nick, a Mitchell Energy representative,] met with Mike Meyerhoffer 
and his supervisor Ray Walker, and reviewed their well and frac data. Nick was extremely encouraged about 
the techniques’ potential in the Barnett.”). 
 312 Id. at 122–23; see also id. at 129 (“Kent Bowker joined Mitchell Energy in February 1998, and was 
given geological responsibility for the Barnett play.”). 
 313 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 5. 
 314 See supra text accompanying notes 193–94. 
 315 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 5. 
 316 John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and 
Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 120 (2001) (“The Bayh-Dole Act . . . sought to 
stimulate such technology transfer by allowing government grantees and contractors to patent inventions and 
to sell exclusive licenses for their use.”). 
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model has proven optimal is controversial,317 but there can be little doubt that 
government endorsement of this approach helped foster an environment in 
which universities took increasingly proprietary and exclusionary views of the 
fruits of their intellectual efforts.318 GRI’s quite distinct, partly opposite 
approach might predictably have nudged private actors in an alternative 
direction. 
In any event, information-sharing requirements and cultural norms fostered 
by GRI were not the only government supports for information sharing. Under 
regulations applicable in most of North America, oil and gas producers had to 
“reveal fracturing and production-performance data within 6 months.”319 In a 
world in which simply developing information about the possibilities for 
fracturing and resource recovery from a particular rock formation often 
demanded huge capital investments, competitors could be expected to “plunder 
[such data] for insight.”320 Instead of complaining that other prospectors were 
free riding, members of the relevant industrial community seem to have 
accepted the fact that such information would circulate and designed their 
business models accordingly. It probably aided such acceptance that, as 
suggested by Mitchell’s story,321 as long as a producer had made sufficient 
advance purchases of land and mineral rights, circulation of credible 
information about successful fracturing and well development could work to 
an early prospector’s substantial favor by attracting copycats who would drive 
up the value of the early mover’s land and mineral rights by seeking to buy 
their way into a winning play. 
Moreover, energy companies might have partly embraced information 
sharing because of a sense of its inevitability in an industry where producers 
typically relied on various specialized service companies to drill and fracture 
wells. These service companies, whose ranks include multinational firms such 
as Halliburton Co. and Schlumberger Ltd.,322 acted as natural cross-pollinators 
 
 317 Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (2003) (contending that university patenting under the Bayh-Dole Act might 
“hinder rather than accelerate biomedical research”). 
 318 Id. (describing a “frenzy of proprietary claiming” by universities under the Bayh-Dole Act). 
 319 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 62, at 36. 
 320 Id. 
 321 See supra text accompanying notes 275–78. 
 322 See Corporate Profile, HALLIBURTON, http://www.halliburton.com/en-US/about-us/corporate-profile/ 
default.page?node-id=hgeyxt5p (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); Multistage Fracturing Services, SCHLUMBERGER, 
http://www.slb.com/services/completions/stimulation/reservoir/contact.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
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of techniques and geological information as they moved from job to job and 
company to company, making tight restriction of certain transfers of 
knowledge likely to be difficult, if not practically impossible.323 
In short, general difficulties with policing infringement of process-patent 
violations might have combined with the overall regulatory environment, 
government policies, industry norms, difficulties with restricting information 
flow and enforcing patent rights, and the viability of a mixed strategy of 
secrecy and disclosure to make pursuit of patenting undesirable to individual 
players. At a group level, failure to seek or enforce patent rights and 
willingness to share certain kinds of information might have enabled a regime 
of relatively open access to new techniques and knowledge, an environment in 
which a great number of variegated players had an opportunity to benefit.324 
C. Secrecy and Non-Kitchian Patents 
Nonetheless, despite a substantial amount of information sharing within the 
oil and gas industry, characterization of the fracking revolution’s relevant 
technology space as an “IP-free” or “negative IP” zone325 would be mistaken. 
Although broad swaths of information apparently circulated relatively freely, 
players in the unconventional natural gas industry have long kept or tried to 
keep some forms of information secret. Further, patents on aspects of hydraulic 
fracturing, directional drilling, or associated technologies have long been a 
feature of various lines of innovation that converged to foster the shale gas 
boom. 
Generally speaking, there is some schizophrenia in accounts of information 
flows in the oil and gas industry. As indicated above, the ease of information 
 
 323 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 55 (“[M]any projects in the drilling, completion, and 
stimulation (DCS) areas are very risky and difficult for any one company to keep proprietary, since they are 
often implemented by service companies.”); see also Hinton, supra note 6, at 234–35 (observing that, although 
George Mitchell “tried to keep his remarkable success [in the Barnett Shale] under wraps to pick up more 
leases,” other independents obtained “information passed along the well-service-contractor grapevine” and 
“began leasing in areas adjoining Mitchell Energy’s leased land”). 
 324 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 270 (2007) 
(suggesting how an environment favoring information “spillovers” can generally benefit industry members 
through the example of Silicon Valley’s flourishing “in significant part because employees and knowledge 
moved freely to new companies”). 
 325 Cf. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property 
in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1764 (2006) (describing the fashion industry as “part of IP’s 
‘negative space’” because it “is a substantial area of creativity into which copyright and patent do not penetrate 
and for which trademark provides only very limited propertization”). 
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flow and difficulties in controlling that flow are often emphasized.326 On the 
other hand, as indicated above in discussing companies’ hybrid strategies of 
disclosure and nondisclosure,327 it is clear that not all information is shared. In 
emphasizing the value of federal R&D support for smaller independents, Jason 
Burwen and Jane Flegal explain that “[m]ajor companies in the industry tend 
to guard knowledge of their own innovations as competitive advantages.”328 
Indeed, the fact that processes often occur miles below ground might make 
patents difficult to enforce, but it also might make secrecy easier. Firms have 
regularly entered into consortia that conduct seismic testing and mapping of 
shales—complex processes that rely on data captured from far beneath the 
earth’s surface—with an accompanying agreement that the data will not be 
shared beyond the consortium.329 Perhaps even more tellingly, firms involved 
in hydraulic fracturing have long fought against requirements that they disclose 
details of the chemical composition of fracking fluids on grounds that these 
details are commercially valuable trade secrets.330 Whether the anticipated 
“regulatory cost” of disclosure to the public, as opposed to the anticipated 
“competitive cost” of disclosure to other producers, is decisive in motivating 
the holding of these secrets might be an open question. For purposes here, 
however, the most relevant point is that, although much information flows 
relatively freely in the unconventional natural gas industry, there is a 
substantial residuum of information that individual players seek to hold as their 
own. 
Secrecy is not the only way by which companies have sought control over 
technical innovations. One set of commentators has suggested that, as demands 
for disclosure of the details of chemical mixtures used in fracking have 
increased, firms have increasingly obtained patents on these mixtures, 
presumably because the reality or prospect of forced disclosure has rendered 
trade secrecy a nonviable option.331 Regardless of whether this is true, patents 
 
 326 See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text. 
 327 See supra text accompanying notes 308–18. 
 328 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 5. 
 329 See, e.g., Grynberg v. Total S.A., 538 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting a consortium 
agreement among energy companies with a primary purpose to “implement an ‘exploration research study’ to 
obtain and interpret seismic and other geologic data”). 
 330 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 331 Cahoy et al., supra note 26, at 283 (“Simply put, given the demand for disclosure, companies could be 
paradoxically pursuing patenting in part as a means of information containment.”); see also id. at 290–91 
(“[F]racturing fluids are the apparent reason for the increase in patent activity in the gas extraction industry.”). 
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have essentially always been present with respect to key technologies that 
undergird the shale gas boom. 
In the mid-twentieth century, patent protection went hand-in-hand with the 
early stages of hydraulic fracturing’s development. As discussed in Part I, in 
1947, Stanolind Oil and Gas Corporation engaged in the first experiment with 
hydraulic fracturing.332 By 1948, Stanolind, through named inventors Joseph 
Clark, Riley Farris, and G.C. Howard, had begun obtaining a series of patents 
on hydraulic fracturing processes.333 Soon after these patents issued, Stanolind 
licensed them to a service company, Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.334 
Monetization of patent rights was not unknown. In 1953, the companies agreed 
that Halliburton’s license would be nonexclusive but that Halliburton would be 
compensated for this non-exclusivity by receiving one third of royalties 
received under Stanolind’s licenses with others.335 
Stanolind was not the only company obtaining patents in the area. Even 
with only a little searching, one can find multiple patents on hydraulic 
fracturing processes that issued from the 1950s through the 1990s. The original 
assignees of such patents include major companies or major-company affiliates 
such as Atlantic Richfield Company,336 the Dow Chemical Co.,337 Esso 
Production Research Co.,338 Mobil Oil Corp.,339 Pan American Petroleum 
 
 332 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 62, at 27. 
 333 E.g., Well Completion Process, U.S. Patent No. 2,667,224 (filed June 29, 1949) (issued Jan. 26, 1954); 
Treatment of Wells, U.S. Patent No. 2,596,845 (filed May 28, 1948) (issued May 13, 1952); Treatment of 
Wells, U.S. Patent No. 2,596,844 (filed Dec. 31, 1949) (issued May 13, 1952); Fracturing Formations in 
Wells, U.S. Patent No. 2,596,843 (filed Dec. 31, 1949) (issued May 13, 1952) (reissued as U.S. Patent Re. 
23,733 on Nov. 10, 1953). 
 334 Montgomery & Smith, supra note 62, at 27. 
 335 Cahoy et al., supra note 26, at 289. 
 336 U.S. Patent No. 5,054,554 col. 1 ll. 41–46 (filed July 13, 1990) (“[A] fracturing method is provided 
wherein the rate of fluid injection is such as to control the growth of the fracture by packing proppant into the 
fracture tip to arrest fracture length increase and then increasing the width of the fracture by injecting higher 
concentrations of proppant.”). 
 337 U.S. Patent No. 3,302,717 col. 8 ll. 11–13 (filed Dec. 26, 1961) (claiming a “method of fracturing a 
well penetrating a subterranean formation”); U.S. Patent No. 3,181,612 col. 9 ll. 49–51 (filed July 7, 1961) 
(claiming the same). 
 338 U.S. Patent No. 3,378,074 col. 1 ll. 26–28 (filed May 25, 1967) (“This invention relates to the 
hydraulic fracturing of subterranean formations surrounding oil wells, gas wells and similar boreholes.”). 
 339 U.S. Patent No. 4,892,147 col. 4 ll. 44–45 (filed Dec. 28, 1987) (claiming a “method for hydraulically 
fracturing a formation where a fused refractory proppant is used”); U.S. Patent No. 3,858,658 col. 5 ll. 58–60 
(filed Nov. 19, 1973) (claiming a “method of forming a vertical fracture in a thick subterranean formation”). 
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Corp.,340 and Standard Oil Development Co.341 Some patents relating to 
hydraulic fracturing issued to less prominent assignees, including individual 
inventors342 or companies such as California Research Corp.343 and Intercomp 
Resource Development and Engineering, Inc.344 
The multiple technological aspects of fracking processes offered ample 
opportunities for associated sub-innovations. Almost immediately, patents 
issued on mere parts of hydraulic fracturing processes or on materials and 
devices associated with such processes. As early as 1951, Sinclair Oil obtained 
a patent on a “process for breaking soap thickened petroleum gels”345 used in 
fracturing, the point being that breaking down the gels would enable readier 
removal of fracking fluid from a formation.346 In 1952, Stanolind obtained a 
patent on “an improved composition of matter,” “an oil-in-water emulsion 
which is particularly adapted to be used in the Hydrafrac process.”347 In the 
decades leading up to Mitchell’s late 1990s breakthrough, companies and 
individuals obtained additional patents that involved a variety of 




 340 U.S. Patent No. 2,986,213 col. 4 ll. 5–8 (filed Aug. 12, 1957) (claiming a process “wherein quantities 
of a hydrocarbon liquid and blackstrap molasses are alternately injected into said well at a rate sufficient to 
extend a fracture into said formation”); U.S. Patent No. 2,838,117 col. 1 ll. 17–19 (filed May 22, 1953) 
(describing “an improvement in hydraulic fracturing processes wherein the fractures may be produced at 
selected elevations”). 
 341 U.S. Patent No. 2,547,778 col. 1 ll. 1–5 (filed July 5, 1949) (“This invention relates to a process for 
treating earth formations to increase the production of fluids therefrom and particularly to a process for lifting 
and fracturing or ‘breaking down’ earth formations.”). 
 342 E.g., U.S. Patent No. 2,927,638 col. 1 ll. 15–16 (filed Jan. 10, 1955) (“This invention relates to 
improvements in the fracturing of the earth formation surrounding wells . . . .”); U.S. Patent No. 2,915,122 
col. 1 ll. 18–20 (filed Jan. 16, 1956) (“This invention particularly relates to an improved method for 
hydraulically fracturing . . . underground formations . . . .”). 
 343 U.S. Patent No. 2,859,821 col. 5 ll. 26–28 (filed Sept. 8, 1953) (claiming a “method for increasing the 
productivity of a subterranean formation penetrated by a well by hydraulic fracturing”). 
 344 U.S. Patent No. 3,933,205 col. 1 ll. 21–25 (filed Jan. 27, 1975) (“This invention relates to hydraulic 
fracturing of earth formations, and more particularly to the hydraulic fracturing of HC (hydrocarbon) bearing 
formations, e.g. oil and gas sands . . . .”). 
 345 U.S. Patent No. 2,652,370 col. 4 ll. 20–22 (filed Apr. 20, 1951). 
 346 Id. col. 4 ll. 15–18. 
 347 U.S. Patent No. 2,742,426 col. 1 ll. 11–15 (filed July 28, 1952). 
GOLDEN_WISEMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/19/2015 9:41 AM 
1014 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:955 
specific forms of proppants,348 gels,349 “gel breakers,”350 fracking-fluid 
mixtures,351 approaches to generating holes in well casings through which 
fracking fluid can exert pressure on surrounding rock,352 methods for seismic 
imaging of induced fractures,353 and “measurement of delayed gamma rays” to 
determine the distribution of proppant within a formation.354 
Patents similarly chronicle decades of technological developments that 
culminated in modern directional drilling. At least since the early 1920s, there 
were patent claims relating to deflected drilling using a whipstock355 and even 
for a technique of drilling a horizontal hole using a guide pipe with a 
vertical-to-horizontal elbow.356 By the 1980s, there was a drumbeat of issued 
 
 348 U.S. Patent No. 4,892,147 col. 2 ll. 5–7 (filed Dec. 28, 1987) (“This invention relates to a method for 
hydraulic fracturing a formation where a fused refractory proppant is utilized.”); U.S. Patent No. 3,888,311 
col. 1 ll. 50–55 (filed Oct. 1, 1973) (“In the method of the present invention, a fracture generated in a 
subterranean formation by . . . hydraulic force is propped with . . . cement pellets or cement clinker 
particles.”); U.S. Patent No. 3,708,560 col. 2 ll. 12–21 (filed July 12, 1971) (describing “object[s] of the 
present invention” as including provision of proppants with specified properties such as “compressive 
toughness,” “freedom from brittleness,” and “uniform configuration”). 
 349 U.S. Patent No. 4,779,680 col. 2 ll. 11–13 (filed May 13, 1987) (“The gel employed in the fracturing 
process of the present invention comprises a polymer, an aqueous solvent, and a crosslinking agent.”); U.S. 
Patent No. 3,727,689 col. 2 ll. 6–10 (filed Feb. 9, 1972) (“The present invention provides methods of 
fracturing porous formations employing aqueous gels prepared by gelling solutions of certain polyacrylamides, 
and related polymers, as described further hereinafter.”). 
 350 U.S. Patent No. 3,163,219 col. 1 ll. 10–12 (filed June 22, 1961) (“[T]his invention concerns delayed 
action gel breakers for borate-gum gels.”); U.S. Patent No. 2,774,740 col. 5 ll. 8–14 (filed Feb. 12, 1954) 
(claiming a “process for breaking of gels composed of polyvalent metal soap and a liquid hydrocarbon which 
comprises adding to said gel a chelating agent of the group consisting of beta-di-oxo compounds, 
8-hydroxyquinoline, and orthohydroxy aromatic aldehydes”). 
 351 U.S. Patent No. 2,793,998 col. 1 ll. 14–17 (filed Feb. 28, 1956) (“[T]his invention pertains to a 
temporary oil-in-water emulsion which is particularly adapted to be used as a fracturing fluid in the Hydrafrac 
process.”). 
 352 U.S. Patent No. 5,564,499 col. 1 ll. 7–10 (filed Apr. 7, 1995) (“This invention relates to a method and 
apparatus for penetrating well casings and scoring the surrounding rock to facilitate hydraulic fractures.”). 
 353 U.S. Patent No. 3,739,871 col. 1 ll. 6–11 (filed July 30, 1971) (describing an invention “in the field of 
seismic mapping” “concerned with the problem of determining the position . . . of the fractures which are 
induced . . . by the application of high fluid pressures to the rock wall of the bore hole”). 
 354 U.S. Patent No. 4,926,940 col. 2 ll. 19–27 (filed Sept. 6, 1988). 
 355 U.S. Patent No. 2,586,662 col. 1 ll. 3–7 (filed Aug. 20, 1948) (“One object of the invention is to 
provide an improved apparatus for drilling an inclined or directional well which apparatus combines a core bit 
with a deflecting tool, such as a whipstock . . . .”); U.S. Patent No. 1,970,761 col. 1 ll. 1–3 (filed Oct. 3, 1932) 
(“This invention relates to the use of a whipstock whereby a bit is deflected from a course which it has 
previously pursued.”); U.S. Patent No. 1,454,048 col. 1 ll. 10–28 (filed Sept. 29, 1921) (describing “an 
improvement in the process known, in the art of drilling oil wells, as ‘side tracking’”). 
 356 U.S. Patent No. 1,367,042 col. 1 ll. 80–82 (filed Dec. 8, 1919) (describing how “an elbow” is attached 
to the end of a set of “rigid pipe sections”). 
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patents relating to directional drilling with downhole motors357 or to new 
approaches to monitoring drilling progress.358 Initial assignees for these patents 
included service companies or suppliers for the oil and gas industry such as 
Halliburton Co.,359 Maurer Engineering Inc.,360 and Schlumberger Technology 
Corp.,361 but patent rights assigned to major producers were not unknown.362 
In sum, far from being patent free, various lines of innovation that 
converged to generate the technologies behind the fracking revolution appear 
to have been rife with patenting for decades. This conclusion is consistent with 
the sense of some commentators that, “[g]iven the globally competitive and 
cooperative landscape of energy technology development, patents are 
considered a core means of protecting innovation in the energy sector, as in 
other sectors.”363 
Nonetheless, despite their availability and actual presence, patents appear 
not to have played a major role in either stimulating or impeding the final 
breakthroughs that opened U.S. shale formations to commercial exploitation on 
a grand scale.364 At least when we focus on this part of the shale gas story, we 
do not find broad Kitchian “prospect patents” to have a prominent part either in 
 
 357 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,811,798 col. 1 ll. 4–7 (filed Oct. 30, 1986) (“This invention pertains to the 
use of down hole well drilling motors . . . to accomplish either straight hole drilling or directional 
drilling . . . .”); U.S. Patent No. 4,492,276 col. 1 ll. 6–9 (filed Oct. 13, 1983) (“The invention relates to a 
down-hole drilling motor and a method for directional drilling by means of said motor . . . .”); U.S. Patent 
No. 4,185,704 col. 1 ll. 58–61 (filed May 3, 1978) (describing “new and useful improvements in apparatus for 
directional drilling” that are “particularly adapted to the use of in-hole drilling motors”). 
 358 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,160,925 col. 1 ll. 6–37 (filed Apr. 17, 1991) (describing the “present 
invention” as “relat[ing] to a measurement-while-drilling (‘MWD’) system that senses and transmits data 
measurements from the bottom of a downhole assembly,” advantages of which could include “enhanc[ing] 
drilling control during directional drilling”); U.S. Patent No. 5,139,094 col. 1 ll. 6–11 (filed Feb. 1, 1991) 
(“This invention relates generally to methods and apparatus combinations for controlling the direction of the 
drilling of a borehole, and particularly to the use of downhole adjustable tools and directional 
measurements . . . .”). 
 359 U.S. Patent No. 5,332,048 (filed Oct. 23, 1992) (listing Halliburton as the assignee); U.S. Patent 
No. 5,086,850 (filed Apr. 2, 1991) (same). 
 360 U.S. Patent No. 4,991,668 (filed Feb. 6, 1989) (listing Maurer Engineering Inc. as the assignee); U.S. 
Patent No. 4,185,704 (filed May 3, 1978) (same). 
 361 U.S. Patent No. 5,311,952 (filed May 22, 1992) (listing Schlumberger Technology Corp. as the 
assignee). 
 362 See U.S. Patent No. 4,492,276 (filed Oct. 13, 1983) (listing Shell Oil Co. as the assignee). 
 363 Kyungpo Lee & Sungjoo Lee, Patterns of Technological Innovation and Evolution in the Energy 
Sector: A Patent-Based Approach, 59 ENERGY POL’Y 415, 415–16 (2013). 
 364 See supra Part I. 
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launching the field or in coordinating subsequent activity.365 Instead, the 
federal government and its non-patent-oriented beneficiary, GRI, played vital 
coordinating roles for an industry featuring a multitude of independent 
producers,366 and the prospect of vastly increased prices for complementary 
assets—land and mineral rights—provided these private actors with their the 
dominant stimulus.367 Consistent with Robert Merges and Richard Nelson’s 
general competition-based prescription for technological progress,368 the 
competitiveness and relative nimbleness of independent gas producers—not 
broad, early-stage patent rights—drove rapid diffusion and adaptation of 
Mitchell Energy’s key breakthroughs to a multitude of widely dispersed 
drilling sites.369 
Relative to the explosion of innovation that non-patent factors spurred, 
patents played a quieter background role. Patents might well have helped foster 
a slow, decades-long drip of incremental innovation, a drip that gradually built 
up vast reservoirs of relevant technological capacity and know-how.370 But 
patents appear to have had relatively little to do with the critical break that 
unleashed the modern-day flood. The result is a story for the fracking 
revolution that, although not a truly “no patent” story, is still a tale that limits 
patents to a relatively humble role. The story is also something of a 
counterexample—or exception—to theories that patents are particularly crucial 
to fostering disruptive, breakthrough innovation.371 In the story of the fracking 
 
 365 See Kitch, supra note 25, at 267 (contending that “the scope accorded to patent claims, a scope that 
reaches well beyond what the reward function would require,” is evidence of “[t]he importance of the prospect 
function in the American patent system”); id. at 276 (noting how “the patent owner [is] in a position to 
coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent’s value”). 
 366 See supra Part III.A. 
 367 See supra Part IV.A. 
 368 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 839, 908 (1990) (“Our general conclusion is that multiple and competitive sources of invention are 
socially preferable to a structure where there is only one or a few sources.”). 
 369 See Montgomery & Smith, supra note 62, at 36 (“The development and application of hydraulic 
fracturing technology in the US has been driven by independents, with a low cost base and the critical mass 
necessary to learn and respond quickly to new developments in modeling, planning, fluids, and proppants 
technology.”). 
 370 Cf. John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent-Infringement Injunctions, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 2075, 2115 (2014) (suggesting that, in practice, the patent system’s focus might be “directed not so 
much at awe-inspiring forward strides but instead at more innocuous advances and the quiet, comparatively 
diffuse cumulation of social betterment”). 
 371 See John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 545, 595 (2013) (noting that an “oft hypothesized . . . purpose of patents is to provide a foothold for 
‘disruptive technologies’ and upstart entrepreneurs” (footnote omitted)). 
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revolution, the ready availability of complementary assets that could richly 
reward innovation—analogs of the very mineral rights that helped inspire 
Edmund Kitch’s “prospect theory” for patents372—might explain why, in this 
case, patents appear to have been relegated to such an unheroic, non-Kitchian 
role. 
V. LEARNING FROM THE CASE STUDY 
The technological revolution behind the early twenty-first century’s shale 
gas boom provides a great story of success in innovation. Decades of 
technological advances and developments in policy and infrastructure 
converged to open vast new reserves of energy that offer the possibility of 
substantial economic, political, and even environmental benefits.373 
But this story of success is also a story of human limitation and failure. 
Indeed, Mitchell’s persistence in the face of more than a decade of relative 
failure is part of what makes the ultimate success of the fracking revolution so 
compelling.374 More broadly, the story behind the fracking revolution is 
intriguing partly because it is far from a story of streamlined technological 
advance. Key innovations took decades to emerge, relied on a multitude of 
overlapping and frequently only loosely tailored governmental and private 
initiatives, and culminated in an oil and gas boom that arguably overreached, 
squandering at least some of the technological revolution’s positive 
potential.375 
There are lessons for innovation policy and theory in this story of success 
and failure. Although one fundamental lesson involves innovation’s sensitivity 
to context, a number of additional lessons have the capacity to be relevant 
across a wide range of circumstances. Part V.A discusses such lessons, and 
Part V.B explores how at least some of those lessons might inform attempts to 
foster similar technological revolutions in renewable energies or in the 
extraction of oil and gas outside the United States. 
 
 372 See Kitch, supra note 25, at 271–75 (comparing aspects of the United States’ “mineral claim system” 
and the patent system). 
 373 See supra text accompanying notes 51–60. 
 374 Cf. supra text accompanying note 13. 
 375 See supra text accompanying notes 206–14. 
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A. Lessons for Innovation Policy and Theory 
Because federal and state governments implemented a smorgasbord of 
innovation-related policies such as infrastructure development, R&D funding 
and partnerships, tax and regulatory relief, laws protecting complementary 
assets, and laws offering intellectual property rights, it seems folly to think one 
can tease out of this single case study general, universal truths about how a 
wealth of apparent policy levers can be best used to promote innovation. But 
this Article’s case study does suggest some context-sensitive lessons about the 
circumstances and policies that can nurture breakthrough innovations like 
those behind the fracking revolution. In particular, this case study suggests five 
categories of lessons for later policymakers: (1) the potential need for great 
patience in fostering transformative technological change; (2) the potential 
importance to the same end of a diverse innovation ecosystem; (3) the crucial 
roles that governments and infrastructure can play even when private initiative 
is central; (4) the possibility of achieving a productive balance of public and 
private interests through mixed information strategies with both sharing and 
proprietary aspects; and (5) the predictable need for policy adjustment as a 
technology spreads and matures. 
1. Patience and Stable Reward Mechanisms 
As indicated above, the story of the fracking revolution is far from 
streamlined and compact. As two commentators have suggested, “the history 
of unconventional gas technology development demonstrates how many 
threads of effort came together from sometimes unexpected sources over a 
period of decades before resulting in identifiable successes.”376 Stanolind Oil 
& Gas pioneered hydraulic fracturing a half century before Mitchell Energy’s 
critical 1998 breakthrough,377 and directional drilling with downhole motors 
had been maturing since the 1980s.378 The Eastern Gas Shales Project launched 
in 1976,379 and during the intervening decades, shale gas development had 
enjoyed consistent support from a combination of DOE and GRI funding as 
well as various forms of tax and regulatory relief.380 Meanwhile, an 
infrastructure of pipelines and markets for natural gas that could reward 
 
 376 BURWEN & FLEGAL, supra note 50, at 2. 
 377 See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 378 See supra text accompanying notes 87–94. 
 379 See supra text accompanying note 166. 
 380 See supra Part III. 
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exploitation of unconventional reserves continued to develop.381 Despite all 
this, Mitchell’s 1998 success came as something of a surprise, and it took 
additional years for markets to appreciate its implications.382 
The long and unpredictable gestation of the fracking revolution highlights 
that policymakers might need to exercise substantial patience in fostering 
transformative technological breakthroughs. Perhaps more to the 
institutional-design point, this potential need for patience suggests that 
innovation–reward mechanisms possessing substantial reliability over time can 
be crucial to fostering game-changing innovations. In this respect, Mitchell 
might have been particularly fortunate in being able to appropriate at least a 
substantial portion of the value of innovation through well-established 
complementary assets, land and mineral leases,383 that were relatively unlikely 
to be rolled back with the whims of political cycles. The availability of stable 
and relatively apolitical mechanisms for rewarding success might be 
particularly crucial when success is likely to be long in coming. 
2. A Diverse Innovation Ecosystem 
A second point relates to the value of diversity, diversification, and 
decentralization in innovation ecosystems.384 The federal government’s 
investment in unconventional natural gas—a field largely neglected by major 
producers385—helped diversify the United States’ “energy bets.” If, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, both the government and private producers had 
uniformly focused on still available conventional energy sources that appeared 
to be better bets for near-term, fossil-fuel production and profit, the United 
States might not have stumbled on the “winning hand” of shale gas production 
until much later than it did. The United States’ possession of a throng of 
experienced independent producers and service companies, perhaps in part a 
product of a system of decentralized private property rights in land and 
minerals,386 helped avoid a situation in which the major producers’ neglect 
would have required governments to try to develop from scratch the 
 
 381 See supra Part II. 
 382 See supra text accompanying notes 13, 110–12. 
 383 See supra text accompanying notes 276, 279. 
 384 See generally Merrill, supra note 109, at 980 (identifying “decentralization of control over resource 
development” as the key reason “the United States developed fracking technology before anyone else”). 
 385 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 386 Cf. Merrill, supra note 109, at 978–80 (linking private ownership of mineral rights in the United States 
to “decentralization of control” and openness to experimentation with extraction techniques). 
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institutional means for shale gas development. State and federal governments 
did not need to invent a Mitchell Energy. Instead, they could succeed by 
providing more marginal inducements and support for private entities ready to 
take a swing at making shale gas commercially viable. 
The crucial role of independents in the fracking revolution should not 
completely overshadow the important role played by major producers and 
prominent service companies in helping to develop much of the technology 
and knowledge that independents such as Mitchell deployed. Records of U.S. 
patents attest to multiple streams of innovation stretching over decades to 
which large companies contributed,387 and Mitchell Energy’s own eager 
pursuit of information and know-how developed by Chevron suggests the 
value that even abortive or tangential efforts by well-resourced majors could 
add.388 In short, the story of the fracking revolution indicates the potential 
value of an innovation ecosystem that supports a diverse range of business 
models and retains openness to contributions to innovation from any quarter.389 
The value of a diverse innovation ecosystem bears some relation to the value 
of biological diversity: just as biological diversity can make a species or 
ecosystem more robust and adaptable to new circumstances,390 diversity in 
enterprise forms can render an economic system hardier and nimbler in 
exploiting new opportunities. The fracking revolution seems a case in point.391 
3. Government and Infrastructure 
Part of the value of a diverse innovation ecosystem is its capacity to draw 
on the efforts of a great variety of private actors in helping to effect 
technological change. But the story of the fracking revolution also illustrates 
how government can play crucial roles in fostering and maintaining such an 
ecosystem. As comparisons with other nations make clear, even the private 
 
 387 See supra text accompanying notes 336–62. 
 388 See supra text accompanying notes 311–12. 
 389 Cf. Hinton, supra note 6, at 230 (“[T]he connection between small and large industry players is often 
as much cooperative as it is competitive.”). 
 390 See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 309 (rev. ed. 1999) (“In short, an ecosystem kept 
productive by multiple species is an ecosystem less likely to fail.”); John Harte, Land Use, Biodiversity, and 
Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge of Preserving Earth’s Life Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929, 934 
(2001) (contending that, to ensure the survival of salmon of the Pacific Northwest, “we must protect the 
diverse gene pool today so that adaptation is possible tomorrow”). 
 391 Cf. Hinton, supra note 6, at 229–30 (“With their smaller scale operations, [independent producers] can 
look for oil in quantities too small too interest major companies and can make a profit on modest 
discoveries.”). 
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property rights in land and mineral rights that played a central role in the 
fracking revolution reflect government policies and backing.392 Further, either 
directly or through publicly sponsored entities such as the Gas Research 
Institute, governmental entities provided funding, engaged in cooperative 
public–private projects, helped coordinate private efforts, and encouraged 
information exchange.393 Government raised the expected value of investments 
in unconventional resources through indirect subsidies such as tax benefits and 
regulatory exemptions.394 Finally, the federal government in particular took a 
variety of steps that helped generate a robust interstate network of open-access 
pipelines and a natural gas market, crucial pieces of infrastructure for 
producers looking to develop more commercially marginal reserves.395 This 
blend of government contributions was particularly vital for unconventional 
natural gas, a field dominated by independent producers that tended to lack the 
comparatively generous research and development budgets characteristic of the 
majors.396 
4. Mixed Information Strategies and Non-Kitchian Patents 
In suggesting the desirability of a diverse ecosystem of parties positioned to 
contribute to innovation, the story of the fracking revolution and ensuing boom 
also suggests the desirability of a diverse set of policy levers to sustain such an 
ecosystem and enable adaptation of policies over time. Further, the 
complicated and unpredictable nature of technological advance in the story 
indicates that significant technological developments might not always fit a 
Kitchian model, in which broad, early-stage prospect patents foster coordinated 
and relatively streamlined follow-on research.397 
In the case of the fracking revolution, lightly coordinated development 
through DOE intervention and GRI leadership combined with largely 
patent-free exploration of technological possibilities to help generate the 
 
 392 See infra Part V.B. 
 393 See supra Part III.A. 
 394 See supra Parts III.B–C. 
 395 See supra Part II. 
 396 MIT STUDY, supra note 175, app.8A, at 1; see also Merrill, supra note 384, at 977 (“Mitchell had 
nothing comparable to the resources or the engineering talent of the major oil companies.”). 
 397 See supra Part IV.C; see also Kitch, supra note 25, at 276 (discussing how “a patent ‘prospect’” “puts 
the patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the 
patent’s value so that duplicative investments are not made”); id. at 278 (“[A] patent system enables firms to 
signal each other, thus reducing the amount of duplicative investment in innovation.”). 
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Mitchell synthesis and its stunningly rapid diffusion.398 In conformity with 
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson’s accounts of broad, early-stage patents 
that appear to have slowed later innovation,399 the story of the United States’ 
fracking revolution thus stands as an example of a situation in which restraint 
in patenting might have facilitated technological development, although 
patents might still have played a nontrivial, positive role by stimulating the 
generation and public disclosure of a continual trickle of innovations that 
ultimately provided fodder for the Mitchell synthesis.400 The leaky, plural, 
even chaotic information environment that formed part of the backstory of the 
fracking revolution might appear hopelessly inefficient—far from the 
coordinated, duplicative-investment-avoiding world that Kitch suggested as an 
ideal.401 But this environment might have been crucial to providing 
independents like Mitchell with the freedom, information, and incentives 
needed to generate the late 1990s’ breakthrough. If obvious candidates in 
government or the private sector had succeeded in streamlining research and 
development, the result might have been substantial abandonment of shale gas 
development altogether.402 
Circumstances nurturing a less than streamlined environment for 
innovation included more than the government research and funding, tax and 
regulatory relief, and infrastructure support discussed above.403 
Complementary assets well localized in space—namely, land and mineral 
rights—played a vital role in sustaining a plural information environment in 
which players could benefit from not only their own knowledge but also that of 
others, albeit perhaps with some delay. Acting in accordance with a balance of 
competing private interests, government and GRI policies, and industry norms, 
private parties like Mitchell commonly pursued a mixed-information strategy 
in which they held some information tight but disclosed much to others.404 The 
 
 398 See supra Part III.A. 
 399 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 368, at 877 (“We can present empirical evidence that the granting of 
broad patents in many cases has stifled technical advance and that where technical advance has been rapid 
there almost always has been considerable rivalry.”). 
 400 See supra text accompanying notes 336–62. 
 401 See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
 402 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 109, at 976 (noting that, although “the U.S. Department of Energy has 
channeled billions of dollars in grants to promote new sources of energy,” “comparatively little . . . has been 
devoted to the development of new oil and gas extraction techniques”); supra text accompanying note 312 
(discussing Chevron’s abandonment of the field as late as the 1990s). 
 403 See supra Part III. 
 404 See supra Part IV.B. 
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result was a leaky information environment, free from patent absolutism, 
although not free from patents, in which a significant amount of knowledge 
sloshed about speedily and widely enough to provide players such as Mitchell 
with crucial pieces of knowledge at critical times.405 
5. Innovation in Governance 
The story of the fracking revolution and ensuing boom also suggests the 
importance of progressive adaptation of government policies as a technology 
and its scale of implementation move from infancy to maturity.406 After a 
technology has become established, private actors might no longer need 
facilitators of innovation such as tax or regulatory relief to use and further 
refine it. Further, failure to recalibrate regulation in light of large increases in a 
technology’s use can risk not only immediate economic and environmental 
harm but also a backlash that could stymie technological development for 
decades.407 Local backlash against fracking and related activities has already 
occurred, and even the city of Denton, Texas, located in the heart of the area 
where Mitchell Energy made its shale gas breakthroughs, has voted to ban 
fracking.408 
Many of the causes of this backlash are now notorious. The shale gas boom 
has a darker side, often locally concentrated, that contrasts with its substantial 
benefits. As mentioned earlier, social costs in production areas have included 
 
 405 See supra Part IV.B. 
 406 Cf. JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO BOOST 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 146–47 (2009) 
(discussing the need for regular evaluation of the value of government programs to promote entrepreneurship, 
including periodic assessment of “whether the economic rationales that justified [a] program’s creation still 
apply”). 
 407 Cf. JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 202 (2005) (explaining 
Icelandic society’s technological and social conservatism as a product of historical experience that led to the 
conclusion that Iceland “is not a country in which [the inhabitants] can enjoy the luxury of experimenting”). 
 408 See Max B. Baker, Denton Leaders Submitting Fracking Ban to the Voters, STAR-TELEGRAM (Dallas) 
(July 16, 2014, 8:36 AM), http://www.star-telegram.com/2014/07/15/5973163/denton-fracking-ban-hearing-
draws.html (“Denton is in the middle of the Barnett Shale . . . .”); Jim Malewitz, Denton Bans Fracking, but 
Challenges Almost Certain, TEX. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2014, http://www.texastribune.org/2014/11/05/denton-bans-
fracking-spurring-bigger-clashes/ (reporting that Denton’s vote “to ban hydraulic fracturing” has “se[t] up a 
high-profile property rights clash likely to be fought in courtrooms and the [Texas] Legislature”); cf. 
Unconventional Gas in Europe: Frack to the Future, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2013, at 53, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21571171-extracting-europes-shale-gas-and-oil-will-be-slow-and-
difficult-business-frack-future (noting temporary or indefinite bans on fracking or shale gas extraction in 
France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, North Rhine-Westphalia, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria). 
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chemical spills, increased crime and drug use, boomtown shortages of social 
infrastructure, and air pollution.409 Independent producers that spearheaded the 
boom have not always been responsible stewards. They can be underinsured410 
and, through bankruptcy, potentially relatively judgment proof in the event of 
environmental or human damages.411 Further, they have sometimes extracted 
deals for land or mineral rights that have later left landowners feeling 
betrayed.412 Finally, although natural gas is often presented as a “bridge fuel” 
to a better environmental future,413 the shale gas boom has arguably diverted 
effort from development of even more environmentally friendly technologies 
and has fed technological developments that have also generated a boom in the 
production of other, non-“bridge” fossil fuels such as shale oil.414 
These downsides of the fracking revolution’s aftermath counsel that 
policymakers should consider in advance how to mitigate often all too 
 
 409 See supra text accompanying notes 262–70. 
 410 See Bhavini Kamarshi, Jason B. Kurtz & Richard Soulsby, Fracking: Considerations for Risk 
Management and Financing, MILLIMAN (June 21, 2012), http://www.milliman.com/insight/insurance/ 
Fracking-Considerations-for-risk-management-and-financing/ (noting “the hundreds of small companies active 
in shale gas production with typically minimal pollution liability coverage”). In the context of fracturing, some 
insurance companies have suggested that they are unwilling to insure any companies, large or small. See David 
A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, 
Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1560–61 & 
nn.154–155, 1574 (2014). 
 411 See Dana & Wiseman, supra note 410, at 1558 (“Unconventional well operations to date have 
involved many small LLC enterprises that could be defunct or insolvent if sued years after well abandonment 
or closure.”); see also City of Midland’s Motion for Estimation of Claims for Purpose of Allowance, Voting, 
and Determining Plan Feasibility, and Request for Determination that Remediation Claim is Entitled to 
Administrative Expense Priority at 2–3, In re Heritage Consol., LLC, Bankr. No. 10-36484 HDH-11 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 256 (describing a case in which a company accepted oil and gas wastes 
into an injection well and entered bankruptcy after polluting the water supply). 
 412 Cf.  Complaint at ¶¶ 7–9, Koonce v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, No. 2012-CV-136 (Ohio Ct. Com. 
Pl., Columbiana Cnty., Mar. 7, 2012) (a complaint in which plaintiffs alleged that “[t]he leasing strategy 
utilized by Defendant Chesapeake, including Anschutz, is to dispense land agents that canvass specific 
counties or townships with the intent of persuading landowners to enter into oil and gas leases” and that “land 
agents concealment, failure to disclose, and/or active misrepresentation of material facts, resulted in many 
landowners entering into oil and gas leases in which they received less than 1% of the fair market value for the 
up-front Signing Bonus payments that are currently being paid in Columbiana County”). The Defendant’s 
removed this case to the Northern District of Ohio on March 27, 2012. See Notice of Removal, Koonce v. 
Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, No. 4:12-CV-00736-JRA (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2012), ECF No. 1. 
 413 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Destination, 32 UTAH 
ENVTL. L. REV. 245 (2012). But see Russell Gold, The Siren Song of Natural Gas, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577301111353242458.html (“[T]he bridge is 
looking longer and longer, spanning decades into the future.”).  
 414 For a comparison of air emissions from natural gas, coal, and oil—showing lower emissions from 
natural gas for many pollutants—see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 59, at 58 tbl.2. 
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predictable dislocation and damage from the widespread adoption of new 
technologies. Although governments cannot be expected to anticipate all the 
positive or negative effects of innovation, accumulated experience should 
enable governments to recognize that booms in resource extraction will likely 
have negative impacts and therefore should be monitored with care.415 In the 
case of the shale gas boom, state and federal governments’ adaptation of 
regulation to the new scale of shale-gas related activities has sometimes lagged 
frustratingly behind the times. Even now, the federal government has failed to 
invest in a national cost–benefit analysis for unconventional gas 
development.416 To facilitate greater responsiveness to a gathering boom, 
government might helpfully act anticipatorily—for example, by equipping 
pre-boom packages of tax or regulatory relief with sunset provisions, 
requirements of regular regulatory review, or activity-level triggers that ratchet 
relief downward or require revisitation of its intensity as the scope of relevant 
activities escalates. In such ways, the government might more effectively 
induce reconsideration and adjustment of policies as circumstances change, 
thereby perhaps preventing the polity from blithely riding the wave of a boom 
until a potentially excessive backlash results. 
Innovation in governance might also require attention to the peculiarities of 
a particular technological innovation or its implementation. The nature of new 
technologies and their modes of exploitation might demand more than 
straightforward adjustment of existing regulation in light of growth in the 
volume or intensity of related activities. For example, tax structures might need 
qualitative revision to generate funds needed to address localized impacts on 
physical infrastructure, social services, or the environment. In areas 
experiencing an economic boom, restrictions on local or state tax increases can 
complicate the task of collecting revenue to maintain local roads.417 Moreover, 
 
 415 See Wiseman, supra note 262 (suggesting that governments regulating an activity should anticipate 
that the activity might expand in scale and should implement mechanisms to address resulting impacts, such as 
provisions for automatically ratcheting up agency enforcement staff). 
 416 Reports commissioned by the DOE concluded that natural gas exports are in the public interest, but it 
did not conduct a nationwide analysis of all costs and benefits of all unconventional gas development. NERA 
ECON. CONSULTING, MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LNG EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES (2012), 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/nera_lng_report.pdf; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, EFFECTS OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS (2012), 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/fe_eia_lng.pdf. 
 417 Ana Campoy, Drilling Strains Rural Roads: Counties Struggle to Repair Damage from Heavy Trucks 
in Texas Energy Boom, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2012, at A3, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10000872396390444840104577551223860569402 (“Texas laws effectively limit tax-revenue increases [for 
county governments] to less than 8% a year . . . .”); cf. SEAN O’LEARY, W. VA. CTR ON BUDGET & POLICY, 
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as operators increasingly drill long laterals, the average environmental impact 
of individual wellheads could rise with the average amount of oil or gas 
flowing out of each wellhead. Taxes allocated on a per-wellhead basis might 
need adjustment to tie resulting revenues more closely to actual production or 
expected environmental impacts.418 In short, the fracking revolution and 
ensuing boom might require short- and long-term rethinking of how drilling 
activities are taxed. 
The rise of an activity dominated by independents—as hydraulic fracturing 
and horizontal drilling of unconventional resources have generally been419—
also might call for more careful or innovative regulation in light of 
independents’ potentially higher discount rates and potentially greater 
tendencies to take risks that could generate serious, long-term environmental 
externalities.420 Some of the very characteristics that make independents well 
 
POLICY BRIEF: IMPACTS OF GAS DRILLING IN WETZEL COUNTY 9 (2014), http://www.wvpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Impacts-of-Drilling-in-Wetzel-County.pdf (“[I]n Arkansas, the Highway and 
Transportation Department found that the damage caused to state highways by drilling-related traffic will cost 
$218.7 million to repair, but the Department has only received one-seventh of that amount from the increase in 
severance tax revenue.”). 
 418 Many states already have severance taxes that are tied to the value of oil and gas produced. See 
Jacquelyn Pless, Oil and Gas Severance Taxes: States Work to Alleviate Fiscal Pressures Amid the Natural 
Gas Boom, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/oil-and-gas-
severance-taxes.aspx (comparing current state severance taxes). Pennsylvania, on the other hand, recently 
implemented an impact fee that is based on the number of wells “spud” (drilled). See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2302–2315, 3501–3504 (West, Westlaw current through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (providing for an unconventional 
gas well fee and its distribution). Although the implementation of a tax based on the number of wells could 
have reflected a political compromise rather than a genuine effort to address impacts (Pennsylvania’s governor 
resisted a severance tax, fearing that it would discourage production), it also could have reflected a belief that 
properly designed per-wellhead taxes better address impacts, or do so more accurately than taxes on 
production. See id. §§ 2302–2315; Susan Phillips, Corbett Says Taxing Natural Gas May Be a Future Option, 
STATEIMPACT (Oct. 13, 2014, 11:05 AM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/10/13/corbett-says-
taxing-natural-gas-may-be-a-future-option/ (“Corbett continues to oppose this [severance] tax for now, saying 
it would cut too much into the drillers bottom line, causing them to move out of state.”).  
 419 See supra note 178 and accompanying text; see also Collin Eaton, Big Oil Comes Up Short in Shale, 
FUELFIX (Apr. 13, 2014, 2:13 AM), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2014/04/13/big-oil-comes-up-short-in-shale/ (“In 
terms of acreage in the three biggest shale-oil plays, small players outweigh the majors 5-to-1, according to a 
FuelFix analysis of data compiled by Bloomberg.”).  
 420 See supra notes 409–12 and accompanying text. In this more mature stage of the oil and gas boom, 
many of the current producers, whether technically qualifying as independents or not, are in fact relatively 
large companies, but smaller companies remain important players. See Dana & Wiseman, supra note 410, at 
1558 n.140 (describing the dominance of a small number of large companies in the Marcellus Shale play but 
the continued importance of small entities and the importance of subcontractors); see also Statewide Data 
Downloads by Reporting Period, PENN. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION OIL & GAS REPORTING, https://www. 
paoilandgasreporting.state.pa.us/publicreports/Modules/DataExports/DataExports.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 
2015) (agree to informational statement, select hyperlink “CSV” under “Production” for “Jan-Jun 2014 
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suited to bringing about a boom in the exploitation of an unconventional 
resource might make them questionable long-term stewards. Further, even 
when producers are relatively large and stable companies, inadequate oversight 
of contractors and subcontractors that themselves lack expectations of 
long-term ties to communities can lead to similar concerns. Although the 
environmental performance of vertically integrated energy majors has been far 
from perfect,421 such companies, which likely expect to be in business for 
decades, might often recognize potential savings of cost and risk from good 
environmental practices422 and can have substantial interests both in general 
reputation423 and, more concretely, in maintaining good social standing with 
communities whose support or acquiescence is necessary to enable long-term 
production, including the drilling and fracturing of more wells or reworking of 
wells as production declines.424 In contrast, smaller actors whose independent 
existence is more precarious might often be expected to lack equally strong 
forward-looking incentives. 
B. Applications Abroad and to Other Technologies 
As indicated above, the meaning and meaningfulness of lessons drawn 
from the United States’ fracking revolution are context dependent. 
 
(Unconventional Wells)”) (showing that comparatively large producers like Chesapeake operate the largest 
numbers of wells, with Chesapeake operating approximately 858 wells out of 7707, Chevron operating 390 
wells, and XTO operating 239 wells). 
 421 Cf. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEPWATER: 
THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 90 (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf 
(concluding that “[a] blowout in deepwater was not a statistical inevitability” and blaming the blowout at the 
Deepwater Horizon’s Macondo well on management failures of BP and its contractors). 
 422 Jennifer L. Molnar & Ida Kubiszewski, Managing Natural Wealth: Research and Implementation of 
Ecosystem Services in the United States and Canada, 2 ECOSYSTEM SERVS. 45, 52 (2012) (“Whether a local 
US or Canadian company or multi-national firm, corporations rely on ecosystem services to maintain their 
bottom line, including by providing raw materials, protecting facilities from natural disasters, and regulating 
regional or global climate.”). 
 423 Beware the Angry Birds: In the Social-Media Age, Bosses’ Careers Are More Vulnerable Than Ever, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21623676-social-media-age-bosses-
careers-are-more-vulnerable-ever-beware-angry-birds (contending that “[t]he stock market is more sensitive to 
reputational disasters than ever before,” and reporting that “[a] 2013 survey of 300 executives about the risks 
facing their companies by Deloitte, a consulting firm, put reputational ones at the top”). 
 424 See DIAMOND, supra note 407, at 360 (discussing “reasons why Chevron and the handful of other big 
international oil companies have been taking environmental issues seriously”); cf. Molnar & Kubiszewski, 
supra note 422, at 52 (observing that maintenance of “ecosystem health” can decrease costs and risk for 
relevant companies and can also have “indirect connections [to companies’ bottom lines], including through a 
company’s license to operate in a landscape, brand reputation, or community relations”). 
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Nonetheless, a number of the lessons might helpfully inform efforts to advance 
other technologies or, to the extent desirable, to advance the spread of the 
fracking revolution abroad. 
1. International Transfer 
Up to this point, the United States has almost singlehandedly led the 
fracking revolution,425 but there are abundant fuel-rich shale formations 
worldwide,426 and many countries are looking to exploit them.427 Foreign 
companies have attempted to gain access to U.S. know-how by investing 
heavily in companies operating in the United States428 and by forming joint 
ventures with U.S. companies429—both approaches serving as potential means 
to gain technologies and skills that might apply to formations abroad.430 But 
although foreign shale gas development will not require reinvention of the 
most basic aspects of the fracking revolution, it will likely demand significant 
additional innovation as producers confront different sets of geologies, local 
environments, and resource constraints. 
In overcoming likely technical obstacles to a shale gas boom abroad, 
foreign countries might benefit from the lessons discussed in Part V.A. In 
particular, they might facilitate their own fracking revolutions by adopting 
policies to support a diverse innovation ecosystem, to provide a 
correspondingly broad array of government supports for innovation, and to 
 
 425 Jeff McMahon, Six Reasons Fracking Has Flopped Overseas, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2013/04/07/six-reasons-fracking-has-flopped-overseas/ (“Shale gas 
deposits have been found in Poland, Argentina, China, Great Britain and other countries, but only the United 
States has fracked its shale gas into a national energy boom.”). 
 426 Shale Oil and Gas Resources are Globally Abundant, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14431 (reporting data indicating that shales contain 32% of 
the world’s wet natural gas reserves). 
 427 See Editorial, OPEC Versus the Shale Revolution, BUS. TIMES SING., May 29, 2013 (noting that 
“Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Estonia and Russia, among others,” are “tapping into shale”). 
 428 See Foreign Investors Play Large Role in U.S. Shale Industry, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 8, 
2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10711 (showing that “[j]oint ventures by foreign 
companies accounted for 20%” of all investment in U.S. shale plays between 2008 and 2012). 
 429 John Kemp, U.S. Fracking Giant Goes to China, REUTERS, June 11, 2014, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/china-shalegas-idUSL5N0OS3QF20140611  (reporting on “a joint 
venture between FTS International and Sinopec”); id. (noting that “Helmerich & Payne, one of the largest 
drillers in North America,” would “transfer 10 of its modern FlexRigs to exploit Argentina’s Vaca Muerta 
shale under a five-year contract with state-owned YPF, which has teamed up with Chevron”). 
 430 See Foreign Investors Play Large Role in U.S. Shale Industry, supra note 428 (noting that “foreign 
companies gain experience in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing” by investing in joint ventures with 
U.S. companies). 
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encourage mixed strategies for information management that allow substantial 
incentives for innovation to coexist with information flows and spillovers. But 
a variety of constraints, including constraints of politics and culture, might 
make it difficult for other countries to follow the United States’ example. Most 
notably, the United States is an outlier in the extent to which its mineral rights 
are privately owned.431 Other countries’ minerals are generally state owned, 
and state ownership and regulation can be a hurdle to establishing a diverse 
and decentralized environment of industry players.432 
China is an illustrative case. China has been estimated to have the largest 
shale gas reserves of any country.433 But much of its known shale gas is 
located in mountainous areas,434 where transporting water to wells for 
fracturing might be difficult. Further, the geology of the shales differs from 
that of typical U.S. sites435 in ways that tend to complicate resource 
extraction.436 Moreover, as a nation, China is already much more water 
stressed than the United States.437 These and other conditions suggest a need 
for further innovation in relatively underdeveloped techniques of waterless 
fracturing.438 New pipeline infrastructure also will be required, thus suggesting 
the need for large infrastructural investments similar to those made in the 
United States.439 
 
 431 Merrill, supra note 109, at 977 (observing that the “United States is something of an outlier” in “that 
mineral rights in the United States are predominantly privately owned”). 
 432 See id. at 977–78 (noting that “[m]ost other countries follow the rule that subsurface minerals belong 
to the state” and thus have access to minerals “controlled by a centralized bureaucracy”). 
 433 David Biello, Can Fracking Clean China’s Air and Slow Climate Change?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-fracking-clean-chinas-air-and-slow-climate-change/ (“By any 
estimate, China appears to have the largest reserves of shale gas in the world.”). 
 434 Catherine T. Yang, China Drills Into Shale Gas, Targeting Huge Reserves Amid Challenges, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 8, 2012, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/08/120808-china-shale-
gas/. 
 435 See id. (noting differences in clay content). 
 436 Biello, supra note 433 (“[T]he geology itself is more challenging [in China] than in the U.S.”). 
 437 DIAMOND, supra note 407, at 364 (“By world standards, China is poor in fresh water, with a quantity 
per person only one-quarter of the world average value.”); Yang, supra note 434. 
 438 See Stephen Rassenfoss, In Search for the Waterless Fracture, J. PETROLEUM TECH., June 2013, 
available at http://www.mydigitalpublication.com/article/In+Search+Of+The+Waterless+Fracture/1408907/0/ 
article.html (“For now, the only practical waterless options are hydraulic fracturing using oil and natural gas 
liquids (NGL) most of it in a select group of formations in Canada, where adding water has long been thought 
to reduce gas production.”). 
 439 See Yang, supra note 434 (“China lacks the extensive pipeline network that has enabled the United 
States to so quickly bring its new natural gas bounty to market.”). 
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China also faces challenges in developing an innovation ecosystem as 
diverse and vibrant as that in the United States. China’s efforts to dramatically 
increase its shale gas production might test the limits of what state-led 
development through giant companies such as Sinopec440 can accomplish. 
Although development by state-owned firms might facilitate financing and 
favorable regulatory treatment, excessive reliance on large energy companies 
might stifle creativity and make it difficult for China to replicate the U.S. 
fracking revolution’s success.441 China is trying to counter this concern by 
permitting non-state-owned companies to engage in shale gas exploration and 
by lightening the regulatory grip on prices for shale gas.442 Other countries 
following the typical global model of state ownership of mineral resources and 
development of those resources by a limited number of large companies443 
might need to take similar steps.444 
With respect to regulatory adaptation, state ownership and development 
dominated by large companies might make matters easier by facilitating 
responsiveness to changes in government policy but could also make matters 
worse by increasing the risk of regulatory capture that prevents favorable 
changes in government policy from occurring. Regardless, lessons from 
negative environmental and social consequences of the United States’ oil and 
gas boom might place foreign countries at a comparative regulatory advantage. 
For example, today’s greater awareness of the potential environmental and 
seismic effects of extraction-related activities could enable regulators abroad to 
require better care in their initial deployment, especially in areas of known 
environmental or seismic sensitivity.445 
 
 440 See Eric Ng, Sinopec Leads China’s Shale Gas Revolution With Successful Drilling, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Apr. 24, 2014, 2:37 AM), http://www.scmp.com/business/commodities/article/1495391/ 
sinopec-leads-chinas-shale-gas-revolution-successful-drilling. 
 441 See supra Part III. 
 442 Biello, supra note 433 (“The Chinese are also attempting to mimic the U.S. in allowing companies 
other than the state-owned oil giants to begin exploring for shale gas, legally designating the resource as one 
that can be independently mined.”). 
 443 See Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum 
Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT’L L.J. 13, 30–32 (1989) (discussing typical forms of agreements for development 
of state-owned mineral resources). 
 444 Cf. Shale Gas in Mexico: On Shaky Ground, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2014, http://www.economist.com/ 
news/americas/21601518-mexicos-prospective-shale-boom-will-be-long-time-coming-shaky-ground 
(reporting on Mexican efforts to implement “a constitutional overhaul . . . which, for the first time in 75 years, 
lets private companies drill for hydrocarbons”). 
 445 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF CANADIAN ACADS., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF SHALE GAS EXTRACTION IN 
CANADA 18–19 (2014), http://www.scienceadvice.ca/uploads/eng/assessments%20and%20publications 
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In short, other countries might have difficulty replicating the United States’ 
success in generating a shale gas boom and will likely succeed only if they can 
successfully adjust the United States’ formula to their particular circumstances. 
But as seen with China, countries are already trying to benefit from the 
fracking revolution’s positive and negative lessons. 
2. Renewable Energy 
Lessons from the fracking revolution can also have value in other energy 
sectors. The policies that helped spur the shale gas boom have particular 
relevance in technology areas that face a similar set of hurdles and 
opportunities. No field may fit this set of circumstances better than renewable 
energy. Indeed, just as skepticism of the commercial viability of shale gas long 
caused oil and gas majors to eschew its development,446 many critics currently 
discount the economic prospects of renewables.447 But the story of the fracking 
revolution teaches us that, whatever the validity of such discounting with 
respect to renewables’ immediate economic prospects, policymakers should 
not consider it conclusive for the longer term. As with shale gas, wind and 
solar technologies have the potential to fundamentally alter world energy 
markets and provide rich, long-term economic and environmental benefits.448 
But like shale gas, wind and solar technologies will require a proper array of 
supporting factors to experience a transformative boom. 
 
%20and%20news%20releases/shale%20gas/shalegas_fullreporten.pdf (noting that certain underexplored 
Canadian shales are in environmentally sensitive forests or agriculturally productive regions); Biello, supra 
note 433 (noting that areas such as China’s Sichuan Province “are already prone to earthquakes”). 
 446 See Hinton, supra note 6, at 234 (noting that, whereas Mitchell Energy persisted in efforts “to produce 
gas from a type of rock that most people thought was commercially hopeless,” “[m]ajor companies had long 
since decided that there were far better places for exploration than north Texas”).  
 447 See, e.g., PHILLIP BROWN & GENE WHITNEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41954, U.S. RENEWABLE 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION: RESOURCES AND CHALLENGES 1, 38–39 (2011), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R41954.pdf (entertaining the possibility of renewables proving at least partly feasible, but noting, but 
noting the existence of various “deployment barriers,” including “cost,” demand for “significant quantities of 
materials and other natural resources,” and the need for “investments in specialized infrastructure”); cf. A 
Sharper Focus On the Bottom Line, SHELL (June 2014), http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/ 
speeches-and-articles/articles/sharper-focus-on-the-bottom-line.html (quoting Shell CEO Ben van Beurden as 
saying, “When it comes to solar and wind, we’ve tried to be successful but it did not work for a company with 
our particular skills and expertise”). 
 448 See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS: WORLD ENERGY 
OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT ON UNCONVENTIONAL GAS 91 (2012), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ 
media/weowebsite/2012/goldenrules/WEO2012_GoldenRulesReport.pdf (concluding, based on previous 
reports and more recent data, that “natural gas cannot on its own provide the answer to the challenge of climate 
change”). 
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Renewable energies have experienced substantial progress, both in terms of 
technological development and technology adoption,449 but they have not yet 
experienced the sort of great leap forward that yielded the shale gas boom. 
This has been true in the United States despite the fact that renewable energies 
have enjoyed significant government support, in substantial ways comparable 
to, if not greater than, the support directed toward development of shale gas 
during the thirty years from the mid-1970s creation of DOE and GRI to the 
start of the shale gas boom.450 Government entities like the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory have long spearheaded projects similar to those 
of the Gas Research Institute or DOE in relation to shale gas, including the 
extensive mapping of areas with abundant sunlight and wind451 and the 
formation of public–private partnerships to push forward relevant 
technologies.452 Renewables have also received tax relief such as a production 
tax credit.453 Likewise, they have been targeted for regulatory relief, perhaps 
most prominently through efforts to speed processes of government permitting 
and approval.454 Finally, renewable-energy developers have access to a private 
property rights system not entirely dissimilar to that which enabled shale gas 
developers to appropriate value by buying and selling complementary assets: 
renewable-energy developers can buy land and perhaps also air rights that, at 
least in theory, could be made more valuable through innovations that make 
wind or solar technologies more profitable. 
 
 449 Cf. Wind Industry Installs Almost 5,300 MW of Capacity in December, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9931 (showing that in 2008, 2009, and 2012, 
there were more installations of new wind energy capacity than of any other form of electric generating 
capacity, including natural gas). 
 450 But see Melissa Powers, Sustainable Energy Subsidies, 43 ENVTL. L. 211, 214 (2013) (“[H]istorical 
fossil fuel subsidies eclipse recent government support for renewable energy.”). 
 451 See Dynamic Maps, GIS Data, and Analysis Tools, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www. 
nrel.gov/gis/maps.html (last modified Feb. 18, 2015). 
 452 Working with Us, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/wind/working_with.html 
(last modified Feb. 3, 2015) (discussing public–private efforts “to research, design, and build advanced wind 
energy technologies”). 
 453 E.g., American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, tit. IV, §§ 406(a), 407(a), 126 Stat. 
2313, 2340–41. 
 454 See, e.g., Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. 
72,440 (Dec. 5, 2012) (codified as 25 C.F.R. § 162 (2014)) (simplifying leasing of federal land); Renewable 
Energy Development by the Department of the Interior, Order No. 3285 (Feb. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.drecp.org/whatisdrecp/docs/DOI_Secretarial_Order_3285_A1.pdf (creating a task force to speed 
the renewable-energy permitting); Overview: Offshore Wind Energy Development off the Atlantic Coast, U.S. 
DEP’T OF INTERIOR (2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/02-07-10-wea-fact-sheet.pdf 
(announcing the “Smart from the Start Initiative” to help speed up the process of approving offshore wind 
projects). 
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But government support has not always been steady or effective. Patience 
and stable sources of support like those enjoyed in the lead-up to the fracking 
revolution have often been lacking. Tax relief for renewables has been 
notoriously fickle,455 frustrating efforts to foster the sort of sustained 
dedication to resource development that marked Mitchell Energy’s long toil in 
the Barnett Shale.456 Moreover, even under a somewhat streamlined system for 
renewable-energy approvals, the bureaucracy associated with development 
approval has often seemed to move too slowly, inviting Jeffrey Thaler’s 
description of relevant government agents as “fiddling as the world floods and 
burns.”457 
Moreover, private property rights in land and air have so far proven less 
useful as complementary assets to promote innovation. In the case of wind 
energy, this is perhaps in part because, in contrast to states’ general treatment 
of mineral rights,458 state governments have largely prevented the effective 
severance of air rights from rights in the land’s surface.459 A more general 
problem might be that, in contrast to rights in previously unknown or 
non-extractable minerals, the relevant surface and air rights already have many 
existing valuable uses and thus have a value to which positive developments in 
wind and solar energy will likely add only incrementally. In contrast, a 
technological development that makes an underground mineral newly 
extractable might turn previously worthless mineral rights into an effective 
gold mine, the result being a much more substantial return on the innovator’s 
investment. Without a prospect for such a high rate of return, private land and 
air rights might be a comparatively ineffective means of appropriating value in 
renewable-energy innovation. Although some owners of land or air rights 
 
 455 See Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 1679, 1691–93 (2012) (describing the ups and downs of the production tax credit for renewable energy). 
 456 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES: STATUS, PROSPECTS, AND 
IMPEDIMENTS 12–13 (2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/download.php?record_id=12619# (highlighting 
the need for “sustained, consistent, long-term policies that provide for production tax credits, market 
incentives . . . to support significant growth of the market for renewable electricity”). 
 457 Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change Urgently Requires a 
Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 42 ENVTL. L. 1101 (2012). 
 458 See John Lowe, The Easement of the Mineral Estate for Surface Use: An Analysis of its Rationale, 
Status, and Prospects, 39 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 4-1, 4-3 (1993) (noting courts’ grant of “broad application 
to the general rule that the mineral owner or lessee has an implied right to use the surface”). 
 459 But cf. Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind Law, 5 TEX. J. 
OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 165 (2010) (noting that Texas wind developers are in some cases obtaining only air 
rights and that Texas courts will likely apply the reasonable use doctrine from oil and gas to the wind energy 
context). 
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might be able to obtain high returns,460 these happy results might be 
significantly less common than for owners of rights in minerals. 
In any event, even if renewable-energy development were supported by 
complementary assets comparable to mineral rights, renewable-energy 
developers would face substantial infrastructure and market-access difficulties 
reminiscent of those facing independent natural gas producers before the 
1970s.461 The first and most significant problem for renewable-energy 
development comes in the form of inadequate transmission infrastructure. Just 
as operators drilling for natural gas once lacked sufficient access to interstate 
pipelines, renewable-energy developers face high hurdles in the form of 
continuing transmission constraints. Many of the best places for generating 
renewable energy are in remote areas of the United States, and developers of 
renewable-energy technologies therefore need access to transmission lines 
connecting their project sites to places of substantial electricity demand.462 
Unfortunately for renewable-energy developers, there are multiple 
impediments to the construction of adequate interstate and regional 
transmission lines. First, unlike interstate natural gas pipelines, for which 
FERC approves the routes and grants developers eminent domain authority,463 
no federal agency has authority over the actual siting of interstate transmission 
lines.464 FERC has ordered that owners and operators of transmission lines 
plan for the regional expansion and operation of transmission lines,465 but 
FERC’s authority in this area ends at planning. Siting and eminent domain 
power lies solely with state and local governments, a situation that predictably 
generates coordination problems. A further problem comes from the fact that, 
 
 460 See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY., 
DOE/GO-102001-1284, WIND POWERING AMERICA 2–3 (2001), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy01osti/29895.pdf 
(describing fifth-generation farmers in Minnesota who were “barely making a living” but now receive “over 
$40,000 in revenue” from a wind farm on their property, and stating hopes to have wind energy account for 
5% of federal electricity use, and estimating that this would provide “$1.2 billion in new income” for 
landowners). 
 461 See supra text accompanying notes 124–39. 
 462 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: 
A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811 (2012) (“[T]he best wind resources are often located 
far from electricity demand centers . . . .”).  
 463 See supra text accompanying note 135. 
 464 See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 
1015, 1017 (2009) (“The determination of siting—or the location of a line and its approval, including eminent 
domain authority—remains largely within the hands of state regulators.”). 
 465 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 
76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011). 
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even though FERC requires that all transmission line owners and operators 
offer their lines to any generators who need to use them on an open-access, 
non-price-discriminatory basis,466 there are bottlenecks in the use of such lines 
that at least partly reflect the coordination problems discussed above. These 
bottlenecks can result in generators being denied effective access—or charged 
premium fees for access—because they are too late in a usage queue ordered 
on a first-come, first-served basis.467 
A second problem for renewable-energy developers comes in the form of 
barriers to the development of effective national markets. This problem is 
reminiscent of the prior caps on prices for natural gas sold interstate, which 
stymied the production of natural gas for out-of-state markets, including gas 
from unconventional resources such as shales.468 Although FERC allows 
generators to charge a market-based rate for electricity in most parts of the 
country where FERC has determined that generators lack market power,469 
certain state laws and regulations prevent the effective operation of this 
otherwise open market. States determine where and whether a developer may 
build a power plant that will produce electricity—electricity that might be sold 
both wholesale (in which case FERC has jurisdiction over the transaction) and 
retail (in which case the state has jurisdiction over the sale).470 This permits a 
situation like that in Florida, where the relevant public utility commission only 
certifies plant construction by generators providing electricity to retail 
customers in Florida.471 The result for Florida is an effective prohibition on the 
construction of generation capacity directed solely toward the production of 
electricity for wholesale, out-of-state customers. Such state-based obstacles 
 
 466 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services 
by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540 (May 10, 1996). 
 467 This “usage” queue is, in energy parlance, called “interconnection”—the process of initially 
connecting one’s generation to transmission lines to that electricity can be sent through those lines. For an 
example of the difficulties of interconnecting wind farms despite FERC orders for uniform interconnection 
standards for wind, see Order On Rehearing and Compliance Filing, 143 FERC ¶ 61,050 (Apr. 18, 2013), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2013/041813/E-14.pdf (describing the 
interconnection process for several wind generators). 
 468 See supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 469 See 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (describing the existing authority of wholesale sellers to charge market-based 
rates and refining certain rules). 
 470 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012) (granting the federal government certain power over electric 
generation, transmission, and sale but not “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over 
facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce”). 
 471 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000). 
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can seriously hinder the development of a robust national market in renewable 
energies, which are often principally associated with electricity generation. 
Another market barrier to renewable energy can arise from state practices 
that cap at a “just and reasonable” level the rates that utilities may charge for 
electricity.472 Although limiting prices to “just and reasonable” levels might 
seem relatively benign, it can have a comparatively adverse impact on use of 
renewable energy, an impact that could run contrary to the public interest. 
Some states effectively preclude reliance on renewables473 by pegging “just 
and reasonable” caps to the cheapest sources of energy available. The results 
can be contrary not only to long term interests in renewable-energy innovation 
but also to more immediate public interest. Many consumers might be willing 
to pay a premium for the use of renewable energy,474 and the apparent 
cheapness of other energy sources might be belied by comparatively high 
upfront costs that rate reviews neglect, such as costs of nuclear power plant 
construction.475 
A chicken-and-egg problem can result from complications to 
renewable-energy investment, such as those fostered by inconsistent tax 
policies and unfavorable approaches to rate regulation. Potential builders of 
transmission lines that could serve renewable-energy generators become 
reluctant to build without assurance that there will be enough generators for 
their lines to serve. Potential generators do not want to build without assurance 
that adequate transmission capacity will be available. States like Texas476 and 
 
 472 See generally Robert R. Nordhaus, Electric Power Regulation: Marking Partially-Regulated Markets 
Work, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 365, 367 (2002) (describing cost-of-service ratemaking by states). 
 473 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald & Tom Zeller, Jr., Costs of Green Power Makes Projects Tougher Sell, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/science/earth/08fossil.html 
(describing three states that rejected renewable power on the basis of cost). 
 474 Lori A. Bird, Karlynn S. Cory & Blair G. Swezey, Green Price Stability, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2009, 
at 42, 42 (noting that of the “utility green power programs” offered to consumers, where consumers may 
voluntarily choose to buy electricity generated from renewable sources at a premium, there is an average of 
2% customer participation, “with the top programs averaging from 5 percent to 20 percent”). 
 475 Cf. Kelley M. Gale et al., Financing the Nuclear Renaissance: The Benefits and Potential Pitfalls of 
Federal & State Government Subsidies and the Future of Nuclear Power in California, 30 ENERGY L.J. 497, 
502 (2009) (noting that under some state nuclear power financing laws, “a utility can pass the construction 
costs for a new nuclear reactor along to ratepayers before the plant is completed by obtaining rate increases 
periodically during the construction process without regard to whether development stays on-budget or 
on-schedule”). 
 476 TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904 (West Supp. 2014); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.173 (2014) (requiring 
the establishment of Competitive Renewable Energy Zones). 
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California477 have sought to prevent such an unproductive standoff by 
identifying geographical areas having the best renewable-resource potential 
and mandating construction of transmission lines to them. More generally, a 
true renewable-energy boom might require greater federal coordination, 
perhaps along the lines of FERC’s role in relation to gas pipelines478 and 
pricing.479 Moreover, to truly replace heavy reliance on more broadly 
established energy sources like fossil fuels, renewable energies such as wind 
and solar will likely require substantial advances in energy storage 
technology480 or other innovations to address the intermittency of local sources 
of supply, such as innovations that enable transmission networks to better 
integrate renewable sources with different peak production times. As with the 
fracking revolution, patience, reliable sources of incentives, well-targeted 
government aid, and infrastructure all have important roles to play. 
In sum, governments in the United States and abroad can use lessons from 
the fracking revolution in seeking to develop alternative technologies such as 
renewable energy. At the same time, however, policymakers need to be 
sensitive to the distinct and often changing circumstances that they and 
would-be innovators face. A large part of the fracking revolution’s lessons 
about the value of policy adjustment and a diverse innovation ecosystem 
reflects likely needs for adaptability in both space and time. Ultimately, in 
spurring game-changing innovation, there is only so much one can learn by 
rote. 
CONCLUSION 
The story of the early twenty-first century’s U.S.-centered boom in 
unconventional oil and gas development is far more complex than is often 
acknowledged. This story involved a wide array of actors beyond George 
Mitchell, a wide variety of technologies and innovations, moderate use of 
 
 477 Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative (RETI), CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
reti/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (describing “a statewide initiative to help identify the transmission projects 
needed to accommodate . . . renewable energy goals, support future energy policy, and facilitate transmission 
corridor designation and transmission and generation siting and permitting”). 
 478 See supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
 479 See supra text accompanying notes 137–47. 
 480 R.M. Dell & D.A.J. Rand, Energy Storage—A Key Technology for Global Energy Sustainability, 100 
J. POWER SOURCES 2, 6 (2001) (noting that, whereas fossil fuels “are readily transportable” “energy stores,” 
“most of the renewables (except for biomass and hydro) cannot be stored and cannot be transported to the 
place of use, except by first converting them to electricity” (emphasis omitted)). 
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patents, mixed practices of secrecy and information sharing, vital roles for 
private property rights in minerals and land, and a long history of government 
research support, tax benefits, and regulatory and tax exemptions. Intriguingly 
for innovation theory, a lack of patenting of critical aspects of the Mitchell 
synthesis of slickwater fracturing and directional drilling might well have 
contributed substantially to the new technologies’ rapid adoption and spread 
through the actions of a large number of small, independent producers. 
Moreover, technological innovations specific to drilling and fracturing are 
only part of the story behind the shale gas boom. Substantial spurs to the 
fracking revolution came from a number of other technological improvements 
that emerged before or alongside developments in drilling and fracturing.481 
Government policies played key roles, with a combination of direct research 
and funding,482 partnerships with private players,483 regulatory and tax relief,484 
and infrastructure development helping pave the way for the boom.485 This 
convergence of facilitating factors provides lessons for policymakers looking 
to expand horizontal drilling and fracking internationally or to stimulate further 
innovation in other technologies, such as those relating to renewable sources of 
energy. As highlighted in Part V, these lessons include instruction on the 
importance of patience and reliability in seeking to promote game-changing 
innovations, the value of diverse innovation ecosystems and mixed information 
strategies, and ways in which governments and infrastructure can help foster 
and maintain such ecosystems and strategies. 
In the renewable-energy context, the development and deployment of 
efficient, effective, and competitive renewable-energy technologies will 
require time and patience and thus, most probably, reliable government 
support. The renewable-energy production tax credit, which Congress 
threatens to cancel annually (and did cancel at the end of 2013),486 has so far 
failed to provide the sustained and predictable incentive that the fracking 
revolution’s story suggests is crucial. A diverse innovation ecosystem featuring 
players of various sizes and types will likely be critical for renewable energy—
perhaps even more so than for fracking—because renewables have important 
 
 481 See supra Part I.B. 
 482 See supra Part III.A. 
 483 See supra Part III.A.  
 484 See supra Part III.B–C. 
 485 See supra Part II.A. 
 486 See Powers, supra note 450. 
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applications in a variety of contexts ranging from the very localized and 
distributed to the mid-sized and highly centralized.487 Infrastructure and 
government support will be equally important, and in this realm, renewables 
appear to be faring well: in relation to transmission, open-access 
requirements488 and recent FERC directives for regional planning489 are 
helping renewables overcome significant challenges. 
Other aspects of the story behind the fracking revolution will likely find 
analogs in a revolution in the use of renewable energy. Shared information can 
facilitate the implementation of renewable-energy technologies in different 
geographies and climates as, for example, the precise placement of a wind 
turbine or solar panel can greatly affect its performance. Likewise, properly 
designed complementary assets could do more to spur innovation in 
renewables if states provided more effective recognition of the value of rights 
in wind or sunlight. Even the “negative lessons” from the oil and gas boom’s 
harmful effects can be instructive. Renewable technologies can also have 
non-negligible negative impacts on their surroundings,490 and policy 
adjustments over time will be needed to ensure that renewable technologies 
realize their full positive potential. 
Similarly, lessons from the fracking revolution could facilitate development 
of energy technologies abroad. Other countries have not yet experienced the 
fracking boom seen in the United States, yet they are striving to replicate it. 
Stable, long-term support will be needed for substantial application of 
horizontal drilling and fracking abroad, as differences in both political and 
physical climates will not allow an international boom to emerge overnight. 
Lack of private ownership of mineral rights and of a preexisting phalanx of 
relatively nimble independent producers and service companies could impede 
replication of the fracking revolution in other countries. On the other hand, 
state ownership of minerals could allow for creative government partnerships 
with both small and large companies and could, as with FERC-provided 
funding for the GRI in the United States, give governments levers to encourage 
beneficial information sharing. Infrastructural challenges might be daunting,491 
 
 487 See Hannah J. Wiseman & Sara C. Bronin, Community-Scale Renewable Energy, 4 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 165, 170–82 (2012–2013). 
 488 See supra note 466 and accompanying text. 
 489 See supra note 465 and accompanying text. 
 490 Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241 (2011). 
 491 See supra Part V.A.1. 
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but lessons from the United States’ fracking revolution suggest that these 
challenges are some of the first that countries should seek to address. Finally, 
to avoid a backlash that could prevent new extraction technologies’ from 
realizing their positive potential, foreign governments will likely need to 
identify risks and to adjust regulations to limit fracking’s negative consequents. 
An additional, more general implication of the fracking revolution’s lesson 
about the value of diversity in innovation ecosystems is that a government 
seeking to facilitate socially beneficial innovation should be wary of casting its 
net too narrowly. The process of fostering major innovations tends to be too 
unpredictable and fortuitous to favor efforts to pick a small set of winners in 
advance. This conclusion might be particularly true for the area of energy, 
where there can be a risk of overinvestment and, in that sense, 
“over-innovation” in one technology area at the expense of another. As 
exemplified by the story behind the shale gas boom, revolutionary innovation 
can require decades of investment in technology areas or resources that were 
not originally viewed as significant. As these technologies are developing, so 
too must a supporting infrastructure that itself can take years to build and 
perfect. Under such circumstances, excessive focus on one technology area to 
the detriment of another could impoverish society by stunting the development 
of promising technological opportunities. 
The fracking revolution’s lessons regarding the potential importance of 
infrastructure and a diverse innovation ecosystem suggest not only that 
governments should commonly seek properly balanced deployment of an array 
of policy levers but also that they should generally seek balanced investment in 
an array of innovation targets. Although the United States might wait decades 
before experiencing another energy boom comparable to the current one, 
policymakers can look immediately for opportunities to plant the seeds for new 
game-changing innovations. As the story behind the fracking revolution shows, 
policymakers have a host of levers they can deploy. 
 
